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             ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Trust comes in many forms. Trust is, at the very least, both an act and a set of attitudes. In 
this dissertation, I motivate the distinction between acts and attitudes of trust and offer 
partial accounts of each. Acts of trust are forms of active reliance. But acts of trust (or trust 
reliance) require more than mere active reliance. I argue that the central feature of trust 
reliance is a non-monitoring, commitment condition. This condition can explain what 
makes some acts more trusting than others, and it can explain why trusting others often 
makes us vulnerable. Next, I motivate the idea that attitudes of trust come in two forms: 
propositional trust (trust that) and interpersonal trust (trust in). Propositional trust is a 
matter of predictive expectation about what others will do, particularly when we rely on 
them. Interpersonal trust, though, is more a matter of trusting persons than a predication 
about their performance. After motivating the propositional/interpersonal distinction, I 
defend a version of weak cognitivism with respect to interpersonal trust, according to 
which this attitude entails beliefs that others are trustworthy (i.e., trust beliefs). These 
beliefs are not only about the reliability of others, but about their motives for working on 
one’s behalf. To interpersonally trust is to, in part, believe that others are disposed to 
working on one’s behalf because one needs them to. Finally, I defend cognitivism against 
objections. In the end, weak cognitivism comes out looking like a plausible view of the 
attitude of interpersonal trust.  
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                   Chapter  One 
 
    INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Trust is an important part of social life. As one theorist claims, “With the complete 
absence of trust, one must be catatonic, one could not even get up in the morning.”1 Trust 
is vital at both the macro and micro levels. Trust plays a role in everything from acquiring 
knowledge, building and maintaining interpersonal relationships with others, moral and 
psychological development, to the proper functioning of society.2 The absence of trust 
would leave us paralyzed, unable to let our guards down. As sociologist of science, Bernard 
Barber says, “[trust] can be thought of as the basic stuff or ingredient of social interaction, 
as matter is the basic stuff of the physical world.”3 Some have described trust as the cement 
or adhesive holding societies together,4 while others have referred to trust as “the lubricant 
of society.”5 Both metaphors are apt; the former in the sense that trust is necessary for 
both stable social relationships (e.g. marriage) and political institutions; the latter insofar as 
economic efficiency is concerned.6 Understood as cement, lubricant or in some other way, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Russell Hardin, “Street-Level Epistemology”, Politics and Society, vol. 21, p. 519. 
2 Most sociologists who write on the role of trust in society emphasize trust’s importance to society’s 
functioning. Baier (1986) and Jones (1999) emphasize the role of trust in moral development. See Annette 
Baier, “Trust and Anti-trust,” Ethics XCVI (1986): 231-260 and Karen Jones, “Second-Hand Moral 
Knowledge,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 96, No. 2 (Feb. 1999): 55-78. 
3 Bernard Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983), p. 9. 
4 Welbourne (1981) describes trust as the cement of epistemic communities. 
5 See Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chapter 21. See also 
Partha Dasgupta, “Trust as a Commodity,” Trust, Diego Gambetta, ed., (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988). 
6 I do not mean to suggest that we should abstract the economic sphere from the social, cultural and political 
spheres. As Fukuyama (1995) argues, economies, including their success or failure, are inextricably linked to 
the character of social and cultural life within local/national economies. Societies where trust abounds tend to 
have more efficient economies.  The various metaphors highlight different ways of conceiving of trust’s role 
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trust is fundamental to our existence as social beings. Trustful relationships thus lay the 
framework for meaningful political and social cooperative ventures. Trust is the basis for 
stable, healthy and productive relationships that shape the social, cultural and political 
character of societies. Without it we would, as Niklas Luhmann affirms, “[fall] prey to a 
vague sense of dread, to paralyzing fears,” thus impeding political, social and economic 
progress.7  
 Cultivating and sustaining trust also matters epistemically, both for individual 
epistemic agents and for epistemic communities.8 With respect to epistemic communities, 
Welbourne (1981) notes, “What binds the members of an epistemic community is trust.”9 
The stable flow, including the dissemination and acceptance of information within 
communities, depends on epistemic cooperation without which knowledge sharing and 
sustaining would suffer severely. And epistemic cooperation transpires in healthy epistemic 
communities where stable networks of trust thrive.10 Networks of trust are among the 
critical elements in the process of acquiring information (and knowledge) in an efficient 
manner. The massive consumption of information news outlets communicate to the public 
daily, and the trust news purveyors must display in their sources manifests the existence of 
complex networks of trust. Without some level of trust in sources, most information 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in our lives. See Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free 
Press, 1995). 
7 Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power: Two Works by Niklas Luhmann (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), p. 4. 
8 As with economies, the  “health” of epistemic communities largely depends on social and political factors. I 
certainly don’t mean to completely divorce the epistemic from the social, which this dissertation will confirm. 
9 Michael Welbourne, “The Community of Knowledge,” Philosophical Quarterly 31 (125) (1981), p. 303 (original 
emphasis). 
10 Townley (2011) emphasizes this point. See Cynthia Townley, A Defense of Ignorance (Lanham, Maryland: 
Lexington Books, 2011). 
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passed on to the public would literally be “old news,” given the demands of constantly 
double-checking one’s sources (or their information), and double-checking the double-
checkers, and so on. On the individual level, most of what we believe and/or know comes 
by way of testimony. And the majority of what we believe via testimony we believe (or 
accept) on trust. One could argue that everything we believe (or accept) on testimony 
involves trust on some level. The breadth, depth, and consistency of a person’s doxastic 
web depend on her respective place within the networks of trust that constitute her 
epistemic community. Noting the importance of trust to an epistemic community and its 
members, Lorraine Code writes, “…[trust] is a condition of viable membership in an 
epistemic community. In fact, the very possibility of epistemic life is dependent upon 
intricate networks of shared trust.”11 So what is the nature of this trust that’s so vital to our 
lives as social and epistemic beings? Is the kind of trust manifest when we believe others, 
notably, those we know are trustworthy, the same as the kind intuitively exhibited when a 
father loans his teenage daughter the family vehicle?  
 Types of views fall into two broad categories: action and attitude views.12 First, we 
must determine under which general category trust falls before providing specific accounts. 
Action-based views identify trust as something we do, specifically, a form of reliance on 
others. Attitudinal views, on the other hand, identify trust either as an attitude toward our 
reliance on others or, simply, as an attitude toward others on whom we may rely. 
Differences of opinion abound in each camp. For instance, concerning prospective 
attitudes, some have argued that trust is a type of belief. Others hold that trust is an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Lorraine Code, Epistemic Responsibility. (Hanover, N. H.:  University Press of New England, 1987), p. 173. 
12 Cynthia Townley (2011) makes a similar distinction between commitment and views that identify trust as 
an attitude. I choose not to label my distinction this way because, as we’ll see, both acts and attitudes of trust 
entail commitment of sorts.   
	  4	  	  
affective attitude, such as a feeling of optimism or security.13 As we’ll see, I reject the 
notion that trust is exclusively an act or exclusively an attitude, a view to which I devote 
space below.  
 
   1.1 Definitions and Vernacular 
Assuming common usage is a reliable guide to the meaning of our terms—perhaps because 
meaning partly supervenes on use—‘trust’ is multiply ambiguous. This fact is confirmed in 
linguistic practice. The diversity of usage links the term to cognates such as ‘belief’, ‘faith’, 
‘confidence’, ‘expectation’, ‘convictions’, and ‘reliance’, among others.14 For this reason, the 
whole idea of offering a definition of trust is misguided in my view. Yet, there are many 
definitions to be found in philosophy and the social sciences (especially, political science). 
Just about any definition of trust runs the risk of accounting for certain phenomena, 
events, or entities that intuitively qualify as trust at the expense of excluding other equally 
relevant phenomena, etc. As Karen Jones notes, “there is no one common phenomenon 
that all uses of the word ‘trust’ pick out.”15 
 ‘Trust’ is a common enough term that its meaning hardly requires explanation. 
Explaining its meaning to native English speakers seems utterly silly in ordinary 
circumstances. Asking others to specify what they mean by ‘trust’ would likely, and 
legitimately, elicit an aggravated non-answer: “You know what I mean?” Nevertheless, like 
many other terms (e.g., “knows”) its meaning and the nature of its corresponding 
referent(s) is unclear. Entries in most dictionaries suggest the term is multiply ambiguous, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Jones (1996) and Becker (1996). 
14 ‘Faith’ is multiply ambiguous as well. As with trust, there’s much debate about faith’s nature. 
15 Karen Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” Ethics 107, no. 1 (October 1996), p. 5. 
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fact confirmed in common usage, and expressed in the trust literature.  Most dictionaries 
define ‘trust’ as both a noun and a verb. For instance, the Oxford American English 
Dictionary offers the following doxastic definition: 
n. Firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability or strength of someone or something.16 
This definition is seriously limited for reasons that will become apparent later. In brief, the 
definition fails to capture the sort of thick, interpersonal trust we come to expect of those 
with whom we share our most intimate relationships (e.g., family and friends). Other 
dictionaries define trust in terms of firm conviction (or faith) or confidence in others.  
 Moreover, most reputable dictionaries offer definitions of ‘trust’ understood as a 
verb. Consider the following definition provided in the Oxford English Dictionary: 
v. To have [or place] faith or confidence in; to rely or depend on.17 
This definition identifies trust both with the act of placing faith or confidence and with the 
act of relying or depending, which are arguably two different types of act, or at least two 
ways of expressing a particular kind of act. I will consider trust’s relation to faith and 
reliance in chapter two. Regardless of any misgivings one might have with this definition, 
there does seem to be an inextricable connection between trust as something we do and the act 
of relying or depending on someone or something. 
 To get some purchase on the multiple ambiguity of ‘trust’ as confirmed in ordinary 
conversational contexts, consider the following examples. Imagine a parent reluctantly 
loaning her sixteen-year-old daughter the family vehicle for the night despite serious worry 
about her safety. The parent’s reluctance—including, her worry and doubt—stems from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Oxford American English Dictionary, “Trust.” 
17 Oxford English Dictionary, “Trust.” 
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the fact that, like other sixteen-year-olds, her daughter is relatively inexperienced on the 
road, has a terrible attention span, has slower reaction time than the average adult, etc. 
Insurance companies charge higher rates for sixteen-year-olds for good reasons; they are 
notoriously bad drivers. Combined with the fact that this sixteen-year-old belongs to her and 
we have one worried parent. After all, the parent would be devastated if her child was 
injured and, less importantly, the family would be “up a creek” were the car irreparably 
damaged.  
Now imagine loaning a substantial amount of money to someone of whom you 
know precious little and without any restrictions (or oversight) other than the 
understanding that she remit payment as soon as possible. For all you know, this person 
might never repay her debt but she seems desperate. Your ignorance (and doubts) causes 
some anxiety and does not predict re-payment. These examples represent similar types 
where one person relies on another in circumstances where the outcome is in doubt. Now 
imagine loaning money to a close friend to whom you have often loaned money in the 
past, a friend with unassailable moral character. She promises to re-pay the money after 
receiving her paycheck next week. You have complete confidence in your friend and expect 
swift re-payment as promised just as you would allowing your spouse, an experienced, 
proven driver, to drive the family vehicle. Both types of scenario represent paradigm 
instances of trust, so I claim.  
 The type (or degree) of trust one generally displays (or places) when following the 
directions of a complete stranger is different than the kind (or degree) of trust people 
generally have (or place) in those closest to them. Both are, in some sense, paradigmatic 
instances of trust. Where complete strangers are involved, we often describe ourselves as 
“going on trust.” However, that’s not the case when, for example, I follow my spouse’s 
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directions to the supermarket. We would be far less apt to describe my following her 
directions as “going on trust.” Nevertheless, the fact that I trust her is part of the most 
plausible explanation for why I “go three blocks down and turn right” in response to her 
instructions. More precisely, I trust my wife for directions to the corner store, so I form the 
belief that it’s three blocks down to the right—a belief, which when coupled with my desire 
(or need) to go to the store, explains why I follow her directions. Why I follow the 
stranger’s directions may be a completely different matter. For I might not necessarily 
believe the stranger’s directions are accurate, despite acting as though they are.  
 We employ ‘trust’ in different ways depending on the circumstances. Without some 
context—perhaps provided by the other words in the sentences in which we employ the 
term—the word is ambiguous. One sentence that references trust can mean something 
different than another sentence that uses the same term to reference something else. 
Consider the following trust statements, each of which represents a meaningful, proper use of 
‘trust’.  
 (1) “Sam trusts that Tamara will pay the mortgage on time.”  
 (2) “Sam trusts Tamara to pay the mortgage on time.” 
 (3) “I know you are worried, but you’ll just have to trust me.” 
 (4) “Don’t trust the clock in the lobby; it’s only right twice a day.” 
 (5) “That’s the last time I’ll trust you.” 
 (6) “Tamara won’t let Sam borrow money because she does not trust him.” 
 (7) “Sam completely trusts Tamara to tell the truth.” 
The first thing to notice about each of these sentences is that they all convey the 
commonly held view about trust—namely, that trust is a three-place relation roughly of the 
form, “X trusts Y to z” (or “X trusts that Y will z”), and the corresponding, “X does not 
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trust Y to z” (or “X does not trust that Y will z”).18 Alternatively, the three-place relation 
might be formulated to say, “X trusts Y with respect to z” and “X does not trust Y with 
respect to z.”19 The first formulation of the relation suggests active reliance or dependence, 
while the second reads more passively. Truth-conditions of sentences that express the 
three-place relation will depend on the context of utterance (or thought), which in turn 
depends on viable semantic interpretations.20 
 Despite this similarity, each requires separate and careful treatment, since the 
relation and sense of trust expressed in each has a character of its own. The first statement, 
(1), plausibly conveys an expectation, indeed the belief, that Mary will pay the mortgage on 
time. The use of ‘trust’ in (2) is similar to its use in (1). Read one way, (2) expresses the 
proposition that Sam displays a particular attitude toward Tamara, perhaps one of 
confidence, belief, and/or an emotion. (2) might also convey, in addition to (or as part of) 
an attitude, an action disposition. Read this way, (2) says that Sam is disposed to relying on 
Tamara to pay the mortgage, not that Sam is at present relying on Tamara to pay it. 
Statements (1) and (2), though similar in content, express different propositions, if 
interpreted thusly; therefore, their truth-conditions differ as well. We could imagine a 
scenario where (1) is true but (2) false. Interestingly, the reverse is true only in a qualified 
sense. I’ll explain why this is so and why their truth conditions vary in more detail later. 
Statement (3), on the other hand, seems more like an exhortation to do (or not do) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Most philosophers and theorists working in the area think of trust as a three-place relation. These include 
Baier (1986), Hardin (1992), Holton (1994), Jones (1996), and Zagzebski (2012). 
 
19 Notice it does not make much sense to say “X trusts that Y with respect to z” if ‘Y’ refers to a person. 
20 I think that sentence meaning is more semantically fundamental than speaker meaning. Speaker meaning 
depends on sentence meaning, which plausibly supervenes on collective use. A speaker’s utterance of the 
form “X trusts Y to z” is therefore meaningful only to the extent that her use of ‘trust’ fits one of its 
meanings—that is, only to the extent that what she intends to communicate matches one of the possible 
word, hence, sentence meanings.  
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something. More precisely, (3) reads like one person pleading with another to rely on her 
despite reservations.21 Statement (4) is not quite as straightforward as the rest. Given some 
context, one might plausibly read (4) as both a command not to feel confident in the 
clock’s readings and to avoid letting it affect what one does—or, put in more pedantic 
terms, to avoid using information about the clock’s readings in one’s practical reasoning. 
The most natural reading of (4) is as a warning not to rely on—e.g., make plans based on—
the clock in the lobby. At best, one will suffer the fate of being Gettiered if she forms the 
belief that the time is what the clock “says” based on an assumption of its reliability.22 At 
worst, one will be completely thrown off by the clock’s unreliability. I’ll say more in 
subsequent chapters about what distinguishes these various forms of trust. The purpose of 
offering these examples is to highlight apparently different uses of ‘trust’.  
 Like (2), statements (6) and (7) relate one person to another by way of trust. (6) 
effectively says that Tamara will not rely, more precisely, entrust money to Sam, because 
she does not trust him. This sentence wouldn’t make sense, if ‘trust’ referred to an action 
Tamara performs. Otherwise, it would say in essence that Tamara does not do something 
because Tamara does not do something. (7) plausibly conveys that Sam has complete 
confidence in Tamara, and consequentially, believes what Tamara says. The totality of these 
statements reflects the plasticity of trust’s concept.  
 The definitions provided above point to some important facts about trust, facts 
confirmed in communicative discourse. Taken together they signal something to which 
most competent English speakers would assent, namely, that trust is sometimes something 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 As will become clear later, in my view, the person doing the exhorting is telling the other person she will 
have to trust (i.e., perform an act of trust) despite lacking an attitude of trust. 
22 This assumes one does not receive testimony about the clock’s unreliability.  
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we do and sometimes an attitude we take toward other people, things (e.g., animals and 
inanimate objects), and statements (propositions or states of affairs). Some trust statements 
involve expressions of attitudes, while others express a way of acting (or behaving). Most 
theorists who write about trust tend to fixate on either trusting action or trusting attitudes 
at the expense of the other. 
 Making sense of the trust literature—a literature that spans across many disciplines 
(e.g., social psychology, sociology, political science, business, and philosophy)—is especially 
difficult. Some authors define ‘trust’ as a noun, while others define it in terms of an action 
verb. More specifically, ‘trust’ has been defined as an act, (action/behavioral) disposition, 
belief, expectation, feeling, to name a few. Other authors assume the reader has a good 
enough grasp of trust’s nature that they need not offer any account or definition, 
considering their target lies elsewhere with the value, effects, etc. of trust. This makes 
reading much of the trust literature extremely frustrating. What exactly do people mean 
when they say trust is necessary for personal relationships and social cooperation as I 
claimed above? Are various forms of trust at work in one’s relationships with family and 
friends, on the one hand, and in relationships between large groups of relative strangers in 
a society, on the other?  
Different types of trust emerge when we consider that ‘trust’ applies in distinctly 
different circumstances. Intuitively, trust one displays toward others in society often differs 
from one’s trust in close friends. However, life would be much more difficult, and perhaps 
psychologically unbearable to the point of utter paranoia, if the kind of trust present in our 
closest relationships were not, at least on some level, present in typical circumstances 
involving other citizens for whom we lack evidence of trustworthiness. It’s this type of 
trust—whatever its nature—about which Hardin says that the lack of it would almost 
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certainly lead to utter paralysis. If we did not trust anyone, where trust in this sense is 
something akin to confidence, feelings of security, belief in others etc., we would likely 
never rely on others to do things for us. What’s more, if we never relied on others, society 
as we know it, including close personal relationships, would be virtually non-existent. This 
would be very counterproductive indeed. 
 Here is a sampling of definitions or characterizations found in trust literature. The 
first three place special emphasis on the vulnerability supposedly inherent in trust: 
“…the willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations about 
another’s behavior.”23 
 
“accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or lack of 
good will) toward one.”24 
 
“…the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another partly based 
on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.”25 
The next characterization makes trust out to be some sort of doing (or action): 
“Trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of others. . . [It’s a] commitment 
through action, or – metaphorically speaking – placing a bet.”26 
“An orientation that’s relevant in situations “when we have to act in spite of 
uncertainty and risk, the third orientation comes to the fore, that of trust.”27 
“…letting other persons (natural or artificial, such as nations, firms, etc.) take care 
of something the truster cares about, where such caring involves some exercise of 
discretionary powers.”28 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 J.J. Dunn and M.E. Schweitzer, “Feeling and Believing: The Influence of Emotions on Trust,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 88, No. 5: p. 736.  
24 Baier, “Trust and Anti-trust,” p. 235. 
25 R.C. Mayer, J.H. Davis, F.D. Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust,” Academy of 
Management Review 20(3): p. 712. 
26 Piotr Sztompka, 1999. Trust: A Sociological Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 25 and 26. 
27 Ibid., p. 25. 
28 Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 105. 
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“To trust someone is to act on the assumption that he will do for you what he 
knows that you want or need, where the evidence gives some reason for supposing 
that he may not, and there are bad consequences if the assumption proves false.”29 
Finally, there are a family of characterizations that identify trust with an attitude or 
psychological state: 
“…a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.”30 
“…trust is an attitude of optimism that the goodwill and competence of another 
will extend to cover the domain of interaction with her, together with the 
expectation that the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the 
thought that we are counting on her.”31 
“The declarations “I believe you are trustworthy” and “I trust you” are 
equivalent.”32  
 The preceding definitions evince apparent disagreement among scholars from 
various fields regarding the nature of trust. However, without endorsing any of them, I 
submit that in some way, each of these definitions reflect vernacular to some degree. And 
vernacular suggests that trust comes in two forms with some variation of each, as the 
meaningful uses above suggest.33 First, there’s a particular way of behaving that we would 
call an act of trust, which, as we’ll see, entails doing something and/or abstaining from 
doing things. Second, trust also comes in the form of an attitude (or attitudes) we manifest 
toward someone (e.g., a person) or something (e.g., a proposition). Attitudes of trust are, at 
first approximation, mental states (or states of mind) that do not by their nature necessarily 
issue in action.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 144. 
30 D.M. Rousseau, S.B. Sitkin, R.S. Burt, C. Camerer, “Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View 
of Trust,” Academy Management Review 23(3): 395 
31 Karen Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude”. Ethics, 107 (1996), p, 4. 
32 Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), p. 10. 
33 Common usage suggests more senses of ‘trust’ than reflected in these two forms. These senses are 
tangential for our purposes.  
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We should therefore approach the above definitions and characterizations, not 
necessarily as competing accounts, though some inconsistencies may be found, but instead 
as efforts to account for common intuitions about trust, and indeed, seeming paradigmatic 
cases of trust. To say that trust is simply this or that attitude, on the one hand, or this or 
that act or action disposition, on the other, makes accounting for all paradigm trust cases 
difficult, if not impossible. And this is exactly what many trust theorists attempt to do. 
Without treading too deeply into the debate, let me say a few words to further motivate the 
act/attitude distinction—a distinction that will guide the remainder of our discussion.  
 
 1.2 Motivating the Act/Attitude Distinction: Against the Univocal View 
One might wonder why I even need to motivate any such distinction between acts and 
attitudes of trust.34 “It’s obvious that ‘trust’ is ambiguous and that trust comes in action and 
attitude forms,” one might say. I will not devote much time to motivating the need to 
motivate the distinction. Perhaps the only motivation I can provide for offering motivation 
is that, as I said above, trust theorists often defend accounts of trust that explicitly 
eliminate one or other alleged important form of trust. Some do so without even a hand 
wave or brief acknowledgement that trust comes in many forms. Others explicitly reject 
any such distinction. For example, Russell Hardin claims that some theorists “conflate 
trusting with acting on trust.”35 Hardin cites, for instance, Sztompka (1999) who, as Hardin 
puts it, “speaks of resorting to trust” (p. 14) and of “placing trust” (p. 25)…[and of] a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 I say use the plural form ‘attitudes’ because there seem to be more than one attitude one might call ‘trust’. 
Some of the statements offered above, particularly (1) and (2), suggest the need for even finer distinctions 
between attitudes that qualify as trust of sorts. I will say more about this later.  
35 Hardin, “Trust,” p. 33. 
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commitment (p. 27)…[and as of] a decision (pp. 66, 69).”36 Call the view that trust is either 
an act or an attitude (but not both), and that ‘trust’ refers to one other the other, the 
univocal view. As the previous sentence suggested, the view crosses theoretical party lines in 
the sense that it applies to any account that explicitly eliminates trusting acts or attitudes. 
  
1.2.1 Charity and Semantic Blindness  
I do not mean to suggest every competent English speaker would agree that ‘trust’ refers 
both to something we do and an attitude (group or complex of attitudes) we hold toward 
someone or something. However, I submit that the average competent English speaker 
would read (interpret) statements (1) – (6) roughly in accordance with the brief 
explanations provided. And this reading would come almost (if not entirely) automatically. 
Granted, I’m making an empirical claim without much supporting data, though one could 
say the same for about any word that comes in both noun and verb form. Consider, for 
instance, the term ‘display’. ‘Display’ refers both to something—i.e., a show or an 
exhibition/arrangement of objects—and something we do—i.e., making a prominent 
exhibition/arrangement of something. Most native English speakers would know the 
semantic difference between “Place the candle on that display” and “I will display the 
candle.” Undoubtedly, ‘display’ is more obviously both a noun and a verb than ‘trust’.  But 
the intuitive, though not ideally substantiated point remains. I’ve never taken a poll and it’s 
likely no one else has either.  
 Granting this fairly safe assumption about the average competent English speaker 
commits one to saying either that (1) trust just is either something we do (e.g., rely on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid., p. 33. See Pior Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). The 
page numbers in Hardin’s quote correspond to pages in Sztompka (1999). 
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others) or an attitude (but not both), hence competent English speakers are “semantically 
blind,” or (2) most competent English speakers know that ‘trust’ has multiple senses—a 
fact confirmed in linguistic discourse.37 Suffering from semantic blindness in this context 
would mean that speakers use ‘trust’ as both a verb and a noun, thus, they mistakenly talk 
as if the univocal view about ‘trust’ were false because they are unaware of the semantics of 
the term. Charity favors interpretations that render speakers’ utterances sensible. We 
should thus interpret divergent use of ‘trust,’ not as evidence that speakers are mistaken, 
but as evidence both of the term’s ambiguity and the complexity of trust—viz., the 
referent(s) of ‘trust’. The most plausible (best) explanation for the evident plasticity of the 
concept of trust is that the concept is indeed as plastic as it seems.     
 
1.2.2 Trust and Doubt  
Philosophers who write about trust often note, and rightly so, that it is inconsistent with 
doubt. This purported fact will become relevant again when I discuss the relationship 
between trust and belief. Doubt does not eliminate the possibility of action. That I doubt 
you will x on my behalf does not rule out the possibility of relying on you. Likewise with 
trust understood as an action, whatever the purported act entails. Intuitively, acts of trust 
do not presuppose the absence of doubt. What’s more, paradigmatic acts of trust, at least 
some examples of paradigm acts, are performed in the face of doubt. Consider again 
statement (3): “I know you are worried, but you’ll just have to trust me.” We exhort others 
to trust us not with the hope that they will feel secure or believe that everything will work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 I borrow the phrase “semantic blindness” from John Hawthorne (2004, p. 107) who coined the phrase to 
describe the plight of most competent users of the term “knows.” Though the term was originally employed 
in the literature on epistemic contextualism, it obviously applies here.  
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out in the end, but with the hope that they will trust despite worry and doubt that it won’t. 
We could imagine the exhorter saying: “Just let me do x. I won’t let you down; you’ll see.” 
 Karen Jones claims that trust and distrust are “contraries but not contradictories; 
between them lies a neutral space.”38 The presence of doubt, then, does not necessarily 
entail a lack of trust, much less distrust. In other words, doubt does not automatically rule 
out trust with its presence. Doubt prima facie signals a lack of trust. The more one doubts, 
the less one trusts. This all seems right but only when we conceive of trust in a particular 
way, that is, as an attitude we take toward someone or something.39 An attitude is more or 
less trusting depending, in part, on the level of doubt one has concerning the 
trustworthiness of the trustee or, in cases of dependence, doubt that the trustee will do that 
for which one depends on her.40  
Consider what might incline one to think confidence and/or feelings of optimism 
and trust (and doubt) are intimately related. Intuitively, the complete absence of confidence 
rules out trust. If, for instance, I have no confidence in your ability to keep a secret— 
suppose, because you are a notorious gab—it would, in one sense, make no sense to say I 
trust you with my secrets. The less confidence one has in a person with respect to some 
task, for example, due to considerations of competence, reliability, sincerity, etc., all else 
being equal, the less one trusts that person.  
Confidence is closely related to the notions of certainty and doubt, both of which 
can be properties of belief. A belief displays certainty psychologically and/or epistemically. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” p. 16. 
39 See Becker (1996) and Jones (1996). I will discuss the relationship between trust and doubt in Chapter 4. 
40 As I argue in Chapter 3, one might predict that others will do what one depends on them for without 
trusting them. There’s a sense, though, in which ‘trust’ refers to such predictions. Doubt is in tension with 
these attitudes, which in Chapter 3 I call “propositional trust.” 
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As Baron Reed puts it, “A belief is psychologically certain when the subject who has it is 
supremely convinced of its truth.”41  Psychological certainty with respect to p seems 
therefore to entail maximal confidence that p is the case. On the other hand, a belief is 
epistemically certain “when it has the highest possible epistemic status.”42 What this means 
exactly will depend on which epistemological theories are true. My concern, though, lies 
more with psychological certainty, particularly as it pertains to trust by way of confidence 
and doubt. 
Victoria McGeer rightfully claims, “For while feelings of optimism or at least 
confidence are involved in central cases of trust, this does not seem invariably the case.”43 
Doubt does not indicate a lack of action. In fact, doubt often arises because we trust (i.e., 
perform an act of trust)—e.g., doubt that those in whom we’ve placed trust (trustees) will 
do what we need or want them to do. If doubt is inconsistent with attitudes—too much of 
it ruling out such attitudes—then trust is also something we do, that is, ‘trust’ refers to 
both an attitude and an act. Indeed, trusting in spite of doubts is something we can do 
voluntarily, where attitudes of trust, the natures of which we’ll discuss later, is not 
something we can will into existence, and the doubt in tension with it, something we can 
will out of existence.  
I trust that I have sufficiently motivated the act/attitude distinction enough to 
proceed. By making the distinction we respect vernacular. I now move to discuss some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Baron Reed, “Certainty,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/certainty/>. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Victoria McGeer, “Trust, Hope and Empowerment”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. (86), No. (2) 
(June 2008), p. 241.  
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theoretical desiderata, all of which I address in some at some point throughout the 
dissertation. 
 
       1.3 Theoretical Desiderata 
There are a few features of trust in its many forms that require explanation, or at least, 
respecting. Let’s consider a few before moving to the dissertation summary. 
 
1.3.1 Explain Voluntariness/Involuntariness 
As suggested above, an adequate theory of trust must explain why trust is sometimes 
voluntary and other times non-voluntary. More specifically, it must account for instances 
when trust is under direct voluntary control and instances when it’s not.44 For example, an 
act, is under direct voluntary (roughly) insofar as it proceeds directly from one’s will. 
Actions under direct voluntary control are things we can “just do.”45 Raising one’s hand 
qualifies as something we typically do voluntarily (i.e., it’s something under direct voluntary 
control) unless, for example, one suffers from a terrible twitch. Falling in love is decidedly 
not something under direct voluntary control but rather something that happens to us. The 
most we can do is put ourselves in a position to eventually fall in love. What direct 
voluntary control amounts to is not particularly clear and it’s beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. The intuitive idea I think seems fairly clear. I contend trust is voluntary insofar 
its an act (i.e., something we do), assuming, of course, that we ever act voluntarily.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For discussion about different kinds of control over belief, see William Alston, “The Deontological 
Conception of Justification”, Philosophical Perspectives, 2 (1988): pp. 257-299. 
45 See Richard Feldman, “The Ethics of Belief,” In Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, Earl Conee and 
Richard Feldman. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). 
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1.3.2 Explain the Relationship Between Trust and Doubt 
Next, as suggested above, trust and doubt are sometimes at odds. An adequate theory must 
explain when and why this holds. Sometimes we trust in the face of substantial doubt, 
while at other times, the presence of doubt (at least too much of it) intuitively rules out 
trust. As will become apparent below, trust and doubt are consistent in trust’s act form. 
Indeed, some paradigm instances of trust acts involve relying on others despite doubts 
about their competence (or ability) or sincerity (including, motivation), including doubts 
that they will accomplish the reason for one’s reliance. Doubt, then, must be inconsistent 
with trust attitudes. The primary goal on this front will be to explain why doubt is 
inconsistent with trust attitudes but not acts of trust (trust reliance).  
 
1.3.3 Thick and Thin Trust 
An adequate theory of trust—particularly, a theory of trust attitudes—must account for the 
distinction between what I’ll call thick (interpersonal) and thin (propositional) attitudes trust. 
The difference roughly boils down to this: thick trust involves trusting of persons, while 
thin trust involves mere beliefs or expectations about circumstances or states of affairs, 
usually about what will happen though sometimes about what has happened. Intuitively, 
trusting that someone will keep a secret is not the same as trusting the person (or trust in the 
person) to keep a secret. The trust theorist must explain why this is so. Trusting that others 
will keep a secret based on something other than an attitude of trust is in many ways akin 
to trusting that the spring will bring rain. I explain and motivate the distinction in more 
thoroughly in Chapter 2.   
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1.3.4 Trust and Evidence (Epistemic Reasons) 
Finally, an adequate theory of trust should explain the relationship how evidence of 
trustworthiness (i.e., epistemic reasons to believe others are trustworthy) and evidence that 
others will do what we want or need relates to the different forms of trust. Many theorists 
present their views in terms of trust’s relation to evidence. An adequate theory must say 
whether, when, and why evidence is inconsistent with trust, and in what sense of ‘trust’. In 
my discussion, I’ll explain how I understand the relationship between evidence and 
different forms of trust.  
 
       1.4 Dissertation Summary 
I devote the remainder of this dissertation to discussing the nature of trust in both the 
broad action and attitude forms distinguished above. Though I do not offer definitions of 
‘trust’, I will identify some important features of acts and attitudes of trust that address to 
some degree the theoretical desiderata briefly explained in 1.3. Let me offer a concise 
breakdown of the view(s) I will defend in this work. As already suggested, my view 
represents a noteworthy departure from the norm of identifying trust strictly with an act or 
an attitude of sorts. Some theorists simply focus attention on one or the other, some while 
explicitly acknowledging trust’s multiple forms.46 Others make no such concession about 
trust’s multiple forms, but instead defend a univocal account at the expense of other forms. 
One purpose of the dissertation is to rectify the situation by giving both acts and attitudes 
of trust their due.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Jones (1996). 
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 Concerning acts of trust, I contend that they are forms of actual reliance 
(dependence) that involve, perhaps among other things, a non-monitoring condition. Acts 
of trust can be more or less trusting, where the difference consists primarily in the level of 
monitoring inherent in the act of reliance.  Much of the debate in the trust literature hinges 
on the question whether trust necessitates belief or predictive expectation. Acts of trust 
(i.e., trust reliance) do not require having any such attitude. 
I contend that one form of trust attitude, propositional trust (or trust that), is basically 
an attitude of predictive expectation where we predict that someone will do something or 
that something will happen. The interesting cases of propositional trust—the ones that will 
concern us—are ones involving predictions that others will pull through for us when we 
are actually depending on them to. There is a thicker attitude of trust, though, one that 
applies to some of our closest relationships (e.g., friendships and hopefully family). This 
attitude, interpersonal trust, as I call it, amounts to trust in others—as opposed to trust that 
(i.e., predict) they will perform some task on our behalf. I argue that attitudes of 
interpersonal trust involve cognitive (thought) and affective (feeling) components. These 
components, I contend, constitute belief more generally, including a specific kind of belief 
appropriate to, because they partially constitute, interpersonal trust—namely, trust beliefs, 
which are beliefs that others are trustworthy.47 A trust belief concerning some person S in 
domain D just is the belief that S is trustworthy in D. I will not argue that interpersonal 
trust just is a cognitive state, but only for the weaker claim that it entails belief, specifically 
trust beliefs.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Pamela Hieronmyi (2008) refers to beliefs in the trustworthiness of others as “trusting beliefs.” See Pamela 
Hieronmyi, “The Reasons of Trust,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86, No. 2 (June 2008): pp. 213-236. 
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 My view differs from those that conflate interpersonal trust with attitudes toward 
one’s dependence on others. I argue for a (partial) view of interpersonal trust that, though 
related to reliance, is not an attitude toward, or an attitude applicable, only in cases of 
actual reliance.48 Instead, interpersonal trust is an attitude toward others the content of 
which has something to do with what they would do (or are disposed to doing) were one to 
place oneself in a position of dependence on them. 
 In Chapter 2, I discuss the nature of acts of trust. I frame the chapter with the oft-
made distinction between trust and mere active reliance. The distinction makes sense 
primarily as one between two closely related kinds of act, especially given the way I carve up 
the territory where some attitudes of trust, specifically interpersonal trust, does not require 
actual reliance on others. Acts of trust are, I contend, a form of active reliance that can be 
withdrawn or withheld. They are voluntary acts that do not entail beliefs that others are 
trustworthy or that they will do come through when we rely on them.  I will thus refer to 
acts of trust as “trust reliance” (or “trust” for short). After motivating the distinction 
between trust reliance and mere active reliance, I briefly explain why mere active reliance 
itself is not a particularly interesting phenomenon. The interesting cases involve reliance 
that’s at least minimally trusting. However, the point remains: some acts are more or less 
trusting. At one end of the continuum, are clearly non-trustful, mere active reliance; at the 
other, fully trusting acts. What makes an act more or less trusting? I consider four 
proposals regarding the difference between trust and mere active reliance and find them all 
wanting. As I see it, trust reliance requires, among other things, entrusting something of 
value to others, and refraining from monitoring the behavior of others or making alternate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See Faulkner (2012). 
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plans in case they fail us—the latter requirement I call the “commitment condition.” The 
level of trust inherent in an act of reliance rises and falls, in part, with the level of 
monitoring the trustor (or dependent) engages in. The commitment condition is 
explanatorily basic in the sense that it can explain why, for example, trust often makes us 
vulnerable. 
 Sometimes others want not only for us to trustfully rely (i.e., perform an act of 
trust), but to display certain attitudes of trust toward them. In Chapter 3, I begin my 
discussion of the nature of trust attitudes in earnest. The purpose of the chapter is 
primarily to motivate a distinction between two types of trust attitudes: propositional and 
interpersonal trust. 49  The distinction consists in the difference between trust that 
(propositional trust) and trust in (interpersonal trust). Propositional trust, as I understand it, 
is primarily a matter of predictive expectation that others will act (or have acted in) certain 
ways. Interpersonal trust is a thicker notion that involves trusting persons. I give reasons to 
think that interpersonal trust—though unanalyzed at this point—does not require actual 
dependence (or reliance) on others. To conclude, I consider and reject the idea that the 
difference is primarily a matter of the type of expectation each attitude entails, where 
propositional trust is a matter of predictive expectation and interpersonal trust (solely) a 
matter of normative expectation. 
 In Chapter 4, I argue that interpersonal trust entails trust beliefs—i.e., beliefs that 
others are trustworthy. I begin by explaining two competing types of view of interpersonal 
trust: cognitivism (of both weak and strong forms) and non-cognitivism. Then, after briefly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See Benjamin McMyler, Testimony, Trust and Authority. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Chapter 4. 
See also, Martin Hollis, Trust Within Reason. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and Paul 
Faulkner, Knowledge on Trust. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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survey some literature in social psychology on attitudes, I give reasons to think that 
interpersonal trust involves the propositional attitude of belief, specifically trust beliefs. 
One key difference between propositional trust and interpersonal trust is that only the 
latter entails trust beliefs. As beliefs about trustworthiness, trust beliefs are largely about 
how and why others would respond to trust reliance on them. 
 In Chapter 5, I critically examine some objections to cognitivism. The first 
objection offered by way of a counterexample modified from Jones (2012) challenges the 
idea that trust beliefs are sufficient for interpersonal trust.50 I contend that the objection 
succeeds only if we identify belief strictly with its cognitive features. The counterexample 
motivates incorporating an affective component in one’s view of trust, a component that’s 
plausibly present in genuine belief anyway. Even if the affective component of belief, 
namely, feelings of (or dispositions to feel) confidence, cannot capture the “feeling of 
trust,” the weak cognitivist need not worry.51 
Next, I consider an objection based on two closely related considerations that 
challenge the weaker necessity claim according to which trust beliefs are necessary for trust. 
As the objection goes and examples confirm, we obviously sometimes trust others without 
believing they are trustworthy. What’s more, some trust is voluntary (i.e., under direct 
voluntary control) which further confirms the point that trust fails to necessitate belief. I 
argue that the success of this objection plausibly hinges on whether trust comes in both act 
and attitude forms. I conclude that since we have reason to accept that trust is both an act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Karen Jones, “The Politics of Intellectual Self-Trust,” Social Epistemology, Routledge, Vol. 26, Issue 2 (2012), 
pp. 237-251. 
51 I borrow the phrase, “the feeling of trust,” from Zagzebski (2012, p. 36). See Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic 
Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy of Belief. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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and attitude, we should reject such considerations as telling against cognitivism. As I point 
out, the objection based on the above considerations equally applies to affective views.  
Third, I consider an argument from J. L. Schellenberg, which I refer to as “the 
vulnerability argument.” Schellenberg uses the vulnerability argument to motivate his view 
of trust as action disposition. The vulnerability argument, I conclude, gives us no good 
reason to abandon cognitivism. I offer reasons to think that Schellenberg has not picked 
out a type of trust with this action disposition account.  
Fourth, I consider challenges to cognitivism based on two alleged tensions between 
trust and evidence. The first tension involves the intuition that trust (in some sense) rules 
out reflecting on evidence of (un)trustworthiness. I contend that the success of this 
objection depends on the type of trust in question. Reflecting on evidence of 
trustworthiness signals a lack of interpersonal trust, though it does not entail its absence. 
The second tension has to do with how trustors often respond to evidence that (allegedly) 
indicates untrustworthiness that the objects of interpersonal trust have acted in 
untrustworthy ways. Trustors often (perhaps tend to) put positive spins on evidence or 
information that plausibly indicates the objects of trust have been untrustworthy. Some 
philosophers see this alleged feature (or consequence) of interpersonal trust as reason to 
reject cognitivism for non-cognitive views that identify trust with an affective feeling or 
emotion. I contend that this alleged tension does not warrant rejecting cognitivism.   
In Chapter 6, I summarize what I’ve said and offer some concluding remarks. 
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                      Chapter  2    
 
           ON ACTS OF TRUST 
 
 
 
Interpersonal reliance is an indispensable part of life. We rely on others in countless ways, 
including for information and to perform (or accomplish) tasks on our behalf. 
Interpersonal reliance is often more practically rational than strict self-reliance. For 
instance, it’s often easier to rely on another’s word (i.e., testimony) than to investigate the 
matter oneself. There’s only so much time in the day to confirm other people’s testimony 
unless, of course, the matter is too important not to. The same is true for everything from 
the clothes we wear, to the food we eat, to our countries’ economic well-being. All people 
lack the time, the resources, the power, or competence required to construct clothes, 
inspect the safety of food, or to positively affect our countries’ economic well-being. Doing 
all, or even part of, the legwork oneself—e.g., making one’s own clothes or acquiring 
(actionable) information—is generally more trouble than it’s worth (and sometimes 
impossible), especially when others, perhaps more qualified, can do it.  
We often confront two choices when interpersonal reliance is an option. First, we 
must choose whether to rely on others. Second, we often must choose whether to trustfully 
rely. Acts of trust entail reliance, but they require more than mere reliance. In this chapter, I 
discuss a commonly made distinction between mere reliance and trust reliance. What 
distinguishes trust reliance (i.e., acts of trust or trusting action), as I’ll call it, from mere (i.e., 
non-trusting) reliance? This chapter surveys some possible candidates for the distinction.  
Acts can be more or more or less trusting. At one end of the continuum, is mere 
active reliance; at the other, fully trusting acts. The interesting cases involve reliance that is 
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at least partially trusting. What makes an act more or less trusting? The purpose of this 
chapter is to offer a plausible proposal, one that’s explanatorily basic in the sense that it can 
explain why, for example, trust involves the possibility of betrayal or why it often makes us 
vulnerable.  
 Following the lead of Elster (2006) and Townley (2011), I argue that what makes 
token acts acts of trust, therefore distinguishing them from mere acts of reliance (i.e. mere 
acts of making oneself dependent on another), is the fulfillment of what I’ll call trust’s 
“commitment condition.” The commitment condition is a practical commitment to 
procedural ignorance broadly construed so to include monitorial abstention and refraining 
from “checking up” on what others do and say. I contend that the level of trust inherent in 
an act rises and falls with the level of monitoring in which the trustor engages. I begin by 
explaining and motivating the trust reliance (trust) and mere (non-trusting) reliance 
distinction. Then I examine four ways theorists have tried to account for the distinction. 
                    
2.1 Motivating the Trust Reliance and Mere Active Reliance Distinction 
Before motivating the trust reliance/mere reliance distinction I must first distinguish active 
and passive reliance, since trust reliance and mere reliance are forms of the active reliance. 
 
2.1.1 Active and Passive Reliance 
There’s almost no way to go through life without relying heavily on others. Relying on 
other people involves others performing tasks on our behalf, and even not performing 
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certain tasks.52 We don’t rely on others (e.g., on other people, animals, inanimate objects 
etc.) simpliciter; rather, we rely on them to do things for us. 53 Therefore, we should 
understand both reliance and trust as three-place relations: X relies on Y to do z; X trusts Y 
to do (or with respect to) z.54  
Reliance can be either active or passive.55 Active reliance is a type of action on the 
part of the person doing the relying. It involves voluntarily making oneself dependent on 
someone or something to do something for one. For instance, when taking my vehicle to 
the mechanic I actively rely on the mechanic. I voluntarily depend on the mechanic to fix 
the vehicle, dependence I could choose to withdraw or I could have chosen to take my 
vehicle elsewhere. Passive reliance, on the other hand, does not involve placing oneself in a 
position of dependence on others; rather, one simply is in a position of dependence. The 
distinction is one between choosing a position of reliance (or making oneself rely on others) 
and simply being (or finding oneself in) a position of reliance.  
At one extreme, you have highly dependent infants. Infants passively depend on 
caregivers for sustenance, without which they will not survive. Infants cannot choose to 
withdraw dependence or decide to place themselves in others’ care. At the other extreme, 
we have God as conceived by Jews and Christians. God relies on humans in various ways, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 I will opt to use terms ‘rely’ and ‘reliance’, particularly in my discussion on the difference between trust and 
reliance/dependence. I take these terms to mean the same as ‘depend’ and ‘dependence’ respectively. 
53 This does not mean every person or thing on which we depend works knowingly on our behalf. Non-
persons certainly don’t. But the same is true of many people on whom we depend. 
54 See Baier (1986), Holton (1994), and Hardin (2002). Karen Jones (1996) argues that “three-place analyses” 
cannot account for a kind of trust she calls “basal trust.” Nonetheless, “three-place analyses,” as she calls 
them, accurately describe most trusting. 
55 Philip Pettit (1995) does not explicitly make this distinction, though he does employ the employ the label 
‘active reliance’ to mean “[relying] on others to the extent yourself vulnerable to them, voluntarily or under 
the force of circumstance” (p. 204). See Philip Pettit, “The Cunning of Trust,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer 1995): pp. 202-225. 
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for example, to help meet the needs of other humans. God, however, is not simply in (or 
simply finds himself) in a position of dependence on anyone, but instead, intentionally places 
himself in a position of dependence—a relation or position from which he could withdraw. 
God could meet the needs of the hungry by pouring manna down from the sky, as with the 
Israelites in the wilderness (in Exodus) or he could voluntarily rely on humans to feed the 
poor, as Hebrew scripture seems to suggest he does.  
 The active-passive distinction is similar to Joseph J. Godfrey’s distinction between 
“accepted dependence” and “discovered dependence.”56 Like active reliance, accepted 
dependence involves voluntarily “putting something some good within the causal range of 
another.” By putting something within another’s causal range we transfer at least some 
control over the well-being of the good. According to Godfrey, though, accepted 
dependence involves trusting, and trusting entails entrusting, where “To entrust is to 
convey what I value from my control to the control of another, handing over my good by 
my choice.”57 It is to commit some matter (or object) to the care of another, which 
involves bringing the matter “within the causal range of another.”58  
But Godfrey’s distinction is mistaken. His distinction suggests that all accepted 
dependence is a form of trusting. However, some instances of dependence are neither 
discovered nor an instance of trust. That is, one might voluntarily rely on others without 
trustfully relying.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Joseph J. Godfrey, Trust of People, Words, and God: A Route for Philosophy of Religion. (Notre Dame, IN: Notre 
Dame University Press, 2012), p. 32-33. As I’ll explain later, I think trust involves entrusting. 
57 Ibid., p. 32. 
58 Ibid., p. 32. 
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 Neither active nor passive reliance presuppose adopting an attitude toward one’s 
dependence on the person depended on (for example, a belief that others will fulfill their 
end). We rely on others in ways about which we’ve never given thought. This is especially 
true for infants. Furthermore, nothing conceptually rules out relying without adopting any 
attitude toward our dependence, much less a particular attitude such as belief or 
expectation. I now attempt to motivate a distinction between two types of active reliance: 
trust and mere (non-trusting) reliance. 
 
2.1.2 Trust Reliance v. Mere Active Reliance 
I take it as given that acts of trust involve active reliance on someone or something. More 
specifically, acts of trust entail making oneself dependent on the actions of others for some 
end. Active reliance, though, does not entail trust (of any type). Hence, trust reliance is 
more than mere active reliance.59 It’s standard procedure in the literature to distinguish 
trust and mere active reliance. Russell Hardin would distinguish them by pointing out that 
trust simpliciter does not even entail reliance.60 Of course, Hardin makes no distinction 
between different types of trust (or different senses of ‘trust’).61  
The purpose of drawing the distinction between trust and mere active reliance is to 
illuminate the concept of trust. Trust theorists typically motivate the distinction by offering 
prima facie obvious examples of mere active reliance, examples involving reliance on 
inanimate objects, instead of persons. Looking ahead, many philosophers argue that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 I will use ‘trust’ as shorthand for ‘trust reliance’ and ‘act of trust’ in this chapter, even though I think there 
are multiple forms of trust. 
60 See Hardin (2006). 
61 In my view, some types of trust do not entail reliance, namely, thick attitudes of trust, which I discuss in 
Chapter 4. 
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difference between relying on inanimate objects and relying on persons is that betrayal is 
possible only when we rely on persons. However, our reliance on persons can be more or 
less trusting, including reliance that’s merely active reliance. I think offering cases involving 
reliance on persons is therefore more helpful. Philip Pettit (2005) offers an intuitive 
example of mere active reliance on a person, one I’ll call, THE BUS FOLLOWER: 
THE BUS FOLLOWER: Suppose I am driving into a city that I do not know and 
I wish to get to the town center. I see a bus and, knowing the pattern on which the 
bus routes are generally organized, I decide to rely on the bus to lead me to the 
center. This is a straightforward case of active reliance. I rely on the driver to 
behave in certain ways in the sense that I build my own plans around the 
assumption that he will behave in that way. I assume the driver is so motivated and 
so informed that he will behave appropriately; or I assume that that is a good bet, 
or as good as any bet available to me. Assuming this, I give over control of certain 
many of my fortunes—or of the fortunes of those with whom I identify—to the 
driver; I bind the welfare of me or mine to his performance.62 
 
Intuitively, THE BUS FOLLOWER is not a case of trust. Annette Baier (1986) contends 
that relying on others “is not yet to trust them.”63 Why not? Baier’s answer: “The trusting 
can be betrayed, or at least let down, not just disappointed.”64 Similarly, Carolyn McLeod 
says, “Reliance without the possibility of betrayal is not trust. Thus people who rely on one 
another in a way that makes betrayal impossible do not trust one another.”65 In defense of 
the betrayal claim, Baier says, “Kant’s neighbors who count on his regular habits as a clock 
of their own less automatically regular ones might be disappointed with him if he slept in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The wording of the case is taken directly from Philip Pettit (1995, pp. 204-205). The case’s name is my 
own. See Philip Pettit, “The Cunning of Trust,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 24, no. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 
202-225. 
63 Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” p. 235. 
64 Ibid., p. 235. 
65 Carolyn McLeod, "Trust," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/trust/>. See also Jones (1994). 
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one day, but not let down by him, let alone had their trust betrayed.”66 The character of the 
neighbor’s reliance makes betrayal impossible. If, for instance, the neighbors miss an 
appointment due to their dependence on Kant and his habits, they could not rightfully feel 
betrayed. The neighbor’s reliance is clearly of the active (i.e., non-passive) sort in that it’s 
both voluntary and could presumably be withdrawn.  
The same is true in THE BUS FOLLOWER. For the bus driver does not know 
that I am following him. The bus driver, like Kant in Baier’s example, cannot meet (or fail 
to meet) the standards of trustworthiness with respect to my active reliance unless I inform 
him that I depend on him to lead me to the town center. That is, the bus driver cannot 
betray me, given the circumstances, but can only disappoint me if, for example, he loses 
track of his route. I may even predictively expect the bus driver will lead me where to go—
i.e., I believe he will lead me to the town center. But circumstances are such that I cannot 
expect anything of the bus driver. There are no such normative expectations (expectations 
of) placed on the driver. THE BUS FOLLOWER, and cases like it, are not instances of 
trust largely due to the fact that the bus driver (or the person being depended on) is 
unaware that I (or others) am relying on him. This largely explains why the driver cannot 
betray me. The standards of trustworthiness do not apply to him—that is, I cannot expect 
anything of him—because I do not yet trust him. This suggests that trust and betrayal are, one 
might argue, analytically linked such that pointing out the impossibility of betrayal in THE 
BUS FOLLOWER (and the Kant case) is not particularly informative. After all, about the 
only time we use the terms ‘betray’ and betrayal’ are in contexts of trust.  
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The most interesting cases presuppose trust and leave open the possibility of 
betrayal. Trust, however, comes in degrees. That is, an act of reliance can be more or less 
trusting. Appeals to the possibility of betrayal cannot explain why an act of reliance, 
assuming it is trusting to some degree, is more or less so. Let’s consider a pair of examples 
where individuals rely on others in a way that, though it may presuppose some trust, 
intuitively falls short of fully trusting action. Perhaps, as most philosophers working in the 
area would claim, the difference between the remaining cases and THE BUS FOLLOWER 
is that only the remaining cases offer examples where the dependent person (the trustor) 
can be betrayed. But, as we’ll see, there is a clear difference in how the dependents rely in 
the first two remaining cases, PARANOID PARENTS and GAMERS, and the final two 
cases, BOOKKEEPER and NAÏVE HEARER. First, consider a case of paranoid parents. 
PARANOID PARENTS: Demitri and Karolyn perform a thorough search for a 
babysitter on a reputable website where potential babysitters are vetted (e.g., given 
background checks).  After doing their homework, Demitri and Karolyn decide to 
call Jordan, confirmed reliable career babysitter to sit on Friday so they can attend 
an important event. Friday arrives. Demitri and Karolyn leave their child with 
Jordan, but only after installing video cameras in every room a week before to 
capture any inappropriate behavior. On top of that, we might suppose that one of 
them calls home every fifteen minutes, making Jordan wonder why they hired him 
in the first place. 
 
PARANOID PARENTS is a textbook case of active reliance. Karolyn and Demitri 
obviously rely on Jordan to properly care for their children—reliance of which they are 
obviously aware and could presumably withdraw and could have withheld. The parents 
entrust their child to Jordan in the sense already described, but do not completely trust 
Jordan in the sense relevant to this chapter. That the parents left the children in Jordan’s 
care seems to imply trusting Jordan to some degree. It’s easy to imagine Jordan, after one 
of many phone calls, telling the parents: “Just trust me. Your child will be fine.” It wouldn’t 
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help if the parents responded by saying: “We are trusting you; we left our children with 
you, after all!” As folk psychologist, Jordan knows reassurance will not sate the paranoid 
parents’ paranoia. Instead, Jordan wants the parents to trustfully rely (to place more trust in 
him), despite their worries and concerns—that is, as they would if they felt completely 
secure leaving Jordan the children.   
 Next, consider the following case: 
GAMERS: Sue and Diane enjoy playing video games. Their friendship was mostly 
built through a mutual love for video games. One day while playing a game at Sue’s 
house, Diane notices that Sue has the newest first-person shooter game. Diane asks 
if she can borrow the game from Sue. Sue agrees, but only after having Diane sign 
a contract stating that she (Diane) will return the game within two weeks in the 
same condition. The penalty for violation of the contract: legal action and likely 
loss of friendship. Hurt and bemused, Diane agrees. Diane reluctantly signs the 
contract and takes the game home, wondering what she did to warrant Sue’s drastic 
measures. 
 
GAMERS represents another obvious case of minimal trust. Though Sue’s act of letting 
Diane borrow the game seemingly presupposes some trust, Sue does not trust to the 
degree that she would if she simply allowed Diane to borrow the game without the 
contract. This explains Diane’s bemusement.67  
PARANOID PARENTS and GAMERS are examples of minimal trust—trust that 
almost seems more like mere active (i.e., non-trust) reliance. One’s reliance on another can 
either be of the trusting sort or not, which is why the distinction being made here is 
between trusting and mere active reliance. The requirements for trust are more stringent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 This is not the entire story, however. Sue’s actions toward Diane signal (though does not entail) the 
absence of an attitude of trust. Given the way I’ll carve up the territory on the attitude front in the coming 
chapters, Sue’s minimally trusting act prima facie indicates both that she does not predictively expect Diane to 
return the game safely without the contract (i.e., a lack of propositional trust) and a lack of trust in Diane (i.e., 
a lack of thick interpersonal trust). 
	  35	  	  
than for mere active reliance.68 For this reason, it’s possible to rely on someone (or 
something) without trusting that someone (or thing).69 Moreover, as the examples suggest, 
the trustfulness of an action comes in degrees; on one end of the continuum is mere active 
reliance and at the other, complete trust reliance.  
Compare the above cases with the following paradigm cases of trust reliance where, 
arguably in some sense, the action is fully trusting. First, consider BOOKEEPER: 
BOOKKEEPER: Emilia, a successful restaurant owner, must replace her 
trustworthy, but recently retired bookkeeper. She knows a competent bookkeeper, 
Shawn. Though competent, Shawn has spent time in prison for stealing money 
from his former employer—“skimming off the top” as they say. Shawn, recently 
released from prison, needs a job. The problem: given his untrustworthy 
reputation, hardly anyone will hire him at the job in which he excels. Emilia decides 
to take a chance on Shawn. She hires Shawn and allows him to keep the books with 
minimal oversight—indeed, no more oversight than she would give a “normal” 
employee.70 
 
Second, consider NAÏVE HEARER: 
NAÏVE HEARER: Harold is visiting New York City from afar. He has never been 
outside his home state or to a large city, much less one the size of New York. Being 
from a small town, Harold finds the MTA subway system somewhat confusing. 
While at Yankee Stadium, Harold, an avid Simon and Garfunkel fan, asks a 
passerby how to get to Bleecker Street in Manhattan. The passerby says: “Take the 
D train all the way to the W. 4 St./Washington Square stop. Once you get off you’ll 
be within a block of Bleecker.” Harold boards the D train heading for Washington 
Square without double-checking the directions. 
 
The subjects doing the trusting in BOOKEEPER and NAÏVE HEARER intuitively trust 
more than the subjects in PARANOID PARENTS and GAMERS. What distinguishes 
these two cases?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 ‘Requirements’ may refer to descriptive and/or normative demands/conditions on trust. This will become 
clear later when I discuss Townley’s (2011) view of trust in some detail. The main point is that trusting 
requires more of the trustor (in a sense) than mere reliance. What the extra requirements should become 
apparent later. 
69 Again, self-trust and self-reliance are possible. But the topic is interpersonal trust and inter-entity reliance. 
70 Holton (1994) offers a similar example. See Richard Holton, “Deciding to Trust”, Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 72 (1994): pp. 63-76. 
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 The possibility of betrayal might be necessary for trust but it’s not sufficient. It can, 
perhaps, distinguish trust from our reliance on inanimate objects, which cannot betray, but 
only disappoint us, as Baier (1986) and others claim. Though I have doubts about this 
clam, I will set those aside. 71  Even so, the possibility of betrayal cannot adequately 
distinguish BOOKEEPER and NAÏVE HEARER from PARANOID PARENTS and 
GAMERS. As Cynthia Townley explains, “betrayal arises only in cases of trust, but betrayal 
concerns the response to trust, it does not explain what the person who trusts is doing.”72 
Trust reliance may involve (or be) the acceptance of the possibility of betrayal. The story 
cannot end there, however, since we need to explain what betrayal amounts to, and we 
have no independent account of betrayal aside from its relationship to trust. We must say 
more to distinguish trust from mere active reliance, and to explain why some acts are more 
or less trusting than others, as in the examples above.  
In the remainder, I consider some proposals offered in the literature. The 
difference between mere active reliance and trust reliance is not so much that trust involves 
the proposed features. Even if we grant for the sake of argument that the proposed 
features are unique to trust, which I give reason to doubt, the difference consists in 
whatever explains why they are unique to trust reliance.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Zagzebski (2012) defends an account on which trust is an attitude we can take toward non-persons. See 
Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy of Belief (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p. 37. 
72 Cynthia Townley, A Defense of Ignorance: Its Value for Knowers and Roles in Feminist and Social Epistemologies. 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), p. 30. 
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         2.2 Distinguishing Trust Reliance and Mere Active Reliance:  
          Four Proposals 
According to orthodoxy, trust entails some combination of the following four features: 
namely, (1) awareness of one’s dependence on others and the possibility of withholding 
dependence,73 (2) the position and/or acceptance of vulnerability one places oneself in 
when one trusts,74 (3) reliance on the goodwill of others,75 and (4) ignorance of the 
outcome of trust and/or ignorance of others’ trustworthiness.76 I will discuss (1) – (4) in 
turn.  
There is some reason to think that (1) and (2) do not apply uniquely to trust, and 
that (3) and (4) are false. Even if any of (1) – (4) are unique features of trust, we must go 
one step further to the constitutive feature(s) of trust that explains why (1) – (4) are 
features of trust but not mere active reliance and what makes an act more or less trusting.  
 
2.2.1 Proposal (1): Awareness and Withholding 
One might think that trust requires awareness. In fact, Godfrey claims, “Trusting adds to 
dependence [or reliance], first, awareness, and sometimes, second, the possibility of 
withdrawing or withholding.”77 Awareness seems like a necessary condition for trusting 
(i.e., trust)—at least it’s present in typical cases—though it’s not for every form of reliance, 
particularly, passive reliance. This awareness is not always explicit. As Godfrey claims, “it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See Godfrey (2012). 
74 See Baier (1986), McLeod (2015), and Seligman (2000). 
75 See Baier (1986) and Jones (1994). 
76 See Gambetta (1988). 
77 Joseph J. Godfrey, Trust of People, Words, and God, p. 262 (original emphasis). 
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simply…not unaware and not unconscious, but not focal or explicit.”78 The possibility of 
withdrawing or withholding dependence also seems like a necessary component for trust 
reliance, which strongly suggests that trust reliance is intentional and voluntary. Passive 
reliance, on the other hand, is clearly neither intentional nor voluntary since, to use 
Godfrey’s phrase, “my wanting it not to be so does not make it not so.”79 Godfrey takes 
this to show that dependence does not entail trusting, in other words, that reliance is not 
necessarily trust. 
However, trust shares, indeed, inherits the awareness requirement from its being a 
type of active reliance. So, trust’s awareness requirement, understood as awareness from 
the trustor’s (or dependent’s) perspective cannot distinguish it from mere active reliance. But 
neither can we distinguish the two by noting that trust is potentially withdrawn or withheld. 
For the same is true of mere active reliance. Both trust and mere active reliance typically 
involve elements of intentionality and voluntariness, as suggested in the previous 
subsection.80 Godfrey’s two “additions” neither account for the trust/mere active reliance 
distinction nor motivate it. The additions therefore cannot distinguish trust from mere 
active reliance, or explain what makes one act of reliance more trusting than another.  
  
     	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Ibid., p. 262. 
79 Ibid., p. 262. 
80 We will return to the issue of the voluntariness of trust in a later chapter. Attitudes of trust are not 
products of the will, as we’ll see. They are involuntary dispositions. Holton (1994) claims some instances of 
trust are voluntary. Jones (1996, p. 18) contends that trust is not voluntary, since according to her, trust is an 
attitude. Jones considers trust’s involuntariness as a datum in need of explanation – one that we can account 
for on an attitude account of trust. In response to Baier’s entrusting account, Jones argues, “Entrusting is an 
action and actions are, paradigmatically, things that can be willed. If, however, trusting involves an attitude, 
and attitudes cannot be adopted at will, we have an explanation for why one cannot trust at will” (1996, p. 
18).  
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2.2.2 Proposal (2): (Accepted) Risk and Vulnerability 
Trust theorists often link together vulnerability and risk with trust. Though he does not 
directly mention risk or vulnerability, Richard Swinburne’s view suggests a link: “To trust 
someone is to act on the assumption that he will do for you what he knows that you want 
or need, where the evidence gives some reason for supposing that he may not, and there 
are bad consequences if the assumption proves false.”81 Some contend that trust implies 
vulnerability and/or risk.82  
Following Duncan Pritchard, we should distinguish the risk involved in some 
activity from the activity’s being risky.83 To call some event (or activity) a “risk” suggests, 
“an event as being possible, though, unwanted outcome.”84 On the other hand, “When we 
talk of an activity as being risky, in contrast, we are in addition describing the unwanted 
possible outcome—the risk event—as being relatively high risk.”85 Holding an account on 
which all instances of trust are risky in the sense just described would be misguided. 
Certainly, some trusting acts involve more risk than others and, indeed, some trusting acts 
are risky—e.g., trusting known untrustworthy people with no indication of character 
reformation. Most theorists, including myself, agree that to call an act “trusting,” absent 
risk, seems implausible.  
Other philosophers associate trust with accepted risk/vulnerability. In one place 
Annette Baier explicitly offers a preliminary definition of trust in terms of the notion of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason. 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 144. I discuss 
Swinburne’s view in more detail below.  
82 See Baier (1986), Seligman (2000), and McLeod (2015). 
83 See Duncan Pritchard, ‘Risk’, Metaphilosophy 46 (3) (2015), pp. 436-461. 
84 Duncan Pritchard, “Risk,” p. 437. 
85 Ibid., p. 437. 
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(accepted) vulnerability: “Trust is accepted vulnerability to another’s power to harm one, a 
power inseparable from the power to look after some aspect of one’s good” (1994, 133). 
“Accepting vulnerability” suggests acknowledging that one is vulnerable in trusting.  
Some philosophers have accounted for trust in terms of what they perceive as its 
primary function: namely, as a way to deal with vulnerability.86 The idea, I think, is 
supposed to be that risk, and/or its acceptance, partially sets trust apart from mere active 
reliance. When we trust others we run the risk that they will not pull through for us in the 
appropriate ways, which is why trust, though necessary for normal functioning lives, makes 
us vulnerable. Carolyn McLeod says: 
But trust involves the risk that people we trust will not pull through for us; for, if 
there was some guarantee that they would pull through, then we would have no 
need to trust them. Thus, trust is also dangerous. What we risk while trusting is the 
loss of the things that we entrust to others, including our self-respect, perhaps, 
which can be shattered by the betrayal of our trust.87 
 
McLeod rightly describes risk in terms of a lack of guarantee. Guarantees, according to 
McLeod, rule out trust. This seems correct, indeed a datum calling for explanation, 
particularly concerning acts of trust. Describing an act as trusting suggests—probably, 
entails—the trustor has no guarantees (or proof) the trustee will fulfill her end of the 
relationship.  
 Risk and felt (or perceived) risk are different. So, too, is vulnerability and felt (or 
perceived) vulnerability. According to Nicholas Rescher, “at bottom risk is an ontological not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See L.C. Becker (1996), “Trust as Noncognitive Security About Motives,” Ethics 107(1): pp. 43-61. 
87 Carolyn McLeod, “Trust,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/trust/>. 
Note: I am not claiming that McLeod thinks risk/vulnerability inherent in trust sets it apart from mere 
reliance. I cite her work only as an example of the common view that trust is linked in some way to 
risk/vulnerability. 
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an epistemological category: it has to do with action affecting the chance of mishap itself, 
not with the recognition or acknowledgement of this chance.”88  
McLeod refers to risk (vulnerability) itself in the quote above: “trust involves risk 
that other people will not pull through for us.”89 For Baier, accepted vulnerability (risk) is 
constitutive of trust. Accepting vulnerability entails the presence of vulnerability and the 
conscious decision to go forward with others despite acknowledged risk. That is, trust 
involves (i) risk, (ii) the perception of risk, and (iii) accepting the risk.90 I think, however, (i) 
– (iii) plausibly apply just about whenever we rely on others: from the most trusting acts to 
some of the least. Baier’s cursory definition will not do since both trust and mere active 
reliance (1) place dependents in positions of vulnerability, and so, (2) (very often) involve 
dependents accepting vulnerability.  
Furthermore, in some scenarios we make ourselves more vulnerable by abstaining 
from trust and relying on ourselves. Self-reliance is ill-advised when, for example, you need 
dental work done, but are not a dentist. Investing at least some trust in a professional 
seems like a good thing. Doing the work yourself, or we might suppose, not getting the 
dental work done, will likely make you more vulnerable to harm.  
 The proposal under consideration in this section says that risk and lack of 
guarantee are unique to trust. The arguments presented thus far, however, suggest that this 
is not the case. Whenever we rely on others—whether trustfully or not—we risk whatever 
we rely (or trust) others for. Consider PARANOID PARENTS and GAMERS again. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Nicholas Rescher, Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management (Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 5-6. 
89 Carolyn McLeod, “Trust” (2015). 
90 Recall that Baier suggests the difference between trust and mere reliance is that only the former involves 
reliance on the goodwill of others.  
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paranoid parents (Demitri and Carolyn) and game loaner (Sue) obviously do what they can 
within reason to reduce risk. But the only way to eliminate risk in these examples is to simply 
not rely on others. For the parents, this would mean not relying on the babysitter to care 
for their children. For the gamer, eliminating risk would require not loaning the game.91 
Yet, neither the paranoid parents nor the gamer fully trust.   
One might respond by claiming that risk is inherent only in trust or that risk is part 
of the definition of ‘trust’ (the verb) but not ‘reliance’ or ‘rely’. This means, roughly, that 
absent risk, trust is impossible by definition. The same cannot be said for reliance. Even if 
most instances of mere active reliance come with some risk, for an action to qualify as one 
of reliance (or relying) it need not by definition involve risk. Nothing rules out relying on 
fail-safe machines, for example, relying on a perfectly reliable calculator to compute 
numerical sums. But we live in the real world, as people say, where guarantees of reliability 
are far and few between. Raise the stakes and even relying on the thus far reliable calculator 
alone comes with some level of risk.  
Perhaps, then, it is significant risk that distinguishes trust from mere active reliance. 
The significance of risk increases both with the probability of harm and the severity of 
harm. It is doubtful, though, that significant risk distinguishes trust from mere active 
reliance. We sometimes trust people with highly reliable track records, for example, family, 
our physicians, etc. This suggests that minimal risk or “practically” no risk is consistent 
with trust. The presence of significant risk, then, cannot satisfactorily distinguish trust from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Sometimes we cannot eliminate risk by simply relying on ourselves. People are fallible, though we do 
control our own actions to some extent and we have a kind of epistemic access to our own mental states that 
we do not have with others. Presumably, a parent, for example, can know that he will do the best he can to 
care for his children. The parent cannot be certain that others will give his children the same care. 
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mere active reliance. For we can trust people about trivial matters and merely actively rely 
on people for significant things.  
Think of Kant’s neighbors who merely (actively) rely on his dependable habits. We 
might suppose that Kant’s schedule is so precise that one of the neighbors depends on 
Kant keeping this schedule in order to remember to take her heart medicine without which 
she may die. This obvious case of mere active reliance intuitively comes with significant 
risk. So, significant risk may not set trust apart from mere active reliance, after all, even if 
trust is, on the whole, riskier than mere active reliance.  
Likewise, significant risk cannot adequately explain the continuum—that is, explain 
what makes an act more or less trusting—since an act that’s less trusting than it could be 
might plausibly be significantly riskier than if it were more trusting. Looking ahead, the 
reason for this might be that the level of monitoring involved that renders the act less 
trusting may inhibit progress necessary to meet the end of the act—for example, the 
purpose for placing trust. 
Even if for the sake of argument we grant that risk is inherent in trust—that all acts 
of trust presuppose risk—we must identify the feature of trust that renders it especially risky 
and the actors (i.e., trustors or the people performing the acts) especially vulnerable in 
standard cases. For it seems that trust is typically riskier than mere active reliance; relatedly, 
some acts are more trusting than others. The paranoid parents install cameras and inform 
the babysitter about the cameras because they want him to know they will have visual 
record of his performance. They choose to reduce the level of trust in their reliance on the 
babysitter in order to minimize risk. The paranoid parents presumably know that their 
security measures are not fail safe, though they reduce the probability of a bad outcome. 
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So, both trust and mere active reliance often come with risk and accepted risk. The 
difference between the two forms of reliance with respect to risk and vulnerability boils 
down to the constitutive feature(s) of trust. This feature is explanatorily basic in the sense 
that it can explain why trust is typically risker than mere active reliance—and why some 
acts are risker than others—though considerations of risk cannot explain why trust 
involves the constitutive feature(s), which as we’ll see, is a non-monitoring condition.  
 
2.2.3 Proposal (3): Trust and Goodwill 
Annette Baier contends, “When I trust another, I depend on her good will toward me.”92 
When we (merely) rely, on the other hand, we rely on the “dependable habits, or only on 
their dependably exhibited fear, anger or other motives compatible with ill will toward one, 
or on motives not directed on one at all.”93 How exactly does one rely on another’s 
goodwill? The idea, I think, is that one’s dependence counts as trust when and only when 
one expects the fact of one’s reliance on others to in some way (and to a sufficient degree) 
motivate them to act on one’s behalf. Baier says, “…intentional trusting does require 
awareness of one’s confidence that the trusted will not do one harm, although they could 
harm one.”94 
According to Baier, a potential motive’s compatibility with ill will renders it 
incompatible with goodwill. Relying on others’ goodwill is necessary for trust. Call this “the 
goodwill condition” on trust. A fairly common intuition that trust never applies to our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” p. 234. 
93 We will discuss an analogous distinction with respect to trusting attitudes in a subsequent chapter. 
94 Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” p. 235. 
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dependence on animals or inanimate objects, one I think Baier shares, rests on this alleged 
feature of trust. Neither animals nor inanimate objects can exhibit goodwill toward us, 
which means that on Baier’s account, trustfully relying on them is impossible. Regardless of 
whether Baier’s account renders the correct result in general, the goodwill condition cannot 
adequately distinguish trust from mere active reliance.   
 Against the necessity of the goodwill condition, Richard Holton (1994) asks us to 
consider estranged spouses who have children together. Both rely on each other to 
properly care for their children. It seems unlikely that either spouse expects the other to 
express goodwill toward the other in providing temporary care for the child. Yet, their 
mutual disdain for one another seems perfectly consistent with trust.95  
 Or consider BOOKEEPER. In this case, the restaurant owner, Emilia, relies on a 
person she knows has suspect character, Shawn. Even if Emilia does not believe the felon 
will act on her behalf out of goodwill toward her, but because he must make a living or 
wants back into the community of trust, it seems that Emilia, in a sense, still trustfully relies 
on Shawn by acting as if he is trustworthy. Emilia is giving Shawn a chance to reenter the 
community of trust by showing that he can be trusted. Emilia places trust, the kind of trust 
one could voluntarily place in others in response to exhortations to trust. If this is right, 
then trust does not necessarily require reliance on other people’s goodwill.96 As Philip Pettit 
says, “Trustors do not have to depend on the more or less admirable trustworthiness of 
others; they can also hope to exploit the relatively base desire to be well considered.”97 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 See Richard Holton, ‘Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1994), pp. 63-
76. 
96 Holton (1994) offers a similar case of a shopkeeper hiring a convicted felon.  
97 Pettit, “The Cunning of Trust,” p. 203. 
	  46	  	  
2.2.4 Proposal (4): Ignorance of Outcome and Ignorance of Trustworthiness 
Some philosophers think that trust always involves ignorance. The ignorance I am thinking 
of is about what others will do in response to our trust. Diego Gambetta suggests such a 
connection between trust and ignorance of outcomes: “Trust is particularly relevant in 
conditions of ignorance or uncertainty with respect to unknown or unknowable actions of 
others.”98 This brings me back to Swinburne. 
Recall Swinburne’s statement of his account: “To trust someone is to act on the 
assumption that he will do for you what he knows that you want or need, where the 
evidence gives some reason for supposing that he may not, and there are bad consequences 
if the assumption proves false.”99 To fully understand this statement we must know what 
Swinburne thinks it means to “act on an assumption.” To that end, Swinburne writes: 
To act on an assumption that p (or to act as if p) is to do those actions which you 
would do if you believed that p. It is to use p in your practical inferences, to take it 
for granted when working out what to do. If you do A on the assumption that p, 
you believe that there is a small probability that p, and that given the existence of at 
least that probability, no other action is more likely to realize your purpose than A. 
Hence you would still do A if you believed that the probability that p was greater, 
and so, you would do it if you believed that p. In short, when a person acts on an 
assumption that p his action can be described as acting on the belief that there is 
some (albeit small) probability that p. 
 
Swinburne has identified paradigmatic trust where one party trustfully relies on another 
party despite some reason to believe the latter will not pull through. Swinburne’s account 
can explain why trust makes us vulnerable (and is especially risky), why it often involves 
ignorance of outcome, etc.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Diego Gambetta, “Can We Trust Trust?” in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. D. Gambetta 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 218. 
99 Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 144. 
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However, Swinburne’s account rules out acts of trust based on substantiated 
attitudes of trust, the natures of which I describe in subsequent chapters. For dialectical 
purposes, suppose as some theorists argue, that attitudes of trust are, or involve, beliefs 
that others are trustworthy. These attitudes, if epistemically reasonable, are evidentially 
grounded in epistemic reasons to believe the objects of these attitudes are trustworthy. 
These reasons, including one’s belief that (or the fact that) others are trustworthy, may give 
one good prima facie reason to believe that others will do what we want or need such that 
one can act upon (or from) that belief. There is a sense of “acting as if” on which the 
action is consistent with belief that things will turn out well. In this sense, acting as if p is 
consistent both with belief that “there is a small probability that p” (given the evidence) 
and with the belief that p is true (given the evidence). Swinburne’s understanding of “acting 
on an assumption” or “acting as if” entails belief that the odds are not in one’s favor that 
one will get what one wants or needs. Thus, for Swinburne, acting as if others will get you 
what you want or need requires that you not believe that they will, but only “believe that 
there is a small probability” that they will.100 Swinburne’s account therefore entails that one 
does not know the outcome (because one does not really believe it). 
One could argue, though, that in a strict sense of ‘knowledge,’ ignorance of the 
outcome of our reliance (of whatever kind) on others nearly always follows. Can we ever 
know that our reliance will yield a profitable return, especially if the standards for 
knowledge are relatively high—say, because knowledge requires eliminating incompatible 
alternatives? That others will fail to pull through on our reliance, whether because of 
incompetence or insincerity, is often an epistemic possibility; it’s certainly a possibility in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Ibid., p. 144. I will use the phrase in 2.3 to be consistent with both the above readings. 
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any of the other senses (e.g., metaphysical). Even lowering the standards such that we at 
least sometimes know our mere active reliance will yield a favorable return does not imply 
that we know the outcome of all instances of mere active reliance—for example, reliance 
on helplessly unreliable people. So, ignorance of outcome is not sufficient for trust. 
 Does trust require ignorance of trustworthiness (or lack thereof)? I think the 
answer is “no.” Though paradigm examples of trust reliance often involve one person 
“having to” rely in trustful ways on another about whom one knows precious little, we 
should not rule out the possibility of knowledge of trustworthiness (or attitudes of trust) 
explaining one’s trusting other people. Plausibly, relying on close family to watch my child 
could still qualify as trust even though I know they will take care of her. Indeed, my 
knowledge explains why I trust. Knowledge of trustworthiness is irrelevant to trust. One 
can trust (in any sense) with or without such knowledge or even good epistemic reasons or 
justification to believe others are trustworthy. 
 To conclude, the proposals considered above cannot adequately distinguish trust 
from mere active reliance even if, for the sake of argument, we suppose that each, or any 
one characteristic, is unique to trust. In the section 2.3, I show how adding a “commitment 
condition” can explain why PARNOID PARENTS and GAMERS are examples of less 
trusting action than what we find in BOOKKEEPER and NAÏVE HEARER.  
 
         2.3 Trust: The Case for Entrusting and Monitorial Abstention  
The inadequacies of the four proposals considered above make way for an acceptable fifth 
proposal. Supposing acts of trust are specific forms of reliance, we must determine what 
element distinguishes them from mere active reliance. Determining that will tell us at least 
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partially what renders an act of reliance more or less trusting. What would render the 
subjects’ actions in PARANOID PARENTS and GAMERS more trusting? The simple, 
but correct answer would be for the parents to resist exhibiting their paranoia when relying 
on others and for the gamer to stop insisting her friends and acquaintances sign lengthy 
contracts to ensure the safe return of her property.101  
What makes an act one of trust, therefore distinguishing it from an act of mere 
active reliance (i.e. the mere acts of making oneself dependent on another) is a certain type 
of behavior; the distinguishing factor being the fulfillment of what I’ll call trust’s 
“commitment condition.” I show that with the addition of the commitment condition we 
can account for our intuitions in PARANOID PARENTS and GAMERS, and other 
similar examples. I argue that commitment, particularly, commitment to precautionary 
abstention (or non-monitoring) is what renders an act more or less trusting. This 
commitment explains the attraction of the other proposals considered above. To commit 
to procedural ignorance is to accept that others will work favorably on one’s behalf, which 
means behaving as if they will. This, I claim, entails commitment to monitorial abstention, 
which with respect to trust requires conscious, voluntary choice.  
 
2.3.1 Elster’s Behavioral Definition and Entrusting 
Jon Elster offers a “simple behavioral definition” of trust which will prove instructive both 
in understanding the commitment condition on trust and in determining its significance in 
making the distinction between trust and mere reliance. Elster claims, “to trust someone is 
to lower one’s guard, to refrain from taking precautions against an interaction partner, even when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Asking the parents to cease being paranoid, where being paranoid is a matter of psychology, not action, 
would be asking them to do something they cannot, at least not without extensive therapy. 
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the other, because of opportunism, or incompetence, could act in a way that might seem to 
justify precautions.”102 Elster does not explicitly articulate the form of interaction specific 
to trust, though it’s plausibly a form of reliance where one person relies on another to 
achieve some end or fulfill some purpose in a way unique to trust (i.e. trust). We should 
read the definition accordingly.103  
Trust involves entrusting something to one’s “interaction” partner, that is, assigning 
and/or transferring responsibility to the person trusted by committing someone or 
something one values or cares about to another—putting it, as Godfrey says, “within the 
causal range of another, with the understanding that the other will take care of and not 
harm what is valued and entrusted.”104 That which we value could be completing some task 
or caring for, or watching over, someone or something.105 Transferring responsibility 
generates normative constraints (e.g., moral obligations) on the trusted party’s behavior. 
(This is not to say that by entrusting something valuable we completely absolve ourselves if 
our reliance doesn’t turn out well, especially when we should have known better than to 
rely on the relevant person(s).)  
More importantly, though, transferring responsibility means handing over control 
or authority of something valued to someone else. By lowering one’s guard and trustfully 
relying on others, one must in a sense do more, and in another sense do less. The trusting 
party must do more by committing control of something valued to others. An act might be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), p. 344 (original emphasis). 
103 Elster neither defends nor develops the definition much further. 
104 Godfrey, Trust of People, Words, and God p. 32. Baier (1986) also seems to think trust involves entrusting. 
105 The notion of value is important. It seems implausible to say, for example, that I have entrusted a movie 
to someone if I care less whether she returns it.  
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more or less trusting depending how much control one transfers to the person relied upon. 
The trusting party does less by allowing the person relied upon to fulfill her task.  
Relinquishing control to the degree that one’s reliance becomes trust plausibly 
demands, as Elster claims, precautionary abstention. Suppose you hire someone to manage 
your portfolio, but instead of letting the manager do her job you meddle in every decision. 
Hardly anyone would fault you for ensuring your portfolio manager does her job. 
However, she might rightly wonder why you hired her in the first place. After all, you 
clearly don’t trust her. Trusting the manager (and her judgment) in the present sense would 
mean allowing her to do her job without interference. In the next subsection, I will 
consider this proposal in more detail.  
 
2.3.2 Precautionary Abstention and Trust  
In this section, I explain how the account under consideration—that the sine qua non of 
trust (reliance) is letting down one’s guard—can both account for the distinction between 
trust and mere active reliance and explain why trust makes us particularly vulnerable in 
many cases of trust.  
To see the explanatory fruitfulness of Elster’s definition we must consider what’s 
involved in “refraining from taking precautions against an interaction partner.” Refraining 
suggests conscious effort to avoid taking precautions against the trustee (especially) when 
precaution taking is available. In so doing, the trustor effectively lowers her guard. Taking 
precautions implies an attempt to fortify oneself against potential incompetence and 
carelessness of others, and, in many cases, against limitations of others’ goodwill. The hope 
is that by taking precautions one will thereby reduce the risk involved in relying on others. 
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Threatening or coercing one’s (potential) interaction partner is one way to minimize risk, 
even if eliminating risk is practically impossible.  
Making threats and coercing others, though, is inconsistent with trust. A person 
who coerces or threatens those on whom she relies is clearly not relying on their 
goodwill.106 For to rely on another’s goodwill means treating her as a cooperative partner. 
Making threats is pointless when one expects full cooperation. And treating others as 
cooperative partners suggests treating them like trustworthy partners who are motivated to 
help because others need them.107  
Trusting others plausibly involves treating them like trustworthy interaction 
partners.108 It would seem, then, that trusting others generally involves to acting as if others 
will act from goodwill, that is, that they will fully cooperate. Elster’s behavioral definition 
plausibly identifies the core of what it means to act as if others are trustworthy, along with 
the fact that trust involves entrusting someone or something to another someone or 
something.  
“Taking precautions against an interaction partner,” as Elster says, constitutes a 
failure to lower one’s guard. Trust (descriptively) constrains the kind (and extent) of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Again, relying on the goodwill of others is not necessary for trust, so I argued. However, it seems, as I’m 
suggesting, that one cannot rely on the goodwill of others unless one relies on them in certain way, namely, 
without fulfilling some commitment condition understood, broadly speaking, as a requirement of non-
monitoring.  
107 See Jones (1996). 
108 As we’ll see, the attitude of interpersonal trust, perhaps ironically, does not require treating others as 
trustworthy. For one, treating others as trustworthy plausibly amounts to a type behavior. According to my 
understanding, attitudes, including attitudes of trust, do not entail behavior components. Second, even if we 
typically treat the people we trust (in the attitude sense) as trustworthy, we sometimes do not, often for good 
reason. After all, trustworthy people—more precisely, those who we think or know are trustworthy—are apt 
to fail every once in a while. Nothing rules out having an attitude of interpersonal trust toward others 
(understood to be an attitude about others dispositions), but having reason to believe, and believing on this 
reason, that others will not pull through on a particular occasion. 
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behavior that we can engage in while still trusting: both pre-reliance and during one’s 
reliance. As Cynthia Townley claims, 
Trust however, always imposes constraints, often precluding some kinds of 
checking up or extra verification—responding to a surprising eye-witness report by 
requesting the testifier have her eyes checked or undergo a drug scan would (in 
many, if not most cases) be a kind of checking incompatible with trust [reliance].109 
  
Pure unadulterated trust requires reliance without monitoring the performance/behavior of 
the person trusted (at least to a certain degree or extent) or conducting, for example, a 
thorough investigation of trustworthiness before relying on her. Moreover, manufacturing 
constraints and putting measures in place to increase the probability of a positive 
outcome—perhaps by coercion or contracts—is inconsistent with trust.  
With this in mind, Elster’s definition can explain the strength of our intuition that 
PARANOID PARENTS and GAMERS represent obvious examples of minimal trust.110 
The only way to truly lower one’s guard in the relevant sense is to rely on others without 
monitoring their performance. And lowering their guard in this sense is exactly what our 
paranoid parents, Demitri and Karolyn, and our gamer, Sue, do only minimally. They only 
minimally trust, not because they are not aware of their reliance (which they are) and 
cannot withdraw it (which they can), or because they do not rely on the goodwill of others 
(which they at least minimally do), or because they are not vulnerable (which they are), or 
because they are ignorant of the outcome (which one could argue they are). The gamer 
only minimally trusts because she asks her friend to sign a lengthy contract. The paranoid 
parents only minimally trust because they (extensively) monitor the babysitter’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Townley, A Defense of Ignorance, p. 29. 
110 Again, the intuition is that the paranoid parents and the gamer at least minimally trust. Otherwise, they 
would probably not entrust that which they value (i.e., the children and the game) to others. 
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performance. Neither the gamer nor the paranoid parents commit to monitorial abstention 
in a way that would render their acts fully trusting.   
The more precautionary action one takes the less trusting one’s reliance becomes.111 
So, by and large, trust rules out consciously putting security measures or sanctions in place 
to shore up performance of one’s interaction partner (or punish willing failure), seeking 
evidence of trustworthiness credentials, demanding signed contracts to ensure the job is 
accomplished, etc. Otherwise, generally speaking, when the precautionary action reaches a 
certain point, one merely relies, but one doesn’t trust the person on whom one depends. 
When others say things like, “Just trust me! I can do this,” they mean not only to implore 
the skeptical party to rely on them, but to rely in specific manner, that is, to let their guard 
down—to make themselves vulnerable in a manner specific to trust.  
 This idea that trust involves “lowering one’s guard” by relying on others without 
checking into their trustworthiness credentials or monitoring their performance plausibly 
reflects common linguistic usage. So too does the idea that trust (of some form) involves 
“giving over the reins” to others without investigating their abilities or devising backup 
plans in case of failure, sometimes in the face of suspicion and despite doubts or felt 
insecurity (some justified), which would partially explain both the vulnerability and 
sometimes felt vulnerability experienced in some cases of trust. Concerning vulnerability 
and risk, trust makes us particularly vulnerable because it involves not only relying on 
others, but also relying on them absent confirmation that they either will (before relying) or 
are (during one’s reliance) performing up to par.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 McLeod (2015) agrees with this assessment.  
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Confirming the reliability or trustworthiness of others via pre-reliance investigation 
would typically increase the odds of discovering “red flags,” where the point of 
investigation is to avoid relying on people with questionable character or competence. 
Some level of risk is typical even when one’s reliance is predicated on a thorough 
investigation into the trustworthiness or reliability of others, particularly when stakes are 
high. The account on offer, however, can explain both why trust is often especially risky and 
why it often makes us especially vulnerable to others’ goodwill. And that’s because by 
trusting, we effectively forgo the opportunity to discover evidence of unreliability (or 
untrustworthiness) that, were we to acquire, might lead us not to rely. Mere reliance is 
often a better bet than trust reliance if we wish reduce our chances of “getting burned.”112   
One virtue of the present account is that it leaves open the possibility of trustful 
action flowing from attitudes of trust. We often let our guards down and trustfully rely on 
others because our attitude toward them is trusting: either in the sense that we think they 
are trustworthy and/or we expect that they will act favorably on our behalf. I have yet to 
fully articulate or defend my account of attitudes of trust. Whether attitudes of trust just 
are feelings of security or belief that others are trustworthy, the point remains. I trustfully 
rely on close family and friends because I have an attitude of trust toward them. Indeed, I 
believe they are worthy of trust and I feel secure relying on them because I (generally) 
expect them to accomplish the tasks before them. That is, I am willing to let down my 
guard because I have no question about their trustworthiness. Though trustfully relying 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Again, sometimes people put themselves at greater risk by not trusting, especially when the prospective 
trustee is, for instance, an expert in the relevant domain and the prospective trustor is not. We could imagine 
a non-expert, say a non-carpenter, relying on an expert carpenter to make an ornate table against a pressing 
and important deadline, but the non-carpenter simply prohibits satisfactory progress by constantly checking 
every the carpenter’s work throughout the process. In response, the carpenter might (rightfully) tell the client 
to trust so she can complete the table by the deadline, which she might miss if the client does not leave her 
alone.   
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even on close family and friends comes with some (possibly negligible) risk, I needn’t 
worry that they will take advantage of me when I trustfully rely. 
In the next section, I consider whether trust entails an even stronger form of 
commitment. I argue that it does not. 
   
     2.4 Against Townley’s Strong Commitment Condition 
As I described in the introduction, the trusted, in virtue of her (willing) participation, 
commits herself to fulfilling fiduciary responsibilities generated by participation (Barber 
1983).113 The “in virtue of” is so placed because by presenting oneself as trustworthy one 
commits herself to coming through for the trusting party, or if nothing else, giving it her 
best shot. I see no principled reason why a prospective trustee has any obligation to 
participate every time a possible trusting engagement presents itself. But, especially when 
one commits to doing some job (or fulfilling some end) for another—that is, when one 
accepts responsibility—normative expectations govern her performance. Accepting trust 
amounts to, at the very least, a tacit acknowledgement of the normative expectations 
generated by one’s participation. All else being equal, trustees are expected to remain 
faithfully committed to the trustor—more specifically, to the trustor’s ends, to fulfilling the 
task at hand, etc.—which requires displaying competence and sincerity in her dealings. 
When one has done this appropriately in the context of trustful relations, she’s met her 
fiduciary responsibility.114  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Fiduciary responsibility is not generated by participation alone.  
114 I discuss the details of my account of trustworthiness and the normative expectations placed on trustees in 
another chapter. 
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The same considerations hold in, or as is sometimes the case, especially in trusting 
relations where the dependence relation isn’t so straightforward—those unlike simple 
dependence relations where X depends on Y to fulfill some task z (e.g. marriages). This 
much seems fairly uncontroversial. But do trusting relations necessarily generate normative 
expectations on both ends of the relation? If so, are the normative expectations placed on 
the trustor such that their fulfillment partially determines whether or to what extent one 
trusts? Townley’s defense of her trust as commitment view suggests so.  
Though I agree with Townley (2011) that trust (at least the act of trust) entails 
commitment, I take issue with the level of commitment her view requires of trustors, more 
specifically, with what I’ll call the “strong commitment.” The “weak commitment” is 
nothing but commitment to procedural ignorance. According to Townley, the commitment 
constitutive of trust extends beyond procedural ignorance—that is, beyond the realm of 
description—to the trustor-trustee relationship itself—that is, into the realm of the 
normative.  
For Townley, “Trust involves commitment and reciprocal responsibility.” 115 
Trusting relations, as she understands them, presuppose a “distinct set of expectations” 
defined by commitment on both sides not to breach the trusting relationship.116 Townley 
describes commitment as something that restricts freedom of action in a moral sense.  
With regard to trustees she writes, “…an integral part of trust is that the trusted 
takes herself to be committed, and accepts the appropriate constraints on her conduct.” 
Trusting demands commitment from every party involved in the relation; it places 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Townley, A Defense of Ignorance, p. 26. 
116 Ibid., p. 32. 
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normative constraints on both trustor and trustee alike. More precisely, “Trusting involves 
a special kind of reason for the dependent person to maintain dependence: she cannot 
retract simply because, for instance, a better opportunity becomes available.” 117  The 
thought, so I take it, is that trusting generates normative requirements governing proper 
performance in the role of trustor.  
For Townley, both trust (or trustfulness) and trustworthiness in interpersonal 
relationships demand fidelity, which the Oxford English Dictionary describes as 
“faithfulness to a person, cause or belief, demonstrated by continued loyalty and support.” 
And ‘faithfulness,’ at least in one sense, is a synonym for ‘trustworthiness’. So, according to 
Townley, trusting relations require something like steadfast loyalty, firm and constant 
support—that is, trustworthiness of one sort or another—from every party, trustee and 
trusted alike. If this is correct, then in trusting relations, each party involved fulfills both 
roles, that of trustee and trustor, even though, as is often the case, the dependence relation 
extends in one direction only.118 
 It might be true that some relationships (e.g., conjugal, familial, or platonic) come 
with moral obligations to make long-term commitments (or at least, manifesting such a 
commitment in one’s behavior). Townley suggests that commitment, understood as 
faithfulness to the person trusted, lies at the heart of trust. To trust is to commit to 
maintaining the relationship with the trustee even when information calls into doubt her 
trustworthiness. However, we should distinguish norms of trust from trust itself, just as we 
should distinguish the norms of belief from belief. That one epistemically ought to believe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Ibid., p. 32. 
118 In one sense, only one person fulfills the role of dependent. But, as we’ll see, in many cases the trustee’s 
feelings (e.g. her mood, behavior, etc.) depend on whether the trusting party continues on in the relation of 
trust.  
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in accordance with one’s total evidence, let’s suppose, says nothing about the nature of 
belief other than specifying an epistemic norm that applies to it. If one were to abandon 
belief that p based on wishful thinking, perhaps in the face of strong reasons to believe p, it 
would not follow that one never believed p. The example of belief is an imperfect analogy, 
but it suggests that highlighting the norms of trust cannot help capture the nature of trust 
(of any form, really). The norms of trust are another matter, which, in my view, receives 
too much attention in Townley’s view.  
 In conclusion, despite my disagreement with Townley (2011) on the stronger 
commitment claim, I agree on the weaker claim, albeit when we consider trust as an action. 
Trust is inconsistent with monitoring (broadly construed). The more we monitor the 
performance of others on whom we rely, the less we trust. Truly letting our guards down 
requires eliminating taking precautions. 
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       Chapter  3 
 
       ATTITUDES OF TRUST: A DISTINCTION 
 
 
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed the oft-made distinction between two forms of active reliance: 
trust reliance and mere reliance. Introducing the notion of attitudes cannot help capture the 
distinction. For the distinction is not a matter of having certain attitudes of beliefs, 
predictive expectations, etc. about those on whom we rely such that having these attitudes 
would render an act one of trust. In fact, at times we “have to” trust, in a sense, if we want 
to accomplish some task. Such trust involves voluntary interaction with others. Attitudes of 
belief and predictive expectation, though, are not, by most accounts, voluntary. 119 
Producing these attitudes at will is not something we can do.  
However, ‘trust’ also plausibly refers to certain types of attitudes as evidenced by 
our reactions when certain others fail to display them. Consider a scenario where one 
person, a boss let’s say, trustfully relies on an employee to do his job but apparently 
without an attitude of trust—the nature(s) of which I explain over the next two chapters—
to which the employee responds with apparent resentment. 
 Boss: “I did not spy on you or monitor your performance.” 
Employee: “No, but you apparently don’t trust me! You should have known I 
would do good job.” 
This exchange makes sense, even though the boss, we might suppose, fulfilled the 
conditions on trust reliance—the type of trust, an act, we sometimes ask of others to 
voluntarily perform. The boss might wonder what she did to deserve this reaction, given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 I will return to issue of voluntariness and trust in later chapters. Holton (1994) argues against accounts 
that say trust entails belief (i.e., cognitive accounts) based on the idea that we sometimes trust voluntarily.  
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her behavior toward the employee. The employee’s complaint is not about what the boss 
did, that is, not about her behavior, but about the boss’s attitude toward him. By respecting 
the act/attitude distinction, one could say without contradiction that the boss trusted the 
employee in one sense but not another. Theorists should respect the suggested distinction 
in the above example and the linguistic competence of those presupposing it in 
communicative discourse. Fleshed out, examples of this kind suggest theoretical constraints 
on complete accounts of trust.  
There are finer distinctions to be made that stretch beyond the general act/attitude 
distinction. Following the lead of others philosophers, I motivate a distinction between two 
types of attitudes to which ordinary language users assign the label ‘trust’: propositional trust 
and interpersonal trust. To describe an attitude as the attitude of trust is therefore mistaken. 
Propositional trust, or “thin” trust as some philosophers call it, is something like an 
attitude of predictive expectation: namely, expectation about what others will do in 
response to one’s reliance (or dependence) on them.120 Interpersonal trust, or “thick trust,” 
is a much richer notion that typically applies most obviously to our relationships with those 
closest to us (e.g., family and friends). The two attitudes are not unrelated. In the remainder 
of this chapter, I aim to motivate the distinction and explain why it raises problems for 
theories that identify trust attitudes with predictive expectation. I contend that 
propositional trust need not entail interpersonal trust. One might trust that another person 
will do x without trusting the person.  
 
           	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 See McMyler (2011) and Faulkner (2011).  
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           3.1 Trust Attitudes and Expectation          
Some of the most significant issues in the trust literature—a literature that spans multiple 
academic fields—hinge on questions about the relationship between trust(s), belief and 
predictive expectation. In particular, I have in mind the question of whether and to what 
extent trust involves the attitudes of belief and predictive expectation. Some theorists, 
often political and social scientists, defend cognitive accounts on which trust (simpliciter) is, or 
entails, an attitude of belief or expectation. The idea of predictive expectation involved is 
basically a belief about what others will do; they are beliefs about the future or future 
behavior. Some such beliefs are about how others will respond to one’s reliance on them. 
Predictively expecting (or believing that) others will x involves an affirmative attitude 
toward the proposition that others will x.  
Diego Gambetta claims: “trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of 
the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of 
agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or 
independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it 
affects his own action.”121 Even Annette Baier’s earliest account includes an element not 
unlike expectation: “But intentional trusting does require awareness of one’s confidence 
that the trusted will not harm one, although they could harm one.”122 
Other theorists argue that trust attitudes involve, or just are, beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of others. Russell Hardin claims, “To say I trust you in some way is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Diego Gambetta, ‘Can we Trust Trust?’ In Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relationships, ed. Diego 
Gambetta (Oxford: Oxford Blackwell, 1987), p. 217 (original emphasis). On a related note, notice that 
Gambetta thinks trust—which he assumes is an attitude of expectation—entails non-monitoring. 
122 Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” p. 235. 
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nothing more than I know or believe certain things about you—generally things about your 
incentives or reasons for living up to my trust, to be trustworthy to me…The declarations 
‘I believe you are trustworthy’ and ‘I trust you’ are equivalent.”123 Of course, the devil is in 
the details, as they say. One’s view of trustworthiness will have ramifications for one’s 
overall view of trust attitudes on this sort of view. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will motivate the distinction between 
propositional trust and interpersonal trust. Propositional trust is a form of predictive 
expectation about what others will do, including what others will do in response to one’s 
reliance on them.  
 
 3.2 Motivating the Propositional/Interpersonal Distinction 
 
Suppose you visit a local coffee shop for the afternoon to do some work. While there you 
occasionally take breaks, leaving my computer on the table. Given sufficient thought, you 
might discover you have some (epistemic) reason to believe that strangers probably won’t 
steal your computer while you step away. For one, there’s some reason to believe that most 
people share your opinion that stealing others property is wrong, all things considered, and 
that they would not steal others’ property unless they were given good moral reason to. 
Second, circumstances at the coffee shop are not ideal for thievery, especially when many 
other people are nearby to serve to effectively monitor what’s around them, however 
intently. We might suppose that that’s what you believe anyway, and for good reason. But 
if these constitute your reasons for thinking your computer is safe—that the other patrons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), p. 10. See also, 
Arnon Keren, “Trust and Belief: A Preemptive-Reasons Account,” Synthese  Volume 191, Issue 12 (August 
2014), pp. 2593-2615. 
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will not take advantage of your reliance—you seem in some sense not to trust the other 
patrons. By leaving your computer you rely, indeed, trustfully rely on everyone else in the 
place to mind and to intervene should anyone attempt to take your computer. You abstain 
from taking precautions, making no real effort to minimize the risk of opportunistic 
behavior thereby exposing yourself to the limits of their goodwill. But, intuitively, you lack 
the kind of trust to which ‘trust’ typically refers when we say of some people, for example, 
our closest friends and family, that we trust them. For, we might suppose, you have no 
evidence to support their trustworthiness—that is, you have no epistemic reason to believe 
the other patrons are trustworthy. Sensitivity to epistemic reasons therefore rules out 
trusting strangers at the coffee shop.124 The same would probably true for most of us in 
similar circumstances. Otherwise, we wouldn’t go to such lengths to ensure the safety of 
our homes and those living in them.  
 The distinction working in the background is one between trusting that, or 
“propositional trust,” and trusting in, or “interpersonal trust.” Intuitively, there’s a 
difference between trusting that others will do x and trusting (or trusting in) others to do x. 
The distinction basically boils down to the objects of the closely-related attitudes. The 
objects of propositional trust attitudes are, as the name suggests, (strictly) propositions, 
where the objects of interpersonal trust are (at least in a sense) persons. In the coffee shop 
example, you merely trust that your fellow coffee shop patrons will not steal your 
computer. However, you do not trust them not to do so like you would a close friend sitting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 This does not mean I lack practical reasons for trusting others. However, practical reasons, as the label 
suggests, apply to the practical domain—they are reasons for doing things. With respect to belief, practical 
considerations may, at most, offer reasons to bring it about that one believes certain propositions. But bringing 
about a belief is an action. Practical considerations do not offer reasons that indicate the truth of 
propositions.  
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at a nearby table. You wouldn’t merely trust that your close friend would not steal your 
computer; you would trust your friend, the person, not to steal it.  
 Some theorists argue that only persons are potential objects of trust. 125  But 
propositional trust does not necessarily involve other people. Similarly, we trust that the 
sun will rise tomorrow we are not trusting the sun. Rather, in a manner of speaking, we 
trust the proposition <the sun will rise tomorrow>. We trust-that this proposition is true. 
As Godfrey says, “to term some statement true is to declare it to be trustworthy.”126  
Declaring a proposition trustworthy sounds strange, especially if in so doing we 
impute to it intentions or motivations; that would be absurd. Propositions are primary 
bearers of trust, objects of belief, referents of that-clauses, etc., not agents with intentions, 
motivations, beliefs, and desires. To say a proposition (or statement) is trustworthy simply 
means that it can be counted on as true, perhaps in one’s practical reasoning. Like people, 
propositions can be more or less trustworthy. The proposition <a democrat will win the 
next presidential election> is less trustworthy than the proposition <either a democrat or a 
republican will win the next presidential election>. The more probable the proposition, the 
more trustworthy it is; the less probable, the less trustworthy.  
 For instance, I trust that my car will continue functioning properly, I trust that the 
economy will improve, I trust that the summer will bring warm temperatures, and so on. 
However, I am not engaged in a trusting relationship with my car, the economy or the 
summer season; they aren’t the right sorts of entities. Ordinary ways of talking are 
therefore often incorrect because imprecise. People say things like, “I trust my car to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 One’s account of trust does not necessarily determine whether one should hold that only persons are 
objects of trust. 
126 Godfrey, Trust of People, Words, and God, p. 198. 
	  66	  	  
function properly.” But, according to orthodoxy, such statements are literally false. What 
people who make them mean to say—or what they should say—is something like, “I trust 
that my car will function properly.” This is straightforwardly a trust-that statement in 
keeping with orthodoxy. Propositional trust does not entail interpersonal trust. The two 
must be ontologically distinct. 
 What’s more, it even makes sense to say I trust that other people will continue 
being undependable—dependably undependable, if you will. I certainly don’t trust these 
people in any meaningful sense; I simply trust that they’ll likely let down those who rely 
upon them in ways related to their untrustworthiness. This may seem like a minor point, 
but it goes some way toward highlighting the distinction. The distinction still holds even 
when we trust that others will behave favorably on our behalf, where this trust (this 
propositional trust) is akin to, if not reducible to a predictive expectation that others will do 
what we want or need. 
 Ben McMyler (2011) offers a linguistic argument for the distinction that highlights 
the differing truth-conditions for trust-that and trust-(in) statements. 127  Consider the 
following statements: 
(1) James trusts that Frances will pay the mortgage on time. 
(2) James trusts Frances to pay the mortgage on time. 
 
Both (1) and (2) are attitude ascriptions, but each says (or means) something different.128 
The difference between these statements consists in the content each relates to James, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 McMyler (2011) also offers a grammatical argument. 
128 Read one way, (2), in particular, is an attitude ascription. Read another, as discussed earlier, (2) is an action 
ascription. That is, it could be understood as a statement about what James does and the way in which he does 
it. So, (1) may mean that James relies on Frances to pay the mortgage without monitoring her performance in 
this task—e.g., without constantly calling Frances on the day the mortgage is due to make sure she hasn’t 
forgotten. 
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difference that translates into distinct truth-conditions. The first statement ascribes to 
James an attitude toward a proposition embedded in a that-clause, namely, the proposition 
that Frances will pay the mortgage on time. Read as an attitude ascription, (1) states that 
James trusts that this proposition is true.129  
(2), on the other hand, explicitly relates James, not to a proposition, but to a person; 
it ascribes to James an attitude toward Frances. It says that James exhibits an attitude of 
trust toward Frances with respect to paying the mortgage on time. James’s believing that 
Frances will pay the mortgage is, at most, implicit. That being said, it seems rather 
implausible that James trusts Frances to pay the mortgage on time without trusting that she 
will. The truth-conditional differences between (1) and (2) could be chalked up to the fact 
that the entailment relation apparently runs in only one direction. Statement (2) seems to 
entail (1), but not the other way around.  
 To see why, imagine again that James asks Frances to pay the mortgage by 12 p.m., 
but advises her to do so by 11:15 a.m. to be on the safe side. Instead of simply placing trust 
in Frances, we might suppose that James has notified the bank to notify him in case 
Frances has not paid the mortgage by 11:15, giving him time to call and remind her.130 The 
odds of failure are low we might suppose, which explains why James expects Frances will 
pay the mortgage by the deadline. Does James trust Frances? Obviously no, or else he 
wouldn’t take such precautions to protect against possible mission failure. It makes sense, 
though, to say that James trusts that Frances will make the payment on time. Thus, in this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 As a consequence, James’s attitude is the sort of thing that can serve as evidence and/or a premise in an 
argument for relevant conclusions (e.g., that James won’t have to pay a penalty).  
130 Placing trust involves performing an act of trust—it’s the same as trustfully relying. Acts of trust are forms 
of willing unmonitored reliance. Pure unadulterated acts of trust are performed without taking any 
precautions against one’s interaction partner. 
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scenario, (1) is true and (2) is false. James trusts that Frances will pay the mortgage on time, 
but does not trust her to; he simply trusts (that) she will do it. Another way of putting the 
point is this: James knows he can count on the task getting done (he expects it to get done) 
but he apparently does not think he can count on Frances to do it without monitoring her 
performance. Propositional trust is consistent with expecting that others will do something 
because one monitors their performance. But this seems to be inconsistent with, or at least 
it signals, a lack of another important kind of trust attitude, namely, thick attitudes of 
interpersonal trust (or trust in). Predicting someone will do something is thus not the same 
as trusting her to do it.  
Diego Gambetta’s account, which identifies trust with a particular level of 
subjective probability (whatever level that may be) about what others will do, has built into 
it a non-monitoring condition. 131  Subjective probabilities plausibly represent levels of 
predictive expectation that a proposition will turn out true—in the case of Gambetta’s 
account, expectations about the future behavior with others. So, Gambetta’s view does not 
involve trusting others, despite the addition of a non-monitoring condition. 
 Propositional trust does, however, prima facie indicate interpersonal trust’s presence. 
That is, one’s trusting that others will work favorably on one’s behalf is prima facie 
(defeasible) evidence that one trusts others (i.e., the people). Because it does not entail 
interpersonal trust, though, one’s trusting (the truth of) a proposition (“that S will do x”) 
offers only fallible evidence that one trusts the subject of the S will do x proposition. What’s 
more, trust-that statements often communicate a lack of trust (or at the very least, a lack of 
complete trust) to those whom such statements are addressed, as when, for instance, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Gambetta, “Can We Trust Trust?,” p. 217 (original emphasis).  
	  69	  	  
parents of a teenage daughter say, “We trust (that) you won’t throw any parties.” Parent’s 
who say such things could either mean that they predict their daughter will behave or that 
they demand good behavior, or else! If the latter, the teenager’s parents probably mean 
more to communicate a veiled threat or to reiterate normative expectations than to offer 
confidence, expectation or belief that those expectations will be met. If anything, they 
merely accept, that is, take to be true in their practical reasoning that their daughter will 
behave by planning their activities, the duration of their absence, and so on, around the 
assumption that she will behave.132 The above statement, read either to convey predictive 
or normative expectation, advertises their willingness to form strong reactive attitudes in 
response to a possible breach of placed trust.133  
 It seems that trusting others to do x requires trusting that they will do x; at least it 
entails the disposition to expect they will x. There’s nothing inconsistent in saying that I 
trust my friend with respect to x but believe he will not pull through on some particular 
occasion O. Trusting others does not require an expectation of perfection. I trust others 
even though I know they may not always make good on my trust for one reason or other. 
Not expecting a friend to pull through in the relevant domain of trust could be chalked up 
to any number of reasons. Maybe one thinks one’s friend is having a bad day or is not 
feeling up to the task.  
Trusting that others will do x obviously does not presuppose trusting them to do x, 
as the last example above purportedly demonstrates, in which case propositional trust and 
trust are related, though ontologically distinct. (1) and (2) therefore have disparate truth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 John Bishop defends an account of faith on which faith involves taking “faith propositions” (e.g., religious 
propositions) to be true. See John Bishop, Believing by Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
133 See Richard Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1994).	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conditions; (1) may be true even if (2) is false. Strictly speaking, (2) does not entail (1) since, 
as suggested above, the kind of trust expressed in (2), interpersonal trust, does not require 
the trustor to expect favorable results on every occasion of dependence. But it seems 
unlikely, even incoherent, to claim that James trusts Frances concerning timely mortgage 
payment if he does not typically expect her to pay it on time when given the task. 
 Consider a modified version of the coffee shop example with which we began this 
section. This time suppose you visit the coffee shop with your close friend. Like before, 
but especially in this imagined scenario, you expect that your computer will be on your 
table when you return. You expect (believe) that neither your friend nor any stranger will 
steal your computer. Of course, you have reason to believe he won’t. You know where he 
lives! But that’s not why you expect him to refrain from stealing your computer. More 
accurately, you probably expect this because you trust in him. In other words, you trust that 
your computer is safe because you trust your friend. Concerning the strangers, on the other 
hand, your expectation probably has something to do with features of the circumstances as 
described above. You do not trust your friend because (for the reason that) you expect him 
to refrain from stealing you computer.134 The explanations of expectation with respect to 
my friend and the strangers differ.  
 These considerations suggest that views that render trust (the attitude) tout court 
solely a matter of (positive) expectation about what others will do are inadequate. These 
views cannot capture the intuitive distinction motivated in this section. Even if the notion 
of expectation can capture one type of trust, namely, propositional trust, it fails to capture 
interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust is, in my view, the attitude to which people typically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 The ‘because’ in this latter sentence should be read as saying something similar to the following sentence: 
“One is in a baseball stadium because she is in Fenway Park.”  
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refer when they speak of trusting a friend or close relative. Predictively expecting someone 
to keep a secret may suffice for propositional trust, but it is insufficient for the thicker, 
interpersonal attitude.  
In the next section, I consider whether introducing another type of expectation can 
adequately capture the difference between propositional and interpersonal trust attitudes, 
namely, normative expectation. I will discuss what Martin Hollis, in particular, has to say 
about the matter.  
 
        3.3 Hollis and Faulkner on Trust and Expectation      
Martin Hollis (1998) and Paul Faulkner (2011) distinguish two varieties of trust based on 
the types of expectation they entail, specifically, predictive and normative expectation. The 
fundamental distinction is one between expecting that (predictive expectation) and 
expecting of (normative expectation). Normative expectations plausibly involve believing 
certain propositions true. The propositions, though, are about what others ought to do, not 
what they will do, as with predictive expectation.135 Expecting x of someone is a matter of 
believing that they ought to x, and not a matter of believing that they will x. 
According to Hollis, the first variety of trust is solely a matter of predictive 
expectation. It’s common to speak of trusting natural entities and inanimate objects in this 
sense. One might, for example, trust that it will be hot in June or trust that one’s alarm 
clock will go off at the right time.136 Hollis has seemingly identified what I’ve called 
“propositional trust.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 The ‘ought’ may refer to prudential, practical or moral ought’s. 
136 Martin Hollis, Trust Within Reason. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 10.  
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The same is true for people, as I explained in the last section. Consider Baier’s 
example of Kant’s neighbors who count on his dependable habits to tell the time of day, 
kind of like a reliable alarm clock. The neighbors trust that (that is, predictively expect) 
Kant will keep to his regular schedule—for example, that he’ll eat and take walks at the 
same time every day. They do not, however, trust Kant to continue his daily routine. 
Likewise, I may trust that you will bring a 16 oz. coffee to work this morning because that’s 
what you do every weekday, though I’m not trusting you too bring the coffee. These 
examples represent instances of trust that are the product of a reliable inductive inference. 
In this sense, “trust is a matter of warranted prediction.”137 
We not only trust others to behave predictably—in other words, trust that they will 
behave predictably—like we do inanimate objects and the natural world. As Hollis says, 
“we trust one another to do what is right.”138 In this sense, trust involves normative 
expectation in that the trustor expects the trustee to act as she ought. Kant’s neighbor’s 
trust does not entail normative expectation. By trusting that Kant will keep his daily 
schedule, they do not necessarily trust him “to do what is right.” Other things equal, Kant 
is not obligated to keep his daily schedule, at least not for his neighbor’s sake. Neither do 
you have any obligation to bring your 16 oz. coffee to work each morning. I predictively 
expect that you will continue this habit, but I do not (and perhaps should not) expect this 
of you, other things equal. That is, I might expect that you will bring your 16 oz. coffee 
without believing that you ought to bring it.  
Concerning the distinction, Hollis writes: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Ibid., p. 10.  
138 Ibid., p. 10. 
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When I lend you my copy of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, I trust you to return 
it. I expect you to return it even though we both know that I am far too scatty to 
remember that you have it. In what sense exactly do I expect it? In part, no doubt, 
I predict you will, since I would hardly lend you the book if I thought you too 
careless or dishonest to rely on…I also expect of you that you will return my copy 
of Kant. I am entitled to have it back, and you are at fault if you do not oblige.139 
 
The type of entitlement at work in this example is plausibly a positive right.140 Positive 
rights can originate by agreement, whether tacit or explicit as with contracts. By borrowing 
someone’s book you at least tacitly agree to return it with the understanding that the owner 
wants it back. This is not so for Kant’s neighbors who by supposition have not entered 
into any such relationship. Kant, we might suppose, doesn’t even know that his neighbors 
relied on his dependable habits.  
Following Baier (1986), the neighbors could not rightfully feel betrayed if Kant 
sleeps in one day thereby throwing them off schedule. Kant’s neighbors may reasonably 
predict that he will perform certain tasks at certain times of the day, but they cannot 
rightfully expect these performances of him. A plausible explanation of this fact is that the 
type of trust at play here is mere propositional trust. That’s not to say normative 
expectations are never present when we predictively expect that others will act favorably on 
our behalf when we (actively and even trustfully) depend on them to.  
Consider again the statement, “James trusts that Frances will pay the mortgage on 
time.” Assuming Frances willingly (non-coercively) agreed to pay the mortgage on time, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Ibid., p. 11 (original emphasis). 
140 This is how John Arthur understands the genesis of positive rights. Arthur distinguishes positive and 
negative rights in his seminal paper against Peter Singer’s view on the proper response to world poverty. 
Other forms of entitlement involve deserts. See John Arthur, “World Hunger and Moral Obligation: The 
Case Against Singer,” In Exploring Ethics: An Introductory Anthology. Steven M. Cahn (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), originally published in 1984. The distinction is similar to Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) 
distinction between positive and negative liberties. See Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” In Isaiah 
Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty. (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). 
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James can rightfully expect timely payment of Frances and hold her (morally) responsible if 
she fails to pull through. Undoubtedly, in some circumstances we predict that others will 
act favorably on our behalf when we depend on them to in the absence of normative 
expectation. Suppose that I, like James, trust that Frances will pay the (their) mortgage on 
time, but as a third party. Unlike James, though, I could not rightfully expect this of her. 
My trusting that Frances will pay the mortgage on time is analogous to my trusting that 
certain natural events will occur, for instance that it will rain in the month of April. 
Expecting rain of April, in the sense described, or holding the month of April (morally or 
causally) responsible if it doesn’t rain is absurd.141  
Faulkner (2011) also characterizes the difference between the thin and thick 
notions of trust in terms of the type of expectation they entail. He refers to the thinner 
notion as “predictive trust,” and the thicker notion, as he understands it, as “affective 
trust”. According to Faulkner, “Predictive trust is simply a judgement of reliability made in 
a situation of dependence.”142 He defines the attitude more formally as follows: 
A trusts S to φ (in the predictive sense) if and only if (1) A depends on S φ-ing and 
(2) A expects S to φ (where A expects this in the sense that A predicts that S will 
φ.143 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Margaret Urban Walker (2006) defends an account similar to Richard Holton’s (1994) on which trust 
involves taking a participant stance toward others, which is a readiness to feel betrayed. According to Walker, 
by taking a participant stance toward others we hold them responsible for their response to our trust. See 
Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrong Doing. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). The participant stance account fits with the commonly held view in social psychology 
that attitudes are “states of readiness.” 141 See Russell H. Fazio’s and Richard E. Petty’s introduction to Part 1 
“Conceptualizing Attitudes” in Attitudes: Their Structure, Function, and Consequences, Fazio and Petty (eds.) (New 
York: Psychology Press, 2008), p. 2. See also, G. W. Allport, “Attitudes,” in C. Murchison (ed.), Handbook of 
Social Psychology (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University Press, 1935), p. 810. 
142 Paul Faulkner, Knowledge on Trust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 144. 
143 Ibid., p. 145. 
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The thicker notion, affective trust, is merely a matter of normative expectation in the 
context of dependence, not predictive expectation. Faulkner defines affective trust this 
way: 
A trusts S to φ (in the affective sense) if and only if (1) A depends on S φ-ing and 
(2) A expects (1) to motivate S to φ (where A expects this in the sense that A 
expects it of S that S be moved by the reason to φ given by (1)).144  
 
Notice that affective trust does not entail predicting that others will do what one needs. 
Faulkner further explains the distinction between predictive trust and affective trust, saying: 
“The contrast is between expecting that something will happen and expecting something of 
someone. When we expect something of someone we are susceptible to certain reactive 
attitudes if they do not do what is expected.”145 Affective trust, though, does not entail 
believing that others will pull through for us, according to Faulkner.146 
 Both Hollis and Faulkner highlight an important distinction in hopes of capturing 
something like the distinction motivated in this chapter. With the notion of normative 
expectation, we can partially explain why the propositions expressed by sentences (1) and 
(2)—i.e., “James trusts that Frances will pay the mortgage on time” and “James trusts 
Frances to pay the mortgage on time”—have different truth conditions. That one predicts 
others will x says nothing about whether others should x or about whether one rightfully 
expects x of others. Prediction alone does not entail normative expectations.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Ibid., p. 146. 
145 Ibid., p. 147. 
146 Faulkner claims, “…an attitude of trust [i.e., affective trust] may bracket certain beliefs or posit certain things 
that are not believed. So in trusting her new employee the shopkeeper brackets her belief that he might well 
prove undesirable and thereby gives him the benefit of the doubt…Antecedent to the decision to trust S to φ, 
A may or may not have believed this about S, but adopting the attitude of affective trust commits A to 
accepting these propositions about S” (Ibid., p. 152). 
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However, the notion of normative expectation cannot completely capture what it 
means to trust in someone, not even in tandem with the notion of predictive expectation. 
James might trust that Frances will pay the mortgage on time, for whatever reason, and 
Frances might indeed (morally, practically, etc.) ought to. Because she ought to pay the 
mortgage on time, and James believes she ought to, does not mean that James trusts her 
to—that is, it does not mean James trust in Frances. Frances could rightly accuse James of 
not trusting her even if he expects of Frances timely payment of the mortgage.  
Just because we normatively expect things of others does not mean we trust them 
in the thick sense. For example, most people believe that strangers ought not steal their 
property. That doesn’t mean we trust them not to steal our property. I might, for instance, 
live in a secure neighborhood with cameras, security guards, etc. I believe that strangers 
ought not steal my property and I predict that they will not, but only because I think the 
neighborhood’s security will scare off possible intruders. This strongly suggests I do not 
trust strangers not to steal my property.147 So, predictive expectation plus normative 
expectation in contexts of reliance cannot capture the thicker attitude.  
Intuitively, I could predict that you will perform some task on my behalf, expect of 
you to perform the task, but still lack trust in you. Suppose I lend you money. I might both 
expect repayment of you by the agreed upon date and predict (trust that) that you will pay 
it back but only because I know you worry I will take legal action if you do not. I don’t 
think you would be likely to pay it back in a timely manner unless you felt threatened by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 In Chapter 4, I contend that the thick attitude of interpersonal trust (trust in) entails the disposition to 
believe that others will pull through for one in cases of reliance because one needs them to.  
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possible legal action—whether or not I make an explicit threat.148 It seems unlikely that I 
trust you to repay your debt. At least a partial explanation for why a dual-expectation view 
cannot account for interpersonal trust is that the thicker attitude requires beliefs that others 
are trustworthy. I will argue for this claim in Chapter 4.  
In the next section, I consider the relationship between reliance and attitudes of 
trust. In my view, thick attitudes of interpersonal trust do not entail actual reliance on 
others. 
  
       3.4 Trust Attitudes and Actual Reliance                 
Before proceeding to the next chapter let me briefly consider whether attitudes of trust 
require actual reliance on others and, if so, whether it must be trust reliance (i.e., acts of 
trust). The examples discussed in this chapter have all dealt with trust attitudes in the 
context of actual (interpersonal) dependence. Let’s consider propositional trust for the 
moment.  
As I’ve described it, propositional trust as predictive expectation typically involves 
actual reliance on others, whether evidently or not. The attitude is basically what Faulkner 
refers to as “predictive trust.” This is plausibly true even when the relevant predictive 
expectation has nothing to do with others doing anything on our behalf. For instance, 
predicting (trusting that) Crosby, Stills, and Nash will get the band back together does not 
involve them doing anything on my behalf, though the truth value of my prediction, and 
my doxastic life to some extent, depend on their actions. Propositional trust, though, does 
not require trust reliance, even when the reliance is of the active (as discussed in Chapter 2) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 As I explained in Chapter 2, making threats of the sort is inconsistent with trustfully relying on others (i.e., 
performing an act of trust). I might expect that you will do something precisely because I take precautions. 
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variety. Predictions about the future behavior of others may be based solely on the fact that 
one has taken precautions against others to practically ensure a favorable result—for 
instance, one is explicitly monitoring the performance of others.  
Now consider the yet undefined thick attitude of interpersonal trust—again, the 
kind of trust we typically have in those closest to us (e.g., friends). Though interpersonal 
trust often disposes us to trustfully rely on the objects of the attitude, it seems consistent 
with this attitude that one never actually relies on the objects of the attitude. The attitude 
can be detached from actual reliance. It is sustainable before, after, and in between 
instances of reliance, though of course, as I discuss in Chapter 4, the attitude generally 
arises because we have evidence that others are trustworthy from past experience 
interacting with them. In fact, it seems consistent with this attitude that one never relies on 
the objects of the attitude.149 If I trust my friend in this sense, then I will often be disposed to 
trustfully relying and to believing certain things about my dependence—e.g., that it will 
turn out well—were I to rely. For instance, I might trust this friend in the thick attitude 
sense with my children’s lives, but never ask her to watch them. Perhaps there’s never any 
practical reason to. Were I ever needing someone to watch my children, and the friend 
were available, I wouldn’t hesitate for a minute—other than not wanting to burden her—to 
ask for help without feeling the need to monitor their performance. Maybe circumstances 
of the relationship, for example, that this friend lives far away, explain why (and dictate 
that) I never trustfully rely on her to watch my children. Nonetheless, I trust my friend 
with my children’s lives.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Looking ahead, social psychologists working in the area of attitudes have found strong evidence of 
attitude-behavior inconsistency, strong enough to reject behavioral requirements on holding attitudes.  
	  79	  	  
 Making sense of certain uses of ‘trust’ (and forms of trust) is difficult when we 
assume that every use has as its referent something that either is (with added ingredients) 
or entails actual dependence. The question, “Do you trust me?,” clearly makes the most 
sense when understood as an attitude toward the referent of ‘me’—that is, as a question 
about whether one person interpersonally trusts another. Asking this question of another 
would be appropriate both before a particular instance of dependence, before any 
dependence whatsoever (e.g., in new relationships), and when the possibility of actual 
reliance is quite low as in the example directly above.150 The question, then, strongly 
suggests an attitude that does not necessarily require actual dependence. One might object 
by arguing that affirmative answer to the above question must, at the very least, have 
something to do with the expected outcome of potential dependence. That’s largely my 
point, but further, the attitude is not strictly speaking about potential dependence but 
about the person asking the question. I return to this thought below.  
 Completely divorcing the concept of interpersonal trust from dependence would be 
a mistake. For the content of thick attitudes of interpersonal trust is at least partially about 
the trustworthiness of others. More specifically, interpersonal trust plausibly entails beliefs 
that others are trustworthy. The content of such beliefs has something to do with what 
others would do were we to let our guards down and entrust something of value to them. 
The attitude is not restricted to our opinions (or feelings) about others in circumstances of 
actual reliance, though the attitude often influences our beliefs about what others will do 
when we actually rely. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Note also that this question is a best odd, and at worst nonsense, if ‘trust’ refers to a certain way of relying. 
If by asking the question, “Do you trust me?,” one meant to refer to the act of trust (i.e., trust reliance), this 
sentence would not make sense. Instead, one should ask, “Are you trusting me?” There are also problems if 
we understand, as does Schellenberg (2005), to refer to action dispositions. I will hold off discussing 
Schellenberg’s view until Chapter Five when discuss challenges to the view presented in this chapter. 
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         3.5 Conclusion 
Propositional trust is a form of predictive expectation. Some theorists articulate views that 
identify trust with predictive expectation where to trust someone with respect to x means 
that one expects that person to x where one actually depends on her to x. However, there 
are two problems with this view. The first: that some forms of trust—the kind such views 
are at pains to describe—do not require actual dependence, as I explained before. The 
second: that predictive expectation, even if it were necessary for some form of trust, is 
insufficient for the type of attitude views that emphasize expectation attempt to explain, 
namely, attitudes of trust. After all, I might expect you to pay your debt but expect this for 
non-trusting reasons, for example, because I’ve threatened you. Using trust language makes 
sense here, to say I trust that you will pay your debt. This type of trust is simply what I’ve 
called propositional trust understood simply as an attitude of predictive expectation. Even 
if I trust that (i.e., expect or believe that) you will repay me, I might still not trust you in the 
sense we often normatively expect from others, especially the people closest to us. Trusting 
you involves an interpersonal connection between trustor and trustee, one for which views 
that identify trust with mere predictive expectation cannot account.  
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                   Chapter  4                        
            
                   ON ATTITUDES OF INTERPERSONAL TRUST 
 
 
 
In Chapter 3, I distinguished propositional trust from interpersonal trust. Attitudes of 
interpersonal trust (hereafter, “interpersonal trust” or “trust in”) must be something more 
than an expectation that others will (or would) offer a favorable return on our dependence, 
or something else entirely. For we often trust that (predictively expect) others to act 
favorably on our behalf because we trust in them. Interpersonal trust can, and often does, 
explain the presence of predictive expectations constitutive of propositional trust.  
With that in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to get clearer on the nature of 
interpersonal trust. My sketch of a view draws on the social psychology literature on 
attitudes, which I will discuss in some detail. First, I distinguish two types of views about 
the nature of interpersonal trust found in the literature: cognitive and non-cognitive (or affective) 
views, as I call them. The primary disagreement between the camps is over whether trust in 
others entails an attitude of belief, specifically, beliefs that others are trustworthy, or trust 
beliefs.151 I will not argue directly against non-cognitivism but I show that cognitivism offers 
a superior account of interpersonal trust, in part because it can account for certain non-
cognitivist intuitions while respecting the empirical evidence in social psychology on 
attitudes. To home in on my view, I will discuss and critique two cognitivist views, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 I borrow this term from Ken J. Rotenberg, “The Conceptualization of Interpersonal Trust: A Basis, 
Domain, and Target Framework,” In Interpersonal Trust During Childhood and Adolescence, K.J. Rotenberg (ed.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Hieronymi (2008) refers to beliefs in trustworthiness as 
“trusting beliefs”. See Pamela Hieronymi, “The Reasons of Trust”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 2 
(June 2008): pp. 213-236. 
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specifically, the views of Russell Hardin (2002; 2006) and Linda Zagzebski (2012). I end by 
briefly highlighting some plausible consequences of cognitivism.    
 
     4.1 Two Views About Interpersonal Trust 
Many theorists agree that trust is an attitude, but disagree over the attitude’s nature.152 
There are two broad views about the attitude: cognitivism and non-cognitivism (or affectivism). 
I’m going to argue that cognitivism is the correct view. To do that I must briefly explain 
the basic differences between these views.  
Cognitivism is the view that attitudes of trust involve or reduce to beliefs. Some of 
these cognitivists take the relevant belief to be about what others will do (or are doing) in 
response to one’s reliance on them. But, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, there seems to be a 
difference between predicting that others will x (trusting that they will x) and trusting others 
to x (trusting in others)—even if others also ought to x. Cognitivism about interpersonal 
trust, then, must involve more than, if not something completely different from beliefs 
about what others will do in response to one’s reliance, possible or actual.  
There is another cognitivist option in the literature. On this alterative, interpersonal 
trust implies a belief that the trustee is trustworthy. Call such beliefs “trust beliefs.” Some 
go as far as identifying interpersonal trust with trust beliefs, I will argue for the weaker 
claim that interpersonal trust involves trust beliefs, though I’m inclined to accept the 
stronger view. Call views that identify interpersonal trust with trust beliefs “strong 
cognitivism,” and views holding that interpersonal trust merely implies trust beliefs, “weak 
cognitivism.” Russell Hardin (2002) apparently endorses strong cognitivism: “The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Karen Jones (1996) is one such philosopher who acknowledges that trust comes in many forms. Her 
primary target of analysis is trust as an attitude.  
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declarations ‘I believe you are trustworthy’ and ‘I trust you’ are equivalent. 153  Linda 
Zagzebski (2012) endorses weak cognitivism. According to Zagzebski, trust involves 
affective and behavioral components in addition to the trust belief. 154  I will discuss 
Hardin’s view in 4.4 and Zagzebski’s view in 4.5. 
 Some theorists reject cognitivism for non-cognitivism (or affectivism), arguing 
instead that interpersonal trust is a non-cognitive attitude such as an emotion or feeling of 
confidence, or (non-cognitive) sense of security.155 Karen Jones (1996), for instance, argues 
that trust (effectively) an attitude of optimism (or confidence), which “is to be cashed out 
not primarily in terms of beliefs about the other’s trustworthiness, but rather—in 
accordance with certain contemporary accounts of emotions—in terms of a distinctive and 
affectively loaded way of seeing the one trusted.”156 Laurence Becker (1996) argues that 
trust is a non-cognitive “sense of security about other people’s benevolence, 
conscientiousness, and reciprocity,”157 and “a disposition to have confidence in other 
people’s motives, to banish suspicious thoughts about them.”158 Both Becker and Jones 
make trust primarily a matter of affect—indeed, closely related affects—and both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), p. 10. Arnon Keren 
(2014) argues that trust simply requires trust beliefs, not that trust is a belief about trustworthiness. Keren, 
though, neither distinguishes acts of trust from attitudes of trust, nor propositional trust from interpersonal 
trust. His account could be read, though, as an account of the thicker attitude of interpersonal trust. See 
Arnon Keren, “Trust and Belief: A Preemptive Reasons Account,” Synthese (2014) 191: pp. 2593-2615. 
154 See Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy of Belief (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p. 36-37. 
155 See Jones (1996) and Becker (1996) for views that identify trust (at least partially) with feelings of trust 
(Jones) or feelings of security (Becker). Lahno (2001) argues that trust is an emotion. I will not discuss the 
reasons for thinking that feelings and emotions are different.  
156 Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” p. 4. 
157 Becker, “Trust as Noncognitive Security About Motives,” p. 43. 
158 Ibid., p. 46. 
	  84	  	  
emphasize the significance of feeling secure or optimistic about other people’s motives 
over beliefs about other people’s trustworthiness. Trust beliefs, according to Jones and 
Becker, aren’t even necessary for interpersonal trust. Trust in others is a matter of proper 
affect. I will neither discuss Jones’s and Becker’s specific proposals in detail nor criticize 
them directly. However, I will make a few comments in Chapters 4 and 5, particularly 
concerning how cognitivists might respect certain of these philosophers’ intuitions.   
 My case for cognitivism depends on a proper understanding of attitudes. To get a 
better grasp of attitudes, I survey some of the literature on attitudes in social psychology. 
As one would expect, social psychologists working in the area disagree about the nature of 
attitudes. I will not wade too deeply into the debate, though I offer some take-a-ways from 
the discussion. The plausible two-component view that emerges from our discussion will 
provide an empirical tether for my cognitivist view of interpersonal trust. 
        
  4.2 What are Attitudes, Anyway? 
A long standing tradition in social psychology has it that attitudes are “states of readiness” 
that prepare us to respond to circumstances or to others in appropriate ways.159 This 
tradition stretches back G. W. Allport who claimed, “An attitude is a mental and neural 
state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting direct and dynamic influence 
upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it is related.”160 
Though contemporary social psychologists mostly reject the details of Allport’s view, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 See Russell H. Fazio’s and Richard E. Petty’s introduction to Part 1 “Conceptualizing Attitudes” in 
Attitudes: Their Structure, Function, and Consequences, R. Fazio and R. Petty (eds.) (New York: Psychology Press, 
2008), p. 2.  
160 G. W. Allport, “Attitudes,” in C. Murchison (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology (Worcester, Mass.: Clark 
University Press, 1935), p. 810. 
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idea that attitudes are states of readiness remains “central to the concept of attitude as it is 
used today…”161  Exactly which states of readiness are involved will depend on the 
particular attitude and the circumstances or context.  
Richard Holton’s account of trust draws upon this “state of readiness” 
understanding of attitudes. For Holton, trust is an attitude in which trustors take a 
“participant stance” toward others.162 By taking a participant stance we are, to use Allport’s 
phrase, in a “state of readiness,” ready to react should others betray our trust. But to simply 
say an attitude is a “state of readiness” is not yet to say very much. What kind of state are 
attitudes such that they prepare us to respond appropriately to circumstances or other 
people? Are they cognitive states, emotional or affective states, behavioral dispositions, 
some combination thereof, or something else entirely? I aim to show that interpersonal 
trust involves cognitive and affective dispositions that often affect behavior toward the 
object of trust.  
To motivate this two-component view of interpersonal trust, I begin by looking at 
the tripartite model of attitudes.163 Like many others, I reject the tripartite model of 
attitudes. After briefly explaining the tripartite model and the primary objection to it—an 
objection that hinges on the traditional understanding of the attitude-behavior 
relationship—I offer two responses, both of which take seriously the significance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Ibid., p. 2. 
162 See Richard Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1994): 
pp. 63-74. 
163 Both propositional trust and interpersonal trust, as attitudes, are states of readiness to react in certain ways 
to circumstances. Take propositional trust. People typically show surprise when circumstances (or other 
people) confound their (predictive) expectations.  
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objection while respecting the tripartite theorist’s intuitions, particularly about the attitude-
behavior connection.    
 
4.2.1 The Tripartite Model of Attitudes 
An influential model of attitudes, and the most popular type of model among early social 
psychologists, is the three-component or tripartite model.164 This model “would suggest 
that attitudes consist of three classes of response (affective, cognitive, and behavioral) to a 
stimulus, or attitude, object.”165 On this view “an attitude consists of how we feel, what we 
think, and what we are inclined to do about an attitude object.”166 For instance, a positive 
or favorable attitude toward other people will consist of certain favorable feelings and 
positive thoughts about them in addition to particular behavioral manifestations indicative 
of this favorable attitude.  
 The exact natures of the thought and feeling components, in particular, are unclear. 
One plausible understanding has it that “what we think” just is what we believe. That is, 
the thought/cognitive component reduces to belief. But belief itself is an attitude. This 
would make for a strange and complicated view if the attitude of belief entailed a belief 
component in addition to an affective and behavioral component. However, the tripartite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 I borrow this term from Zanna and Rempel, “Attitudes: A New Look at an Old Concept,” In Attitudes: 
Their Structure, Function, and Consequences, R. Fazio and R. Petty (eds.) (New York: Psychology Press, 2008) 
165 Fazio and Petty (2008), p. 7. See S. J. Breckler, ‘Empirical Validation of Affect, Behavior, and Cognition as 
Distinct Components of Attitude. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47 1191-1205. 
166 Ibid, 7. Zanna and Rempel cite Milton Rosenberg and Carl Hovland as early proponents of the view. See 
M. J. Rosenberg and C. I. Hovland, “Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Components of Attitude,” in M. J. 
Rosenberg, C.I. Hovland, W. McGuire, R. Ableson, and J. Brehm (eds.), Attitude Organization and Change: An 
Analysis of Consistency Among Attitude Components. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1960). Zanna and 
Rempel cite S. J. Breckler (1984) as offering empirical support for the tripartite view. See S.J. Breckler, 
“Empirical Validation of Affect, Behavior, and Cognition as Distinct Components of Attitude,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 47 (1984): 1191-205. 
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theorist need not reduce the cognitive component, analyzed in terms of what we think, to 
belief. It could be instead be something irreducible, yet a part of belief, given belief, too, is 
an attitude of sorts. Similar issues arise concerning attitude’s feeling component.  
Consider how the tripartite theorist might analyze resentment. To say that x resents 
y would roughly mean something like this: x thinks y acts (or has acted) wrongly toward x, 
x feels resentful which among other things, may involve feeling perturbed about y’s 
treatment of x, and x manifests these thoughts and feelings by telling y about it or showing 
explicit signs of distress in response to y’s behavior. Now consider gratitude. To say that x 
is grateful of y—i.e., takes an attitude of gratitude toward—roughly means: x has some sort 
of positive thoughts toward y, such as the thought that y has done something nice for x, x 
feels gratitude, which may come with other feelings (e.g., joy), and x behaves as if x is 
grateful of y, for example, by telling y or manifesting some other behavioral sign of 
appreciation.  
There are undoubtedly other ways of analyzing the attitudes of resentment and 
gratitude in accordance with the tripartite view. I’ve offered the above formulations to 
illustrate what a tripartite theorist might say. A similar formula would apply to any other 
attitude, though again, the details might differ from theorist to theorist. I will now briefly 
explain the tripartite model of attitudes before moving to competing views.  
 
4.2.2 Problems with the Tripartite Model: Jettisoning the Behavioral Component 
Tripartite views have fallen somewhat out of favor due to the fact that they treat the 
relationship between attitude and the three components as fail safe. The tripartite model 
predicts, as a matter of “definitional necessity,” that a person’s having certain beliefs 
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(perhaps favorable) about an object O will lead that person to behave in a very particular 
way (e.g., favorably) toward O.167  The relationship between the three components—
thought, feeling, and behavior—as it pertains to attitude is empirical. And, as Zanna and 
Rempel note, studies suggest the attitude-behavioral relation can come apart.  
Yet, what are we to make of a person who fails to behave consistently with his or 
her beliefs about some object? Does that person not have an attitude? If the answer 
were to be “yes,” then we are essentially “defining away” interesting questions and 
empirical research. There is no reason to ask about the consistency between 
attitudes and behavior if consistent behavior is a pre-condition for application of 
the attitude concept.168  
 
The problem with the tripartite model as traditionally explained is that behavior 
does not always reflect or manifest the appropriate attitude. A resentful person who hides 
their resentment for whatever reason (e.g., for fear of confrontation) represents one such 
example. Alternatively, one might never have the opportunity to express one’s attitude in 
behavior. As we’ll see later, similar considerations apply to the belief-behavior relationship.  
Some social psychologists reject the tripartite model in favor of two-component or 
one-component models that, at the very least, jettison the behavioral component 
altogether. A two-component, affective-cognitive model would require the least revision.169 
The primary problem with the tripartite model, after all, is the result of the model’s 
behavioral component. But why not opt for a single component view? On a single-
component, affective view attitudes would amount to how we feel about the attitude object 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 See Zanna and Rempel (2008). 
168 Fazio and Petty, Attitudes: Their Structure, Function, and Consequences, p. 2. 
169 Zanna and Rempel (2008) cite the following as proponents of two-component (i.e., cognitive and affective 
component) views: D. Fleming, “Attitude: The History of the Concept,” in Perspectives in American History, vol. 
1, D. Fleming and B. Bailyn (eds.) (Cambridge, MA: Charles Warren Center in American History, Harvard 
University, 1967); M. P. Zajonc and H. Markus, “Affective and Cognitive Factors in Preferences,” Journal of 
Consumer Research (1982) 9: 123-31; R.P. Bagozzi and R.E. Burnkrant, “Attitude Organization and the 
Attitude-Behavior Relationship,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 (1979), pp. 913-29. 
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(or the feelings we feel in response to an object stimulus). Such a view would say that 
thoughts or beliefs about the object of the attitude do not constitute attitudes. However, an 
affective view of attitudes clearly runs afoul of the commonly-held intuition that belief, 
itself an attitude, involves some sort of thought (or representational) component. This 
intuition is enough to reject a single-component affective view unless emotion has a 
cognitive component. I’ll briefly discuss belief below. To my knowledge, no one has 
defended a single-component view focusing on either of the other components of the 
tripartite analysis, so I’ll move on. I now offer three possible responses to the primary 
objection to the tripartite model.  
 
4.2.3 Two Responses to the Objection to the Tripartite Model 
 
Opponents of the tripartite model rightly reject the traditional formulation of it for the 
reasons articulated above, namely, because of the attitude-behavior inconsistency where an 
expected behavioral response need not occur in every circumstance where the relevant 
attitude becomes salient.170 Empirical evidence suggests the possibility of inconsistency 
between any combination of belief, affect, and behavior. That is to say, these alleged 
“components” can and do come apart in our attitude taking. One still has an attitude of 
sorts when behaving as if one’s clunker car is safe, even when does not feel or believe so 
(e.g., driving the car despite fears about its reliability), and vice versa.  
There are two promising responses available to the pro-tripartite theorist. First, the 
tripartite theorist might deny the behavioral-attitude relation is one of “definitional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 From what Zanna and Rempel say, it appears they think the attitude-affect relation can come apart too. 
They regard attitude as an evaluative notion: “We regard an attitude as the categorization of a stimulus object 
along an evaluative dimension based upon, or generated from, three general classes of information, and/or 
(3) information concerning past behaviors or behavioral intentions” (2008, p. 9). 
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necessity” in the sense the objection assumes. This response, though, considers behavioral 
components not as necessary manifestations. Instead, attitudes involve behavioral 
dispositions. Consider a sixteen-year-old girl, call her Abigail, who is grateful to her parents 
for all their love and care, including the sacrifices they make on her behalf. However, we 
might suppose that Abigail is in the middle of a heated argument with her parents about 
her curfew. Abigail wants her curfew moved back to 1:00 a.m. from the usual 11:00 p.m. 
“Nothing good happens after midnight. We don’t want anything to happen to you,” her 
parents say. From a parent’s perspective, the fact that they care enough to set reasonable 
action (behavioral) constraints qualifies as grounds for gratitude (or appreciation). 
Obviously, Abigail does not see it that way. Instead, she sees the curfew rules as 
unreasonable. It would seem that Abigail is still grateful toward her parents even though 
her occurrent feelings fail to match up with her attitude. This suggests that we should at 
least sometimes think of attitudes in dispositional terms, rather than simply as (mere) episodes.  
Sometimes circumstances arise such that an object’s dispositions are masked and 
sometimes dispositions fail to manifest in circumstances normally conducive to their 
manifestation. A good free throw is disposed to making free throws in normal 
circumstances, which would exclude shooting in gale force winds.171 Even the best free 
throw shooters miss an occasional free throw. The disposition to feel angry when insulted 
involves feeling anger in response to being insulted in normal circumstances. And even the 
angry sometimes surprise with a calm response to that which typically makes elicits anger. 
Chicken eggs are typically fragile; they are disposed to breaking in normal circumstances 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 John Greco (2006) says, for instance, that Derek Jeter’s reliability as a baseball hitter does not require good 
hitting on the moon. See John Greco, Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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when struck. However, place a sufficiently protective covering over an egg and it can 
withstand a drop from several feet off the ground when it normally would not. Understood 
as a disposition, rather than an actual manifestation, we could then characterize the 
behavioral component as necessary to attitudes without necessarily incurring the problems 
traditional tripartite models face. That one never has the “opportunity” to manifest her 
attitude in behavior may simply be a function of one’s circumstances. The plausibility of 
this response does not rely on the possibility of a “fractured” theory on which some 
attitudes come with behavioral components and others do not.  
However, this response seems to somewhat miss the force of the original objection 
to the tripartite model. For we could imagine one adopting an attitude toward some object 
without ever manifesting behavioral dispositions normally associated with the attitude, and 
not because one hasn’t the opportunity to manifest them. Consider a frightened citizen 
living under a totalitarian regime. This citizen strongly disagrees with the despot’s policies 
and resents his callousness toward the needy population. The citizen could, in some sense 
(though coerced), convey her resentment. To manifest her attitude toward the regime, 
though, would put the citizen’s life in danger. As a result, the citizen never behaves in a 
way that comports with her attitude. You might say, “Well, look, the citizen undoubtedly 
has other attitudes that entail certain behavioral dispositions that outweigh the citizen’s 
attitude toward the totalitarian regime.” Maybe, but nothing obviously rules out the 
conceptual possibility of a person never manifesting the types of behavior typically 
associated with certain attitudes. The citizen might, for instance, not be one to ever exhibit 
resentment. Would that mean the citizen did not resent (or have an attitude at all) toward 
the regime? Seems unlikely.        
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 Perhaps, as most contemporary social psychologists think, behavior is too often an 
unreliable indicator of our attitudes for the correct model to include a behavioral 
component. Respecting the dominant view, one might, technically speaking, reject the 
tripartite model by rejecting the behavioral component, while still acknowledging how 
much influence attitudes often have on our behavior toward the objects of our attitudes. 
According to this response, attitudes typically consist of cognitive and affective 
components—still understood dispositionally—that typically (or often) affect the behavior 
of the person to whom the attitude belongs. This response obviously takes the objection 
seriously, but in a way that does not completely sever the attitude-behavior connection, 
thus in a sense respecting tripartite intuitions. Attitudes, especially propositional attitudes, 
help us to make sense of (and explain) people’s behavior and actions, even if no attitude 
entails any set of behavioral dispositions. This final dual-component response is highly 
plausible and, in some form or other, enjoys support in the empirically-based social 
psychology literature.  
Sometimes, however, the way we feel in response to an attitude object fails to 
match our thoughts about the object. So, for example, one might think (or be disposed to 
think) of garden snakes as harmless creatures, but feel fear when confronted with one, 
perhaps even running. Such a person’s thoughts, on the one hand, and feelings and 
behavior, on the other, intuitively exhibit different attitudes. Perhaps one in this position 
has no clear attitude either way. The matter is much clearer, though, concerning the 
attitude-behavior relationship in that one might clearly take an attitude toward some object 
despite behaving as if one does not. 
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4.2.4 Attitude and Belief 
Some social psychologists and philosophers distinguish attitudes from beliefs. Attitudes are 
often understood as evaluations of an object that involve favorable or unfavorable 
reactions toward that object. One might, for example, like or dislike a person, or favor one 
presidential candidate over another, or favor some political policy over another. Charles 
Stevenson, in his work on ethical disagreement, writes: “The term “attitude”. . . designates 
psychological disposition of being for or against something. Hence love and hate are 
relatively specific attitudes, as are approval or disapproval, and so on.”172 According to 
many social psychologists, evaluations that constitute attitudes involve beliefs and feelings 
toward other persons (or events), and behavioral tendencies, though as I already noted, 
most social psychologists acknowledge the often tenuous attitude-behavior relationship. 
Attitudes are overall evaluations or assessments of objects. 
Beliefs, on the other hand, are opinions about objects (or events), not overall 
evaluations of favoring/disfavoring, liking/disliking, etc. of the object. The territory here is 
a bit tricky. Philosophers typically refer to beliefs as attitudes, particularly propositional 
attitudes. The objects of belief are propositions.173 Other propositional attitudes include 
desire, hope (in some sense), and fear, among others. Consider the proposition that 
candidate Y will win the upcoming presidential election. First, one might believe that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 See Charles L. Stevenson, Facts and Values. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). Quotes taken from 
a reprinted abridged version of an excerpt from Stevenson (1963): See “The Nature of Ethical 
Disagreement,” in Exploring Ethics, 3rd Edition, Steven Cahn (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 
71. 
173 The view that propositions constitute the objects of belief is by no means universally held. Some 
philosophers, for example, argue that objects of belief are states of affairs (Schellenberg 2005) or sets of 
possible worlds (Stalnaker 1987)—which assumes that propositions are not states of affairs or sets of possible 
worlds. See J. L. Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2005), and Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry. (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press, 1987). 
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candidate Y will win the election. One might also fear that candidate Y will win the 
election, desire that candidate Y not win the election, hope that candidate Y will win the 
election, and so on. Each of these attitudes involves standing in a particular relationship to 
a proposition: namely, that candidate Y will win the election. But none, taken individually at 
least, is obviously an evaluative attitude in the sense described above. A more 
encompassing view of attitudes must account not only for evaluations, but also for beliefs, 
desires, intentions, fear, hope, etc.  
 Propositional attitudes are attitudes only insofar as they meet the necessary 
conditions on attitudes. Indeed, there’s a long standing tradition in philosophy, according 
to which belief is an involuntary disposition (or set of dispositions) that, like attitudes in 
general, involves cognitive (thought) and affective (feeling) elements. Feelings have either 
positive and negative valences, which seem like evaluations. So, if beliefs involve feelings, 
then it seems they have an evaluative component. Moreover, belief seems to be a judgment 
about how things are or whether the world is thus-and-so. As Andrew Chignell claims, 
many philosophers think, “belief is an involuntary disposition formed in response to 
perceived evidence.”174 If that’s right, then belief tends to involve dispositions formed in 
response to evaluations or judgments of (alleged or perceived) truth-indicators.175 The type 
of evaluation involved would be different than most other attitudes. What disposition or 
dispositions are involved? Many mid-twentieth century philosophers referred to as 
“dispositionalists” or “behaviorists” identified belief with behavioral dispositions (e.g., the 
disposition to verbally assent to propositions). Fortunately, the behaviorist trend in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Andrew Chignell, “The Ethics of Belief,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 edition), 
Edward D. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/ethics-belief/>.  
175 This is not to say that people always or even mostly infer propositions about the world from their 
evidence or that they mostly carefully attend to their evidence. 
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philosophy, as in social psychology, has fallen by the wayside. If attitudes plausibly entail 
dispositions to think and dispositions to feel, and belief is an attitude, it follows that belief 
entails thought and affective dispositions. As with other attitudes, beliefs typically affect 
behavior, though beliefs (whatever their content) plausibly do not entail any particular 
behavioral disposition (or set of dispositions).  
Some philosophers, though, have analyzed belief in terms of one or the other 
disposition. L. Jonathan Cohen, for example, says, “belief that p is a disposition, when one 
is attending to issues raised, or items referred to, by the proposition that p, normally to feel 
it true that p and false that not-p, whether or not one is willing to act, speak, or reason 
accordingly.”176 This affect, the feeling of truth, is something like a feeling of confidence. 
To believe that p is to be disposed to feeling confidence in p when one attends to issues 
raised pertaining to p. William Alston, though he does not identify belief with dispositions 
to feel confidence, argues that such dispositions are necessary for belief: “If S believes that 
p, then if S considers whether it is the case that p, S will tend to feel it to be the case that p, 
with one or another degree of confidence.”177  
On the other hand, some philosophers, particularly J. L. Schellenberg (2005), 
contend that dispositions to think constitute the nature of belief, not dispositions to feel. To 
believe that p is to think (or be disposed to think) something about the world, that is, to 
represent the world (or be disposed to represent the world), in the way described by p. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 L. Jonathan Cohen, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 6. 
177 William P. Alston, “Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith,” in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, ed. Jeff 
Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 1996), p. 4; also, quoted in 
Schellenberg (2005), p. 51. Alston thinks feelings of confidence are necessary, though insufficient for belief. 
In the same work he defends the inclusion of a behavioral component against objections.  
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Hume was perhaps one of the first to recognize the intuition behind the two types 
of accounts just described. Hume defends a dual-component view of belief. He defines 
‘belief’ both as a “lively idea” and “feeling of mind.” An idea is basically a thought that 
represents the world in a particular way. The liveliness of an idea is really the feeling of 
mind that distinguishes commitment to the idea from the mere entertaining of the idea. 
Idea (or thought) alone cannot distinguish belief ideas from non-belief ideas (“fictions” or 
“loose revelries of fancy”).178 A certain feeling of mind must accompany the idea. This 
feeling, whatever it amounts to, distinguishes belief-thoughts (or ideas) that p from other 
thoughts such as entertaining p. The feeling is “annexed” to beliefs but not to fictions (or 
ideas we merely entertain).179 The annexed feelings have a certain “force, or vivacity, or solidity, 
or firmness, or steadiness,” which contemporary philosophers might identify with feelings of 
confidence.180 Contemporary philosophers don’t think of belief, as did Hume, in terms of 
mental episodes, but in terms of mental dispositions (cognitive and affective). Belief does not 
consist in occurrent feelings of confidence and occurrent thoughts. Instead, beliefs are 
dispositions to feel confidence and to represent the world in particular ways. Strengths of 
belief vary with strengths of confidence. As Cohen claims, “If your belief varies in strength, 
it varies with the intensity of your feeling that p when your disposition to feel that p is 
activated.”181  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Hume refers to non-belief ideas as “fictions” in his Treatise  and “loose revelries of fancy” in the Enquiries. 
By “fictions,” Hume simply means ideas we have that do not amount to belief. One could, so to speak, have 
ideas of Santa Clause even if one does not believe that Santa Clause exists. 
179 David Hume, Enquires Concerning Human Understanding. P.H. Nidditch (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975), p. 48. (originally published, 1777). 
180 Ibid., p. 68. 
181 Ibid., p. 6. 
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However, one could argue that feelings of confidence, though, obviously related to 
belief, are not constitutive of it. Against affective views J. L. Schellenberg (2005) 
distinguishes belief from “how [belief] feels from the inside.” 182  Confidence (or the 
disposition to feel confidence) matters only when we consider a belief’s “epistemic status,” 
not its nature.183 It’s unclear what Schellenberg means here. Some strongly held beliefs 
sometimes lack justification or epistemic support. In some sense, one’s confidence in 
propositions may determine whether one knows these propositions. But this is so only to 
the extent that confidence at least partially determines whether one believes the relevant 
propositions. That is, if knowledge requires sufficiently strong feelings of confidence (or 
dispositions to feel confidence), then this requirement must attach to the belief component 
of knowledge.  
Views that identify belief with dispositions to think are highly plausible. To say one 
believes that p despite rarely, if ever, apprehending reality the way p describes rings false, 
even downright contradictory. It violates the plausible intuition that beliefs have 
representational (propositional) content; beliefs represent the way we take reality to be. 
‘Believe’ and ‘think’, ‘belief’ and thought’, are often used interchangeably, and for good 
reason. Dispositions to think indicate what we believe because these dispositions partially 
constitute belief. I say “partially” because nothing obviously rules out manifestations of the 
disposition to think “p” being met subsequently with a lack of confidence in p. This 
suggests dispositions of thought may sometimes fail to track belief, and thus, are only prima 
facie indications (albeit strong) indications of belief without some further component. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 J. L. Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 41. 
183 Ibid., p. 52. 
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that case, we have reason to think the affective and cognitive dispositions compliment each 
other such that one without the other will not do. Without dispositions to feel confidence, 
thought cannot distinguish belief from non-belief. Dispositions to think of reality as 
represented by certain propositions is necessary, but insufficient for belief. The thought “p” 
counts as mental affirmation of p’s truth only to the extent that one is confident (or is 
disposed to feel confidence) in p. 
Nothing rules out dispositions to think “p” in relevant circumstances even when 
one intuitively does not believe p. Though uncommon, people are sometimes disposed to 
thinking in ways contrary to their beliefs. Transforming old habits of thinking can be 
difficult, especially when these habits have become so ingrained in one’s worldview and 
way of life. Consider the reforming racist who has “seen the light,” so to speak. The 
reformation process will likely involve moments of cognitive dissonance where old 
dispositions of thought undesirably manifest. The cognitive dissonance is resolved by 
determining what the reforming racist really believes. How would (or could) we determine 
what a person believes in such cases, if we knew enough about the person’s mental life? 
Maybe such a one has no belief; she’s psychologically and epistemically wavering to the 
extent that her mental state toward racist propositions is more like suspension than belief 
or disbelief. An equally plausible response says that we should look at the reforming racist’s 
affective dispositions. In what propositions is she disposed to having confidence—that is, 
the non-racist propositions or the racist propositions that “pop” into mind, which cause 
the dissonance? If the former, then, plausibly, the reforming racist really believes the non-
racist propositions. If the latter, then the reverse is plausibly the case.  
Furthermore, by about anyone’s lights, belief and doubt are inconsistent. Given 
enough doubt concerning p one does not believe p. Doubt is also inconsistent with 
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confidence. Doubting that p and dispositions to think “p” are not inconsistent, on the 
other hand. This suggests belief and doubt are inconsistent (or inversely proportional) 
because belief involves constitutive feelings of confidence, not because it involves thought. 
Dispositions to feel confidence therefore seem indispensible.  
 
4.2.5 Immediate Takeaways  
If something like the two-component model of attitudes is correct, then we have reason to 
think the attitude of interpersonal trust involves two components, too: namely, cognitive 
and affective components. The cognitive component would consist in what we think or 
believe about the object of trust, and the affective component in how we feel about the 
object of trust. More precisely, according to the two-component view of attitudes, these 
components are dispositions to think and feel certain ways about the trust object. This 
strongly suggests that both cognitive and affective (or non-cognitive) views are on to 
something. Note, however, that affective views not only offer positive proposals about the 
nature of interpersonal trust; they offer negative proposals insofar as they deny that belief 
is constitutive of this attitude, particularly trust beliefs. Thus, cognitive views of 
interpersonal trust have an initial leg up on affect views.  
The evidence, however, only offers prima facie (defeasible) support for cognitivism. 
Though it would be difficult to prove cognitivism, I must say more in defense of it. My 
defense, though, will primarily focus on the advantages and explanatory fruitfulness of 
cognitivism, particularly the brand that says interpersonal trust entails trust beliefs. These 
advantages include the fact that cognitivism can account for common intuitions about 
interpersonal trust: namely, (1) that the attitude is inconsistent with doubt and (2) that the 
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attitude is involuntary and (often) responsive to evidence that others are trustworthy. This 
is where I now turn in section 4.3.     
          
       4.3 Cognitivism as Holding Trust Beliefs 
One of the primary debates in the literature hinges on the question whether interpersonal 
trust involves belief (of whatever kind). Most scholars writing on issues of trust 
acknowledge that trust, particularly something of the sort I have termed interpersonal trust, 
bears some relationship to belief. Ben McMyler (2011), for instance, says “…trust appears a 
cognitive attitude similar to belief, an attitude that involves taking something to be true 
with the aim of getting it right.”184 As we’ll see, the idea that trust sometimes seems like an 
attitude with the aim at “getting it right” is one reason to think thick trust entails belief. 
McMyler also claims that trust, on the other hand, “…appears to involve a kind of 
interpersonal dependence on the person trusted in a way that belief does not.”185  
McMyler rightly notes that trust theorists must account for the competing 
intuitions. I have partly done so by distinguishing acts of trust from attitudes of trust. It 
should be apparent by now that I do not think all forms of trust necessarily involve 
belief—acts of trust in particular do not. Beliefs undoubtedly factor in as partial cause of 
the performance of some instances of such acts (trustful reliance). Yet, like any other type 
of act, beliefs do not constitute (the nature of) action; intuitively, the link between belief 
and action is merely causal or explanatory. In fact, sometimes we rely in trustful ways 
despite doubts about others’ trustworthiness or doubts that others will accomplish that for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Ben McMyler, Testimony, Trust, and Authority (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 114. 
185 Ibid., p. 114. 
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which we rely.186 Refraining from taking precautions in situations of willing dependence 
often produces doubt, fear, anxiety, and feelings of vulnerability each of which is plausibly 
inconsistent with interpersonal trust in some sense.187 As I’ll argue, cognitivism can explain 
this inconsistency.  
In this section I offer reasons to think that interpersonal trust entails belief, 
generally, and trust beliefs specifically. As Chapter 3 showed, predictive expectation is prima 
facie not enough to constitute interpersonal trust. Something more or something else 
completely is required. In the process of arguing for my view, I explain why (interpersonal) 
trustors need not predictively expect favorable return every time they trustfully rely on the 
people (interpersonally) trusted. I argue that one cannot trust in others unless one believes 
others are trustworthy. The primary difference between propositional trust and 
interpersonal trust consists in interpersonal trust’s entailing trust beliefs. Moreover, trust 
beliefs often explain why we trustfully rely on others and trust that they will pull through 
for us.   
 
4.3.1 Interpersonal Trust and Doubt 
The first reason to think interpersonal trust entails belief concerns its relation to doubt. 
Cognitive accounts can at least partially account for the phenomenology of thick trust—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Acts of trusts, understood as (voluntary) reliance on others without monitoring their performance, do not 
rule out acting from attitudes of trust, whether propositional or interpersonal attitudes. That is, the reason 
one trustfully relies on another may be that one believes the other trustworthy or expects positive results, 
even if the results aren’t certain. Acting as if S will x is consistent with belief that S will x and belief that S is 
trustworthy (hence, probably will x).  
187 Therapeutic trust may produce doubt, fear, etc. It involves one relying on another without monitoring 
performance, usually in order to allow the person being trusted (in the action sense) the opportunity to build 
up trustworthiness credentials. See H. J. N. Horsburgh, “The Ethics of Trust”, Philosophical Quarterly, 10 
(1960): 343-354. I will discuss therapeutic trust in more detail in Chapter 5.  
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roughly, how it feels from the inside. As I explained in the Chapter 1, we sometimes trust 
in the face of substantial doubt, while at other times, the presence of doubt, at least too 
much of it, intuitively rules out trust. The best explanation for this fact is the hypothesis 
that trust comes in more than one form. Otherwise, what I’ve just said about trust and 
doubt is a contradiction and the commonly held intuition it expresses is mistaken. Acts of 
trust (trust reliance) are certainly consistent with doubt.188 Attitudes of trust, including both 
interpersonal trust and propositional trust, on the other hand, are inconsistent with doubt. 
One plausible explanation for this inconsistency is that attitudes of trust entail belief. Belief 
that some proposition is the case is inconsistent with doubting that proposition. That 
interpersonal trust entails trust beliefs—i.e., beliefs that others are trustworthy—could 
explain why the attitude and doubt are inconsistent.  
What about belief in particular could account for the inconsistency? The most 
obvious candidate would be belief’s affective component, which consists in dispositions to 
feel confidence—to “feel” propositions true as Jonathan Cohen (1992) would say. To say 
that one doubts that p just is to say one lacks confidence that p. Conversely, to say one is 
confident that p (or manifests the disposition to feel confidence in p) implies that one has 
little or no doubt that p. Of course, some degree of doubt is consistent with belief, though 
actual believing requires us to have at least some level of confidence. Our strength of belief 
is proportional to our levels of confidence; and our levels of confidence vary in proportion 
to our doubt. This sounds a lot like attitudes of trust where our levels of trust intuitively 
vary in proportion to our doubt. Our doubt (or confidence) in what? Presumably either 
doubt that others will pull through for us when we rely on them to or doubts about their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Technically, it’s the proposition <one performed an act of trust despite doubts> that’s non-contradictory. 
	  103	  	  
trustworthiness. Given how I characterized propositional trust as predictive expectation, 
this is straightforwardly so.  
Doubting that others will (or would) accomplish what we want or need in a given 
instance, however, is consistent with the thick attitude of interpersonal trust. 189 
Interpersonal trust, after all, demands not that we think others are perfect in the relevant 
domain but, among other things, that they are reliable. This will become clearer below 
when I discuss in some detail the nature of trustworthiness and the content of trust beliefs. 
If I doubt that you will x when relying on you to x, I thereby fail to trust in a sense. I do 
not trust that you will (that is, expect you to) accomplish x for me. I might have some 
reason to doubt your ability to pull through on this occasion, even if I trust you in the thick 
interpersonal sense concerning matters relevant to x. Or I might have some reason to 
doubt your sincerity on this occasion—say, I trust you with respect to x-related matters but 
think you have some reason to make a false promise to x on this occasion. If I am disposed 
to doubting that you will make good on my reliance—for whatever reason—then I ipso facto 
doubt your trustworthiness. If I rarely if ever expect you to make good on my reliance in 
the domain of x, you would have good (though inconclusive) reason to believe I do not 
trust you.  
On the other hand, doubts about trustworthiness, which seem patently inconsistent 
with trusting persons, are consistent with propositional trust. I might doubt that you are 
trustworthy with respect to x but either believe you have practical reason to x, where your 
having this reason makes probable your x-ing, or that circumstances make your x-ing likely. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 The doubt I have in mind might be about actual reliance on others or about potential reliance. So, one 
might doubt not only that others will accomplish what they want or need—which suggests actual reliance—
but doubt that others would if one were to rely. 
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These considerations strongly suggest interpersonal trust is an attitude that entails believing 
others trustworthy. The content of propositional trust is about what others will do; the 
content of interpersonal trust is (partially) about others insofar as it’s about their 
trustworthiness, that is, (partially) about what they are disposed to doing in response to our 
reliance. 
Of course, non-cognitivists might argue that their view can explain the trust-doubt 
inconsistency. The problem with this proposal, though, is that the typical affective 
component of attitudes to which many social psychologists refer has more to do with how 
we feel about an attitude object. So, one’s attitude toward the president, for example, would 
involve one’s beliefs and feelings toward him, feelings of approval, disapproval, etc. Where 
would the trust-doubt inconsistency come in if trust’s affective component is something of 
the sort? This suggests, however strongly, that attitudes, including trust, entail belief and 
that the trust-doubt inconsistency is explained in terms of the belief component, which 
itself entails the affect of confidence. I understand the territory here is complicated. Maybe 
the attitude of interpersonal trust involves no such affect to which social psychologists 
often refer. Consider propositional trust. Propositional trust is an attitude that plausibly 
involves no other feeling than confidence. Think, for instance, about one’s predictive 
expectation that the Mets will win a baseball game this season; a safe bet indeed. One 
might be indifferent toward the Mets, so neither approve nor disapprove of the Mets (or 
the proposition that they will win a game). Yet one’s attitude plausibly involves some 
affect, namely, a feeling of confidence. If the same is true of interpersonal trust, then 
maybe a strong cognitivist view on which interpersonal trust reduces to trust beliefs, is 
true. After all, this belief as an attitude would entail both an affective (i.e., disposition to feel) 
and a cognitive (i.e., disposition to think) component. 
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Concerning the phenomenology of interpersonal trust (what he calls “the attitude 
of trust”), Faulkner writes: “It is part of the phenomenology of trust that the adoption of 
an attitude of trust involves a certain insensitivity to the possibility that one’s trust will [or 
would] be let down.”190 Trusting in someone neither requires modal ignorance, that is, the 
lack of knowledge of possible let down, nor the absence (or avoidance) of a possible letting 
down. With interpersonal trust, these possibilities aren’t typically salient, nor do they 
engender worry. In fact, the possibility of being let down does not typically cause trustors 
to worry (or doubt) largely because the possibilities are not salient. It seems implausible to 
say that we trust others when we are disposed to worrying and having doubts about their 
commitment, reliability, or motives concerning the relevant task type.  
Again, my purpose is not to refute non-cognitivism but to show that cognitivism 
can account for some plausible intuitions about trust. Let’s consider second and third 
reasons to think that interpersonal trust entails belief. They are closely related which is why 
I will consider them in tandem.  
 
4.3.2 Interpersonal Trust, Voluntariness, and Epistemic Reasons (Evidence) 
The next two reasons to think interpersonal trust entails belief are intimately connected: 
first, that interpersonal trust is not subject to direct voluntary control and, second, that the 
attitude is responsive to, and only to, epistemic reasons to believe that other’s are 
trustworthy.191  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Faulkner, Knowledge on Trust, p. 152. 
191 Pamela Hieronymi (2008) also argues that the reasons for which we trust others have to do with their 
trustworthiness. I approach the connection between interpersonal trust and epistemic reasons in a somewhat 
different way in that I focus more on the lack of voluntariness inherent in interpersonal trust. See Pamela 
Hieronymi, “The Reasons for Trust,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 2 (June 2008): pp. 213-236. 
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Let’s begin our discussion with the intuition about involuntariness. One 
desideratum of a comprehensive theory of trust is to explain why it seems that trust is 
sometimes voluntary and other times involuntary. The most plausible explanation for this 
fact, again, is the hypothesis that trust comes in multiple forms. This hypothesis has two 
advantages. First, it respects common usage of ‘trust’, which suggests the term refers to 
related but different phenomena. Second, the hypothesis offers a more plausible alternative 
to one that implies that one and the same thing (simply, trust) can be both voluntary and 
involuntary. The common intuition is instead that ‘trust’, whatever else it refers to, refers to 
something that is never under direct voluntary control.  
Acts of trust, as I describe them, are voluntary in the sense that we either choose to 
rely on others in trustful ways or not. Convincing others to trustfully rely (i.e., to perform 
an act of trust) may require nothing more than appealing to their interests, showing them 
why it would be beneficial for them to rely on one, perhaps even in the face of doubts as to 
whether one will do what one says. Trust reliance as an action is responsive to practical 
reasons. This illustrates the fact that exhortations to trust expressed in utterances such as, 
“Just trust me,” are most naturally understood as exhortations to act. We do not implore 
others to trust us in order to convince them to believe in our trustworthiness. Trying to 
persuade people this way betrays a serious misunderstanding of trust (and ‘trust’) Indeed, 
one might respond to an exhortation of the sort by asking, “What reason do I have to trust 
you?” An adequate counter-response would require offering reasons to believe one is 
worthy of trust, that is, epistemic reasons (or evidence) that indicate truth—where the 
relevant truth is that one is trustworthy and/or will do what others rely on them for.192 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 I use ‘epistemic reasons’ and ‘evidence’ interchangeably. Whether one’s evidence and only one’s evidence 
constitutes one’s epistemic reasons to believe propositions is a contentious issue. The debate does not matter 
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idea is that one cannot trust, in a sense, without some epistemic reason to. There’s only one 
sense of ‘trust’ germane to our purposes in which one can choose to trust for any reason 
whatsoever—practical, epistemic, etc.—and that’s the act of trust. Attitudes of trust, on the 
other hand, are not something we can drum up at will.   
In some circumstances, we have practical reasons to bring about interpersonal 
attitudes of trust toward others—for example, in marriages or friendships where neither 
party has epistemic reason to doubt the other’s trustworthiness. Fostering healthful 
marriages and friendships seems like a good practical reason to bring about this attitude. 
But interpersonal trust is not directly responsive to practical reasons, only epistemic 
reasons. These would be reasons to believe (not simply bring it about that one believes) that 
others are trustworthy. In other words, interpersonal trust is only directly responsive to 
reasons that indicate the truth about other people’s trustworthiness. Trustworthiness-
indicating epistemic reasons include evidence acquired through experience with others 
whom one trusts. Convincing others to trust in us requires persuading them of our 
trustworthiness, which we do by giving them (epistemic) reasons to believe that we are 
trustworthy, not just (practical) reasons to bring this belief about. Being moved to believe 
by epistemic reasons is an involuntary event (response); being moved when considering or 
evaluating evidence is not something we voluntarily do, but is something that “happens” to 
us.193  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for our purposes. It certainly matters in debates over the epistemic import of testimony for reasons I must 
ignore here.  
193 The considering or evaluating of evidence is typically voluntary. Perhaps the evaluation and the formation 
of belief sometimes occur simultaneously as with perceptual belief and the evidence of our senses.  
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 Invitations (or exhortations) to trust, though, typically involve no such persuading 
or attempt to move others by evidence, but rather involve invitations to do something 
voluntary. Concerning invitations to trust, Baier writes: 
“Trust me!” is for most of us an invitation which we cannot accept at will—either 
we do already trust the one who says it, in which it serves at best as reassurance, or 
it is properly responded to with, “Why should and how can I, until I have cause 
to?194 
 
Baier is referring to epistemic causes—i.e., epistemic reasons. The question posed in her 
quote could also read: “Why should and how can I [trust’], until I have epistemic reason 
to?” Either an invitation to trust is an invitation to perform an act of trust, which is a 
voluntary act or it is an invitation to do something we cannot do at will.  
 Now consider belief. One cannot believe directly in response to practical 
considerations, as Pascal noted in his famous Wager, even if doing so would benefit one. 
Practical considerations might offer practical reasons to act as if one believes that God 
exists in hopes that one might someday believe; but practical considerations are insufficient 
to generate belief that God exists. Only when one’s judgment (or evaluation) of the case 
for God’s existence (i.e., for the truth of <God exists>) changes—when one “sees” the 
evidence differently or acquires new evidence—will one come to believe that God exists.  
Trust in others often serves us well in that these attitudes often facilitate our on 
others in trustful ways when the opportunity arises; indeed, it disposes us to trustfully rely 
on others, even if this disposition is not part of the attitude itself. And we might even 
recognize this dispositional relationship and all the potential practical benefits of (trustfully) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” p. 244. Baier’s quote is rather puzzling, especially given what else she says 
about trust: namely, “Trust, on the analysis I have proposed, is letting other persons (natural or artificial, such 
as firms, nations, etc.) take care of something the truster cares about, where such “caring for” involves some 
exercise of discretionary powers” (1986, p. 240). After all, entrusting is something we voluntarily do; it can be 
withdrawn or withheld.  
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relying on others. Yet, only when we alter our evaluation of another’s trustworthiness (or 
the proposition <so-and-so is trustworthy>) can we, in normal circumstances, form thick 
attitudes of trust toward another, which typically make relying on others easier, mentally 
speaking, by reducing feelings of vulnerability that often come with such reliance.  
Evidence—or at least what we take to be evidence—explains why we believe in 
some people and not certain others; and it explains why we cease to trust. In fact, we 
typically trust (in the relevant sense) those whom we have most (epistemic) reason to trust. 
And plausibly, these reasons consist in evidence for the truth of propositions such as X is 
trustworthy. Responsiveness to epistemic reasons is built into the fabric of interpersonal 
trust.  
Convincing others to form attitudes of interpersonal trust toward us requires 
persuading them of our trustworthiness. The most obvious way to persuade others of this 
is to offer truth-indicative reasons (or evidence) that we are trustworthy. Of course, giving 
others such reasons so that they will rely on us renders any such subsequent act less than 
fully trustful. Asking for epistemic reasons before reliance is a textbook case of the type of 
monitoring inconsistent with acts of trust. Building robust trusting relationships where the 
attitude of interpersonal trust is central, though, typically involves getting to know others, 
or having at least some (epistemic) reason to form this attitude. That is, forming attitudes of 
interpersonal trust often requires confirming other’s trustworthiness by making ourselves 
vulnerable until, by and large, we no longer feel vulnerable in the care of others. Consider 
the question, “How can I trust you?”. People generally ask such questions when they 
encounter options to rely on strangers or others whom they do not know well. The answer 
people look for when asking this question should confirm (or disconfirm) that they can 
predictively expect a favorable outcome were they to rely and that the other will not betray. 
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Asking for confirmation, however, plausibly rules out this possible instance of reliance as 
one of trust. But when we obtain the information we seek, we may then have something to 
build from in the future so that we no longer need assurances.  
 What’s more, interpersonal trust is intuitively inconsistent with trusting for 
epistemic reasons the content of which conflicts with the conditions on trustworthiness.195 
That is, one normally cannot form and sustain interpersonal trust in circumstances when 
one believes that others are not trustworthy. Epistemic reasons that generate and 
underwrite propositional trust, on the other hand, may have nothing to do with the 
trustworthiness of others or, more strongly, may conflict with the conditions on 
trustworthiness. That one faces potential punishment if one fails to do what we want or 
need would, in normal circumstances, raise the probability that one will do what we want 
or need such that we have reason to believe one will.196 Yet to say one could interpersonally 
trust (adopt or form the attitude) in the face of, or worse, because of reasons that signal 
untrustworthiness is basically to say that one might judge another untrustworthy based on 
one’s evidence, but still interpersonally trust. This seems highly implausible, if not 
completely incoherent, even given our shortcomings as rational creatures. Imagine friend X 
saying to friend Y, “I trust you, but I do not believe you are trustworthy.” How would (or 
should) Y probably respond to X? What would (should) Y probably say to X? Y would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 This is not to say that intuitively non-propositional mental states (e.g., perceptual experiences) cannot 
serve as evidence in some sense for claims.  
196 As Peter Achinstein has noted, a fact F’s raising the probability of some proposition p does not entail that 
F is evidence for p (or an epistemic reason to believe p). According to Achinstein, “walking across the street 
increases the probability that I will be hit by a 1970 Cadillac; but the fact that I am walking across the street is 
not evidence that I will be hit by a 1970 Cadillac. See Peter Achinstein, “Concepts of Evidence,” in The 
Concept of Evidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 152. 
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probably feel hurt by X’s comments and would respond with serious skepticism: “What do 
you mean you trust me? I don’t think you understand the meaning of ‘trust’?”  
 Undoubtedly, the explanation for trust in others is often complicated. I’m not 
saying that we always or usually reason from evidence for the trustworthiness of others to 
interpersonal trust. In fact, these attitudes are often formed and strengthened after some 
time getting to know others; the point is that our getting to know others typically provides 
us evidence that either confirms or disconfirms other people’s trustworthiness. The 
explanation why we trust in others may differ somewhat for each of us and for each of our 
respective relationships. An interplay of emotional and non-emotive epistemic (doxastic or 
evidential) forces are typically at work in attitude formation process. The same is true for 
belief in general. Even so, as with belief, interpersonal trust arises in response to, and is 
sustained and strengthened by perceived reasons that indicate trustworthiness (i.e., 
evidence). We normally trust some people more than others because we have reason to 
believe they are trustworthy. It matters not whether intuitively non-epistemic, emotion 
factors partially explain our forming attitudes of interpersonal trust. The point remains: As 
with belief, practical reasons, including any other non-epistemic reasons, cannot generate 
attitudes of interpersonal trust.197   
I have argued that interpersonal trust plausibly entails trust beliefs because we 
typically trust those for whom we have most (epistemic) reason to trust. The formation and 
sustaining of interpersonal trust is, as I’ve claimed, impervious to practical considerations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Allowing for practical reasons for belief—more precisely, to call practical considerations for why it would 
be good for one to believe a proposition, a “reason”—is potentially problematic. On a related note, Pamela 
Hieronymi discusses the problems with identifying “a reason as a consideration that counts in favor of an action or 
attitude. See Pamela Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reasons,” Journal of Philosophy, vol.102, No. 9 (Sept. 
2005), p. 437. I will discuss the relationship between interpersonal trust and epistemic reasons in more detail 
in Chapter 5.  
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Only epistemic reasons to believe others are trustworthy can give rise to interpersonal 
trust. That is, we cannot interpersonally trust for practical reasons, only epistemic reasons. 
Interpersonal trust’s involuntariness can be explained by its not being responsive to 
practical reasons. And this lack of responsiveness to practical reasons can be explained in 
terms of interpersonal trust’s entailing belief. Couple these considerations with the fact that 
interpersonal trust is inconsistent with doubt other people’s trustworthiness and we have 
an attitude that “behaves” similarly to belief. Supposing interpersonal trust does in fact 
entail belief, the belief in question must be something other than the type of expectation 
belief expressed in trust-that statements. The most plausible candidate: trust beliefs, 
namely, beliefs the that others are trustworthy. I will make the case for this in the next 
section. A notable proponent of such a view is Hardin. I will discuss and critique his 
presentation of it in the following section. 
 
                             4.4 Trust Beliefs and Trustworthiness 
One’s theory of interpersonal trust should cohere with a plausible understanding of 
trustworthiness. To be trustworthy is, trivially, to be worthy of trust. Proper appreciation 
of trustworthiness demands an understanding of interpersonal trust (trust in), and vice 
versa, especially if to trust in others entails, or just is, a matter of holding beliefs about 
trustworthiness. I will not argue for a particular theory of trustworthiness but instead I will 
offer some plausible observations about trustworthiness.  
Trustworthiness as is implicated in my account of the attitude of interpersonal trust 
entails at least some degree of reliability. But to be trustworthy is to be more than merely 
reliable. It’s to be committed to the achievement of some good for the sake of some other. 
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But it is not clear that facts about what others are disposed to do in response to our trust 
reliance are enough, however, to determine whether or not someone is trustworthy. Even 
if we factor in how reliable and committed others are to pulling though for us there 
remains the question of why they are doing so. Without delving too deeply into the 
literature, let me say a few words about the importance of motive concerning matters of 
trustworthiness and trust. I will draw on the lessons learned from discussion of Russell 
Hardin’s view of trust, though it presupposes a philosophically suspect account of 
trustworthiness. It’s best that I discuss the competing types of accounts of trustworthiness 
partially in their relation to trust. This is particularly important in understanding Hardin’s 
views of each.  
 
4.4.1 Trust Beliefs, Trustworthiness, and Self-Interested Motives: Against Hardin 
Russell Hardin argues in multiple places for views of trust and trustworthiness he calls 
encapsulated interest views.198 Concerning trustworthiness, Hardin defends a view that makes 
trustworthiness a matter of the trustee’s interests encapsulating the trustor’s interests. On 
this account, y is trustworthy if and only if y’s interests encapsulate x’s, that is, just in case 
x’s relevant interests become part of y’s. Russell Hardin’s view of trustworthiness thus 
allows for self-interested motivations to serve as the bases for trustworthiness.199 So long as 
my interests encapsulate your interests, you may deem me trustworthy, regardless of my 
motivation in pulling through for you. Furthermore, Hardin contends that trustworthiness 
may be “compelled by the force of social norms,” in “close communities that mobilize 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 See, in particular, Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002). See 
also, Russell Hardin, Trust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006). 
199 See Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness. 
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commitment to their norms with sanctions such as shunning and exclusion.”200 It’s safe to 
say that it’s often in one’s interest not to be shunned or excluded from one’s community.  
The takeaway is that trustworthiness can be a matter of meeting one’s own interests 
so long as they encapsulate the interests of one’s (potential) interaction partner. Likewise, 
Bernard Williams thinks there’s a sense in which trustworthiness is consistent with purely 
self-interested motives. According to Williams, “A may trust B to do something because A 
knows that B expects punishment if he fails to do it. In this case B’s motives for co-
operating are crudely and immediately egoistic.”201 Though directly about trust, the quote 
implies that A might be trustworthy, in a sense, even if A acts on B’s behalf only because A 
wants to avoid punishment.   
Naturally, views of trust that presuppose trustworthiness inherit the problems just 
described; the problem occurs on the flip side of the relationship. Articulating the exact 
details of Hardin’s view of trust proves somewhat difficult, especially when taking Hardin’s 
totality of work into account. Some of Hardin’s comments seem downright puzzling. For 
instance, Hardin claims,  
…you trust someone if you have adequate reason to believe it will be in that 
person’s interest to be trustworthy in the relevant way at the relevant time. 
One’s trust turns not on one’s own interests but on the interest of the 
trusted.202  
 
Of course, having a reason to believe such is not the same as believing it.  
However, Hardin says elsewhere: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Ibid., p. 53. 
201 Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 88. 
202 Russell Hardin, “The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust,” in Politics and Society, Vol. 21 No. 4 (December 
1993), p. 505 
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To say I trust you in some way is nothing more than I know or believe certain 
things about you—generally things about your incentives or reasons for living up to 
my trust, to be trustworthy to me…The declarations ‘I believe you are trustworthy’ 
and ‘I trust you’ are equivalent.203 
 
From this, it seems the belief that others are trustworthy is necessary and sufficient for trust, 
not simply reasons to believe that others have certain interests to manifest trustworthiness. 
Otherwise, all trust beliefs are reasonable or justified—a patently false claim. The 
important thing to note is that Hardin thinks (1) trust consists solely in trust beliefs and (2) 
that trust (i.e., trust beliefs) turn on “the interest of the trusted.” In Hardin’s words: “I trust 
you because I think it is in your interest to attend to my interest in the relevant matter.”204 
Believing that others are trustworthy, then, would amount to believing that others’ interests 
encapsulate one’s own in some matter. One incentive for y to pull through for x in 
contexts of reliance (or dependence) would be to avoid damaging a mutually beneficial 
relationship. Karen Jones refers to views of the sort, including views of trust and 
trustworthiness, as “risk-assessment views.”205 On such views, attitudes of trust are the 
result of calculating probabilities of success/failure. To trust is basically to calculate that 
reliance on others would likely yield a favorable return.  
Hardin (2006) devotes some effort to arguing against those who identify trust with 
action.206 Although I disagree with Hardin in that I think trust comes in both act and 
attitude forms, I agree that the attitude of interpersonal trust is cognitive (or doxastic) in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, p. 10. 
204 Ibid., p. 4. 
205 Karen Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy, 96(2) (1999), p. 68. 
206 Hardin argues against theories that identify trust with action. According to Hardin (2006), “I may act from 
my trust, and my action may give good evidence of my trust, but my action itself is not the trust, although it 
may be compelling evidence of my trust. If I trust you, I trust you right now and not only in some moment in 
which I act on my trust by taking a risk on you” (2002, p. 10). 
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that it involves trust beliefs, though Hardin thinks trust is completely cognitive. Hardin’s 
view of trustworthiness, though, is problematic. This problem carries over to his view of 
trust, since to trust just is to believe others have met the requirements of trustworthiness.  
The problem with Hardin’s view is that it deems trustworthiness consistent with 
seemingly non-trustworthy motivations or reasons for acting, when trustworthiness is 
intuitively an other-regarding virtue or characteristic. A disposition to look after one’s self-
interest may easily run counter to a disposition to work on behalf of others because they 
depend on one to. The fact that the relationship between x and y benefits both needn’t 
motivate y to act on x’s behalf. And if x sees this, it seems odd to say x trusts y.  
To see the problem with such views of trust and trustworthiness, let’s consider 
what Nancy Nyquist Potter says about a possible sexist employer:  
I might predict that I will be “treated well,” by, say my employer not because of his 
good will—say he’s sexist—but because there are legal sanctions against him 
treating me badly. This does not seem like a case of my trusting him but rather on 
my counting on sanctions to constrain his otherwise unfair conduct. I don’t trust 
the sexist employer because I think it’s unlikely that he would take of something I 
value and take to be central to my being—my gender identity—in the absence of 
such sanctions.207  
 
Call the kind of case Potter refers to as SEXIST EMPLOYER. SEXIST EMPLOYER is 
supposed to elicit the intuition that trustworthiness requires more than mere reliable 
behavior. The employee, call her ‘Nancy’, can count on the employer’s behavior remaining 
consistent. The employer, however, seems clearly untrustworthy in the sense important to 
interpersonal trust. Of course, the employee, Nancy, can trust that the sexist employer will 
behave (in a sense), as Potter notes. But that does not mean Nancy trusts in the sexist 
employer; in fact, the reverse is true. This is so even if the employer has kept out of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Nancy Nyquist Potter, How Can I Be Trusted? A Virtue Theory of Trustworthiness (Lanham, Maryland: Roman 
& Littlefield, 2002), p. 5. 
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trouble, treating his female employees in accordance with morality and the law. His sexist 
dispositions, though, have simply been masked and would likely manifest under other 
circumstances, in conditions conducive to the manifestation of the disposition. There are 
other beliefs that he has, we might suppose, that dispose the employer to act in ways that 
counteract his sexist disposition—e.g., that he could be sued for sexual harassment.  
 One possible explanation for the employer’s mode of behavior in subsequent 
interaction with his employee’s would cite his trustworthiness. However, Nancy knows 
there’s a better explanation, given the information about the employer to which Nancy has 
access. Nancy knows the employer’s previous behavior didn’t come from trustworthy 
character or because his female employee’s were counting on him, and she knows the 
employer acted a certain way toward his female employees for the wrong reasons. From 
Nancy’s perspective, then, it would seem odd to say the employer is worthy of trust. Even 
though Nancy knows certain legal constraints were put in place to protect people like her, 
she wouldn’t feel right recommending others spend time with him outside the office; he 
can’t be trusted. The primary reason is that Nancy knows that legal constraints can only do 
so much to counteract his sexist dispositions. And she knows that the sexist employer is 
only acting out of self-interest, which in this instance happens to encapsulate his female 
employees’ interests. They have an interest in not being harassed and discriminated against 
in the workplace; he has an interest in not being sued. The end result: the sexist employer 
treats the female employees as he would if he respected them as persons, that is, arguably, 
as he would were he trustworthy.  
 Notice, though, that on Hardin’s account of trust and trustworthiness, the sexist 
employer would be deemed trustworthy. To trust the employer just is to believe that his 
interest encapsulate one’s own. Which of the female employees’ interests are at stake? In 
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other words, which of their interests are relevant in this context? Presumably, the female 
employees’ interests primarily involve fair and respectful treatment, and the employer’s 
interests involve staying in business, not being sued, etc.  
 However, Nancy’s belief that she will not be mistreated or harassed and that the 
sexist employer’s interests encapsulate her own is consistent with her not trusting the 
employer, as Potter suggests. This lack of trust, indeed, distrust, might manifest in her 
actions—e.g., she will not allow herself to be alone with the employer. The employer’s 
main interest is to keep his job, to not be sued, etc., an interest that encapsulates the female 
employees’ interests not to be harassed. That the employer’s interests encapsulate his 
employees’ interests is insufficient for trustworthiness. What’s more, intuitively, we trust 
others only when we believe their reasons encapsulate our own. The process that leads to 
(potential) behavior is relevant, not just the (potential) end result.208  
Interpersonal trust seems to involve expecting more of people when we trustfully 
rely on them, not just that they (typically) will pull through for us, especially not only 
because their interests encapsulate ours. What SEXIST EMPLOYER strongly suggests is 
that trusting in others involves an attitude toward others regarding their dispositions to live 
up to the normative expectations generated by our trustfully relying on them. And these 
expectations include proper reasons or motivations for acting on behalf of the trustor. 
Let’s now consider what that reason could be. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 This business about process and end result is key in debates between minimal state libertarians (e.g., 
Nozick) and new liberals (e.g., Rawls). 
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4.4.2 Trust Beliefs, Trustworthiness, and Other-Regarding Motives 
Trustworthiness in the sense most appropriate to interpersonal trust entails that the trustee 
acts on the trustor’s behalf on the basis of a certain particular motive, namely, that others 
depend on the trusted party to pull through for them. As Faulkner puts it: “…one might say that a 
trusted party S is trustworthy, in a circumstance defined by A’s trusting S to φ if and only if 
S sees A’s depending on his φ-ing as a reason to φ and is moved by φ for this reason.”209 
Karen Jones basically agrees when she says, “…one is not trustworthy unless one is willing 
to give significant weight to the fact that the other is counting on one, and so will not let 
this consideration be overruled by just any other concern one has.”210 More precisely, 
trustworthiness is a stable disposition or characteristic of persons, in part, to act for such 
other-regarding reasons. That others are counting on one is a necessary—and perhaps 
should be the sufficient—motive of trustworthy persons. Untrustworthy people 
occasionally act is if they are trustworthy, right reasons and all, which is why the disposition 
to act for the right reasons is vital to trustworthiness. Conversely, trustworthy people 
sometimes act in response to other people’s reliance for non-trustworthy reasons. As Jones 
claims, “Someone doesn’t show herself untrustworthy simply because there are occasions 
on which the thought that someone else is counting on her is not a consideration that she 
can let prevail.”211  
 An understanding of trustworthiness as involving other-regarding motive 
dispositions avoids the problems of views that say trustworthiness is consistent with, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Faulkner, Knowledge on Trust, p. 148. 
210 Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” p. 8. Of course, Jones’s claim is weaker than Faulkner’s. 
211 Ibid., p. 8. 
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just is, a matter of one’s (the trustee’s) interests encapsulating another’s (the trustor’s) 
interests. The sexist employer is not considered trustworthy on such accounts. Now what 
does all this say about interpersonal trust, assuming the attitude entails trust beliefs? 
Suppose what I’ve said immediately above is correct: trustworthy people are 
disposed to acting on behalf of others because others count on them to. If trustworthiness 
involves the disposition to act on behalf of others because they need us to, then if trust involves 
or just is a belief in the trustworthiness of others, the belief must appropriately reflect this 
feature of trustworthiness. To believe that others are trustworthy—that is, to hold trust 
beliefs about others—,then, is to believe that they are disposed to acting on one’s behalf 
for the right reasons, reasons constitutive of trustworthiness, reasons that plausibly have 
little or nothing to do with the trustee’s self-interest. So, trustworthiness requires (1) the 
propensity toward success in the relevant domains, (2) the disposition to commit to the 
tasks for which others rely in the relevant domains, and (3) the disposition to act on other’s 
behalf because they need one to.212 That others typically do what we want or need because 
we rely on them to indicates that others are trustworthy.  
Trustworthiness, as stable disposition, entails that even when it may pay in the 
short run to betray someone’s trust, trustworthy persons—despite occasional failure—
typically pull through for others for the reason that others need them to. By understanding 
trustworthiness this way we can account for plausible intuitions about SEXIST 
EMPLOYER, namely, that Nancy (the employee) does not trust the sexist employer but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 I do not qualify (3) with “in the relevant domains” because if one is disposed to acting for the wrong kind 
of reasons in one domain, this would plausibly carry over to other domains as well. However, it’s not 
inconceivable that one could compartmentalize parts of one’s life such that the characteristic of acting for the 
wrong reasons does not apply systematically to a person’s motivational structure.  
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merely trusts that he will behave predictably. Perhaps trustworthiness requires more but 
that need not concern us here.  
The sexist employer is not acting because Nancy needs him to. Trustworthiness, 
though, involves the disposition to pull through for others because they need one to. 
Nancy does not believe the sexist employer is trustworthy. For she does not believe the 
employer has a disposition to act on her behalf because she needs him to, but believes he is 
disposed instead to act merely out of self-interest.  
Propositional (thin) trust, considering it’s a form of trust, coheres well with an 
account of trustworthiness as mere reliability that allows for the trustee to do what others 
(the trustors) rely on her for because it’s in her interest. Predictively expecting that others 
will do what we want or need in no way presupposes taking others to be trustworthy in the 
thicker sense just described above, though trust in others often explains, if not justifies, 
trusting that they will pull through for us. Hardin’s account of trust and trustworthiness 
does not properly set interpersonal trust apart from propositional trust. His view really 
seems more like an account of propositional trust.  
Beliefs about trustworthiness set attitudes of interpersonal trust apart from 
propositional trust. Both involve, or maybe simply are, propositional attitudes of belief. 
Trust beliefs, unlike expectation beliefs, are about stable trustworthy dispositions belonging 
to people that entails their acting on other people’s behalf because others count on them 
to. These beliefs are distinctly about people, where mere expectations about other’s behavior 
in response to one’s reliance need not be grounded in beliefs about thick trustworthy 
dispositions, but perhaps instead in features of one’s circumstances (e.g., that others will be 
punished if they do not do what one needs them to do).  
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Holding trust beliefs does not require one ever think “So-and-so is trustworthy.” 
This requirement would be far too stringent, so much so that plausible and obvious cases 
of trust might fail to qualify. Rather, holding attitudes of interpersonal trust toward others 
involves representing them as fulfilling the demands of trustworthiness. By thinking of 
another person as, and having confidence that she is, disposed to feeling indignation for no 
good reason, one plausibly represents the other as a resentful person. One need never 
think “So-and-so is the resentful type,” though of course one might. Similarly for 
interpersonal trust. The point is that we may never actually think “so-and-so is 
trustworthy” yet still believe they are. One might, instead, be disposed to having thoughts, 
and feeling confident in propositions, that express trustworthiness-constitutive properties. 
In that case, one plausibly believes others are trustworthy. 
 
4.4.3 Strong Cognitivism: Why Not Simply Trust Beliefs? 
Thus far I have offered reasons to think interpersonal trust entails trust beliefs. I argued 
further that these beliefs must not only be about what others are disposed to doing, but 
why they are disposed to doing it—that is, their reasons for acting on our behalf when we 
(trustfully) rely. So, why not say that interpersonal trust just is a matter of beliefs about 
others’ trustworthiness? That is, why not strong cognitivism?  
 Trust beliefs are themselves attitudes, since beliefs in general are attitudes. This 
means that trust beliefs also involve whatever kind of components attitudes entail 
generally, including cognitive and affective components. These components include 
dispositions to think and to feel confidence with respect to some proposition. As I 
explained earlier, non-cognitivists tend to identify the key feature of interpersonal trust 
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with feelings such as confidence or security about other’s motives, competence, etc. Notice 
that trust beliefs, as I’ve described them, also involve such feelings, specifically, dispositions 
to feel confidence that others are competent and properly motivated to work on one’s 
behalf because one needs them to. Trust beliefs therefore entail the type of affect non-
cognitivists think is central to interpersonal trust.  
Moreover, since we have reason to think that attitudes in general entail both 
affective and cognitive components, considerations of simplicity would recommend 
identifying interpersonal trust with trust beliefs. The cognitive component, then, would 
amount to dispositions to think of others in trustworthy ways, and not a belief. For belief, 
as a propositional attitude, also entails a cognitive component. The cognitive component of 
belief cannot itself be a belief, but instead must be some sort of thought disposition.213 The 
affective and cognitive components taken together would constitute the trust belief 
identified with interpersonal trust. A strong cognitivist view of the sort respects both non-
cognitivist intuitions and empirical research in social psychology on attitudes.  
Non-cognitivists, however, often emphasize how the affect of trust involves a 
certain orientation toward the trusted party. This orientation involves putting a positive 
spin on evidence that the trusted party has been untrustworthy.214 I’ll discuss this alleged 
feature of interpersonal trust in Chapter 5. Let me say this much for now. If this way of 
seeing is merely voluntary or contrived such that one simply “chooses” to interpret 
evidence of untrustworthiness in a favorable light—where one merely acts as if others have 
been trustworthy—then it would seem that what non-cognitivists have identified as trust 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Social psychologists often do not distinguish belief from thought (or dispositions to think). 
214 See Jones (1996) and  Bernd Lahno “On the Emotional Character of Trust,” Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice (2001), 4: 171–189. 
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falls short of it.215 For we want others to believe we are trustworthy. These beliefs are formed 
involuntarily, often in response to evidence of trustworthiness. Furthermore, if the affect 
constitutive of interpersonal trust is primarily responsible for this orientation toward 
evidence of untrustworthiness, then the cognitivist can account for the non-cognitivist’s 
intuition once again.  
I now consider Linda Zagzebski’s (2012) cognitivist tripartite view of interpersonal 
trust. 
 
  4.5 Zagzebski’s Tripartite View  
Linda Zagzebski (2012) defends a tripartite view, according to which trust involves belief, 
affective, and behavioral components. According to Zagzebski, 
…the state of trust is a hybrid of epistemic, affective, and behavioral 
components. As a first approximation, I propose that when I trust x for 
purpose y, (1) I believe x will get me y, (2) I feel trusting toward x for that 
purpose, and (3) I treat x as if it will get me y.216  
 
Zagzebski’s view is a version of weak cognitivism. She seems to think the view is an 
account of what I’ve called interpersonal trust, especially given her discussion of trust in 
cases of testimony.217 Let’s consider (1) – (3) in turn to see if the view can adequately 
capture the attitude of interpersonal trust, with an eye especially on whether (1) – (3) can 
account for the propositional/interpersonal distinction.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 To use Jonathan Cohen’s (1992) term, this would amount to something like acceptance, not belief.  
216 Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p. 37 (original emphasis). 
217 See chapter 6 of Zagzebski (2012) where Zagzebski clearly sympathizes with interpersonal accounts of 
testimony on which the epistemic import of testimony is found in its interpersonal features. See also Moran 
(2006), Faulkner (2011) and McMyler (2011) for defenses of so-called assurance theories of testimony that 
emphasize the interpersonal in testimonial exchanges. Assurance theorists emphasize trusting speakers, not 
just trusting what they say. Faulkner (2011) seems to think a lot of this distinction, which is like the distinction 
I’ve made but with a narrower scope, namely, testimony.  
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 First, consider (1). Zagzebski is correct that attitudes of trust involve belief. The 
problem with (1) is that the belief in question appears to be a matter of predictive 
expectation. Believing that x will get me y seems to be another way of saying that I 
(predictively) expect x to get me y. But, as I argued in Chapter 3, prediction cannot capture 
the phenomenon of interpersonal trust. If interpersonal trust entails belief, the relevant 
belief must be about something else, a strong candidate being belief about the 
trustworthiness of others. Zagzebski (2012) does not discuss trustworthiness in detail nor 
does she mention trust beliefs in her account. Presumably, Zagzebski thinks no such 
beliefs are required for trust unless she thinks that by believing x will get me y I believe that 
x is trustworthy. However, merely believing that x will get me y does not seem to be a 
belief about trustworthiness. I could trust x for some purpose y without believing anything 
about x’s trustworthiness with respect to y. If Zagzebski’s belief component is simply a 
matter of (predictive) expectation, then her view faces similar problems as Hardin’s view in 
that it prima facie cannot properly account for the propositional/interpersonal distinction.   
Expecting (or believing) that x will get me y is insufficient for the attitude of 
interpersonal trust. After all, I might believe x will get me y because I know that x is under 
immense social pressure the absence of which might mean x would not get me y.  Surely, 
though, this would not count as interpersonal trust. Our epistemic reasons for expecting 
that others will (or would) get us what we rely on them for matter immensely. These 
reasons make a difference as to whether we hold the attitude of interpersonal trust. In fact, 
interpersonal trust seems like a good prima facie epistemic reason to believe that others will 
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get us what we rely on them for, particularly if the attitude consists in beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of others.218 Trust consists in no such beliefs on Zagzebski’s view.  
 Second, consider (2). According to Zagzebski, “Trust includes an emotional 
element, a feeling that cannot be identified any more precisely than “the feeling of trust.”219  
Prima facie, (2) is helpful because it respects the non-cognitivist’s (the affectivist’s) intuition 
that interpersonal trust entails an affective component. Notice, though, that the feeling 
component is separate from the belief component.  
The problem with Zagzebski’s proposal is that this affective component is 
mysterious and ad hoc. Zagzebski claims that this feeling “cannot be identified any more 
precisely than “the feeling of trust”.220 Without an account of this feeling it’s unclear 
whether Zagzebski’s view can distinguish interpersonal trust from propositional trust. As I 
argued, the belief component in her view can do no such distinguishing. However, as I 
claimed at the end of section 4.4, a view that identifies interpersonal trust with trust beliefs 
can account for non-cognitivist intuitions without having to posit a mysterious ad hoc 
feeling component. The trust-constitutive affect would simply be part of the trust belief. If 
the affective component is separate from the belief component as Zagzebski claims, this 
would mean that the attitude of trust for which she attempts to account would essentially 
involve two affective components. But there may be no need for an additional affective 
component when trust beliefs already entail the type of affect non-cognitivists typically 
think is central to interpersonal trust.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 An attitude of interpersonal trust also seems like something that would often lead us to feel trusting and 
treat others as if they will get us what we want or need.  
219 Ibid., p. 37. 
220 Ibid., p. 37. 
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However, if Zagzebski is right, and the affective component is distinct from the 
belief (or cognitive) component, then we have reason to think this “feeling of trust” cannot 
be reduced to feelings of confidence or security—affects we could account for with belief. 
In that case, strong cognitivism will not work. Trust beliefs, then, would be insufficient for 
interpersonal trust.221  
Zagzebski’s view arguably cannot accommodate the propositional/interpersonal 
distinction with or without a clear articulation of the affective component. Whatever the 
feeling of trust—whether it’s some form of confidence, optimism, or security—it seems 
that having this feeling, even when combined with the belief and behavioral components, is 
consistent with a lack of interpersonal trust. Consider the difficulty when, for the sake of 
discussion, we identify this feeling of trust with feelings of security. I could believe that you 
will return my favorite book, behave (or treat you) as if you will return it, and feel secure 
with the book in your care, yet still not trust you. Again, the reason why I believe and feel 
this way makes all the difference.222 I clearly trust that you will return the book. But I might 
believe you will return the book and feel secure about the situation because I’ve, for 
example, threatened not to return your favorite movie, if you lose my book. This belief, 
and my reasons for trusting that you will return the book, are consistent with my not 
trusting you. 
 Finally, consider (3). As I explained earlier, social psychologists have offered an 
array of empirical evidence to think that attitudes do not entail behavioral components. If 
you’ll recall, the problem with the tripartite model of attitudes is that behavior does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 I will return to this in Chapter 5 when I consider an objection to cognitivism on this front. 
222 My reasons for treating you as if you will return the book may be practical: e.g., I do not have the time to 
keep tabs on you or I do not want to insult you by constantly checking to see if you’ve lost the book.  
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always reflect or manifest the appropriate attitude. The attitude-behavior relation can, and 
does, come apart. For instance, the resentful person who hides her resentment still has the 
attitude of resentment.  
Similar considerations apply to Zagzebski’s tripartite view of trust. Treating others 
as if they will get us what we rely on them for is not necessary for having an attitude of 
trust, though trust attitudes (both propositional and interpersonal) often influence the way 
we behave toward the objects of these attitudes. So, even if the attitude of interpersonal 
trust does not entail treating others as if they will (or would) get us what we rely on them 
for, it very often leads us to treat the people we trust this way.  
 To conclude, Zagzebski’s view faces two problems. First, on her view, attitudes of 
trust entail a behavioral component. However, we have ample reason to reject this 
requirement. Second, it seems that her view makes the attitude of trust consistent with 
belief that others will act on our behalf for non-trustworthy reasons. In that case, even with 
the addition of the affective component (“the feeling of trust”), Zagzebski’s view faces 
similar problems as Hardin’s view.  
Before concluding this chapter let me say a few words about some possible 
consequences of a view of interpersonal trust that entails trust beliefs.  
 
  4.6 Consequences of Cognitivism 
If the thick attitude of interpersonal trust consists in (or requires) beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of others, then it is at least partially governed by the norms of epistemic 
rationality. As Karen Jones claims, “if a theorist analyzes trust as (perhaps among other 
things) a belief…then that theorist has committed herself to saying that trust is justified 
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only if the one who trusts is justified in forming the belief constitutive of trust.”223 We will 
consider an objection to cognitivism in Chapter 5 premised on the idea that trust is in some 
sense in tension with evidence.224  
Furthermore, if interpersonal trust (partially) consists in beliefs about 
trustworthiness, then interpersonal trust can be an epistemic reason for other beliefs. That 
is, interpersonal trust not only stands in the “space of reasons” in that it is responsive to, 
and often epistemically supported by epistemic reasons; it also gives us (epistemic) reason 
to believe things about what people will do and how they will respond to our trust 
reliance.225 Sometimes we believe that others will do what we want or need because we 
trust in them. More precisely, we believe others will pull through for us because we believe 
that they are trustworthy in the thick sense described earlier.  
But if interpersonal trust is or involves trust beliefs, it can potentially do more than 
explain why we expect that others will make good when we rely on them; as populates in the 
“space of reasons,” to use Wilfred Sellars (1956) phrase, these attitudes potentially justify 
such expectations.226 So, one could be justified in thinking that you will x because one 
believes you are competent to x (reliable on x-related matters) and are disposed to x-ing 
because, among other things, others need you to.227 If trust in you entails the belief that you 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” p. 4.  
224 I am intentionally stating the alleged tension in terms of trust (understood generally) and not the attitude 
of interpersonal trust for reasons that will become apparent in Chapter 5.  
225 Like any other belief that plays the role of epistemic reason for others, trust beliefs plausibly must be 
reasonable (or justified) themselves.  
226 See Wilfred Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, 
vol. 1, H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds.) (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), pp. 253-329. 
227 Perhaps acting with the knowledge that you are competent to x is also essential to your trustworthiness. 
Acting as if one is competent when one knows one is not—or even simply when one is not—seems to run 
afoul of plausible intuitions about trustworthiness.  
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are trustworthy, then interpersonal trust can ground belief (or predictions) that you will 
likely pull through for others when they rely on you to. Following Thomas Reid’s 
characterization of evidence we could conclude that interpersonal trust is evidential: “We 
give the name of evidence to whatever is the ground of belief” (IP II 20).228  
We not only typically trust in those we have most epistemic reason to trust—a 
datum about trust that cognitivism can easily explain; our trust in others can plausibly 
provide reasons to believe, for example, what others say (to believe them) and to believe 
that they will do what they set out to do in the relevant domain. Where others who simply 
trust that you will x must rely on inductive reasoning from evidence about your past 
performance and/or your current incentives to pull through, one who trust in you need do 
no (and probably wouldn’t do any) such thing. This evidence is often already in place 
upstream such that we typically expect favorable results from the people we trust 
automatically without reasoning from this evidence.  
 
         4.7 Conclusion  
In conclusion, I have given reasons to think interpersonal trust entails trust beliefs. This 
partial account can explain certain intuitions about trust: namely, that trust is sometimes 
inconsistent with doubt and sometimes involuntary. These sometimes features of trust 
further motivate the distinction between acts and attitudes of trust, the later being such that 
it’s always inconsistent with doubt and involuntary (at least partially). This applies to both 
propositional trust and interpersonal trust. Concerning interpersonal trust, though, it seems 
we typically trust in those we have most epistemic reason to trust. Moreover, the attitude’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers in Inquiry and Essays, Ronald E. Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer 
(eds.) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1983), originally published 1785. 
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involuntariness can be explained in terms of its only being responsive to epistemic reasons, 
however imperfectly. We cannot trust in others for non-epistemic, practical reasons. I also 
argued that Hardin’s encapsulated interest view of trust fails because it cannot account for 
the propositional/interpersonal distinction that I motivated in Chapter 3. As I argued, 
Zagzebski’s tripartite view appears to face similar problems.  
I now move to Chapter 5 where I will continue my defense of cognitivism against 
objections. Philosophers often reject cognitivism largely because of the objections I will 
discuss. Offering plausible replies against these objections will help bolster the case for 
cognitivism. Add these replies to what I’ve said in this chapter and cognitivism comes out 
looking like a viable view. 
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                          Chapter  5               
 
                  OBJECTIONS TO COGNITIVISM AND REPLIES 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I discuss some objections levied against cognitive accounts of interpersonal 
trust. The first objection attacks strong cognitivism, the view that interpersonal trust just is 
a matter of holding trust beliefs. Again, trust beliefs are beliefs that others are trustworthy. 
In 5.1, I present a counterexample to strong cognitivism based on a case from Karen Jones 
(2012), which deals specifically with constitutive features of self-trust. 229  Jones’s 
counterexample allegedly shows that believing oneself trustworthy is insufficient for self-
trust. I explain how her counterexample has implications for interpersonal trust. When 
modified, the counterexample challenges the idea that trust beliefs are sufficient for 
interpersonal trust. I offer two plausible responses on behalf of cognitivism.  
 In 5.2, I discuss the second objection, which challenges weak cognitivism, the view 
that interpersonal trust entails trust beliefs. The objection discussed here is based on two 
related and seemingly obvious considerations: (1) that belief is never subject to basic 
voluntary control, though trust sometimes is, and (2) that we sometimes, even often, trust 
others without believing they are trustworthy. I conclude that the objection trades on an 
equivocation. It conflates acts of trust with attitudes of trust. The objection based on the 
two considerations fails to appreciate that trust comes in many forms, including both as a 
type of voluntary act, or set of acts, and involuntary attitude(s).  
 In 5.3, I consider J. L. Schellenberg’s vulnerability objection to cognitivism. 
Schellenberg argues that trust tout court is an action disposition, not a belief, based on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Karen Jones, “The Politics of Self-Trust,” Social Epistemology 26 (2012), pp. 237-251. 
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idea that trust entails vulnerability. After briefly explaining Schellenberg’s action disposition 
view, I argue that cognitivism does not succumb to Schellenberg’s objection. After 
responding to the vulnerability objection, I will identify a problem with Schellenberg’s view 
of trust.  
Finally, in 5.4, I consider two objections to cognitivism based on evidential 
considerations. Due to the complexity of the issues, this section will mostly be exploratory 
in nature, though I do offer potential responses to both problems that are hospitable to 
cognitivism. 
 
              5.1 Problems for Strong Cognitivism     
Strong cognitivism is the view that trust beliefs are necessary and sufficient for trust. The 
view is especially vulnerable to counterexample because of its strength. The view fails, if 
either trust beliefs are unnecessary or insufficient for trust. A successful rejection of the 
sufficiency of trust beliefs requires demonstrating that trust beliefs, or belief of any kind, 
are not enough for trust. One way to accomplish this task is by way of counterexample, 
intuitively, one person X believes that another person Y is trustworthy without trusting Y. I 
offer such an example in this section. The counterexample’s effectiveness hangs on the 
possibility of belief/emotional incongruity, where typical emotional expressions of belief 
are absent. I first consider the possibility of this kind of incongruity before directly 
challenging the sufficiency of trust beliefs.  
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5.1.1 On the Possibility of Belief/Emotion Incongruity 
Several studies indicate that approximately 40 percent of Americans experience substantial 
anxiety at the thought of travel by plane. According to the National Institute of Mental 
Health, 6.5 percent of Americans, among those surveyed, experience fear intense enough 
to qualify as phobia. These people (i.e., aviophobes) fear flying so much they completely 
avoid it, opting for terrestrial travel instead. The remaining 33.5 percent—people whose 
fear and anxiety do not qualify as phobia—travel by air despite fears.230 There’s some 
tendency, particularly among non-philosophers, to clump aviophobes and the remaining 
33.5 percent together epistemically—to simply call members of both groups ‘irrational’. 
Such facile assessments of the normative facts fail to appreciate both the various forms of 
irrationality (e.g., practical and epistemic) and the multiple dimensions of epistemic 
evaluation. Some modes of epistemic failure are not necessarily failures of epistemic 
rationality, especially if epistemic rationality consists in relations of coherence or 
consistency among doxastic attitudes. Rather, some ways of failing epistemically fall along 
other dimensions of epistemic evaluation—e.g., epistemic justification or the ethics of 
belief.231 Yet aviophobes are far more frightened of air travel than travel by car.  
 The publically available inductive evidence suggests that driving a vehicle poses a 
greater threat to survival than travel by plane, particularly commercial planes. Far more 
people die every year in vehicle accidents.232 Aviophobes aren’t necessarily irrational in the 
sense that their attitudes conflict; rather, many fail, in some sense, to heed (properly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 See Tim Murphy, “For Fear of Flying, Therapy Takes to the Skies,” The New York Times (July 24, 2007). 
Other more conservative estimates place the percentage of aviophobes around 20 percent of Americans. 
231 For example, see Feldman and Conee (2004). 
232 See Sorcha Pollack’s Time (February 28, 2013) article, “2012 Was the Safest Year Ever to Travel by Plane.”  
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respond to) available evidence about the dangers that accompany driving relative to aerial 
transportation by commercial plane. One could make a case that many people who fear 
should know better—forgetting, of course, children, or people who know hardly anything 
about planes and certain others. I’ll say more below about people who fall in this category.  
 I’d imagine, however, that a portion of the first group actually believes that air 
travel is unsafe, or at least they don’t believe it’s safe. And I think it’s likely that for a 
substantial portion of these non-believers, though they don’t know better (since they don’t 
believe), they should. For these people—depending, of course, on specifics—the problem 
falls squarely within the domain of epistemic justification or the ethics of belief. For example, 
evidentialists might argue that, at least insofar as one has this publically available evidence, 
one’s attitude of non-belief is epistemically unjustified and believes (or disbelieves) as she 
epistemically ought not. Other non-evidentialist would likely rule the same way, given the 
counterevidence available to defeat the disbeliever’s attitude. 
 What about the aviophobes who purport to believe that flying is safe and/or that 
they will land safely? What should we say about them? One explanation is that their 
epistemic (doxastic) and emotional (affective) attitudes conflict. So, a problem surfaces 
specifically on the dimension(s) of (subjective) rationality.233 This is also the case for people 
of the second group, that is, those who, intuitively, believe that their flights will land safely, 
yet feel anxious nonetheless. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Undoubtedly, some epistemologists would take issue with the distinction being made between justification 
and rationality. For them, a belief is epistemically justified just in case it’s epistemically rational; ‘epistemic 
justification’ and ‘epistemic rationality’ are co-extensional. Evidentialists typically fall in this category. See 
Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). I 
think there are good reasons to distinguish epistemic justification and epistemic rationality. Epistemic 
externalists are often friendly to the idea of distinguishing these notions. For example, one might hold that a 
belief’s justification depends (roughly) on its being the product of a reliable process (which is an external 
matter) but think that whether a belief is epistemically rational depends on how it fits with one’s other 
doxastic attitudes (which is an internal matter).  
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 The fear and anxiety such people feel/experience is irrational because, as I 
conjecture, most believe they will land safely. What’s more, many of these people 
undoubtedly expect safe landings because they believe that traveling by plane is ultimately 
and relatively safe. Otherwise, it’s difficult to explain why such people would get on their 
respective planes. For, in some sense, these people certainly act as if they believe their 
planes will land safely, just as those in the first group who allegedly believe that that flying 
is relatively safe, in some sense, act as if they do not believe. Intuitively, the best 
explanation why most aviophobes fly despite their fear would appeal in part to the fact that 
most know (or are aware of the fact that) the vast majority of planes land safely without 
harm to passenger or plane; and, if given a sort of “gun to the head” test, most would 
conclude based on handy inductive evidence that their flights will land safely too. 
 In some way, the considered phenomenon is similar to akratic action—acting 
against what one knowingly ought to (due to weakness of will). I, for one, have difficulty 
resisting savory dishes, even though I know prudence would advise abstinence or 
moderation for the sake of health. With respect to the moral realm, the majority of 
adulterers cheat on their spouses, not because they believe it’s morally okay, but because it 
“feels right”. These people know better, though, as is the case for most people who engage 
in unscrupulous behavior. It seems likely that many aviophobes in the second group 
ultimately believe they would/will arrive safely at their destinations—probably because 
most believe that commercial airplanes are ultimately and relatively safe—but feel anxious 
nonetheless, even in the face of recognized good reason not to. Of course, the analogy 
with akratic action is imperfect, since, intuitively, it involves voluntary behavior and 
emotions are passive, involuntary responses to stimuli (or circumstances). But I think it’s 
suggestive nonetheless. The prevailing point is essentially that feelings of anxiety and 
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related affects and emotions do not necessarily rule out belief, just as doing some action X 
does not rule out believing that X is immoral or imprudent. The very possibility of akratic 
action demonstrates such. At minimum, nothing rules this possibility out conceptually. The 
presence of such feelings typically absent (e.g., anxiety), or the absence of feelings typically 
present (e.g., serenity), in the presence of belief only constitutes prima facie evidence of 
non-belief; it’s not conclusively indicative of non-belief, even if it plausibly rules out 
knowledge. 
 To deny the possibility of belief in one’s well being in the face of fear/anxiety 
introduces further practical irrationality. Assuming most fearful passengers desire to 
continue living and nothing hangs on missed flights, it seems practically irrational for them 
to board their planes without believing they would land safely, especially if avoiding travel 
is an option. That is, the practically rational person would avoid flying if she (1) desired to 
live, (2) did not believe that flying was relatively safe, and (3) travel wasn’t necessary. 
Charity demands not imputing the kind of obviously egregious practical irrationality that 
would ensue were (1) – (3) true, yet one flew anyway.  
 
5.1.2 The Counterexample and Response 
What does all this have to do with interpersonal trust? The possibility of belief-emotional 
incongruence suggests that belief (including trust beliefs) is insufficient for interpersonal 
trust. Karen Jones (2012) argues that cognitive features are insufficient for self-trust.234 
Believing oneself trustworthy without displaying certain feelings (or emotions) rules out 
self-trust on that occasion. Jones imagines a traveler who, like many of us, compulsively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 See Karen Jones, ‘The Politics of Intellectual Self-Trust’, Volume 26, Issue 2 (2012), pp. 237-251. 
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checks her luggage for her passport on the way to the airport, in the airport, on the plane, 
and just about anywhere else she could possibly lose it. The traveler, we might further 
suppose, is meticulous and thorough—a fact of which she is keenly aware. After checking 
numerous times, it seems that at some point, comes to believe she brought, and continues 
to possess, the passport, even if she initially believed she left it home, contrary to her 
normal mode of operation.235  
This example assumes the possibility of belief-emotional incongruity. It’s not as if 
the traveler neither believes she is trustworthy nor that the passport is safely in her 
possession. Instead, the traveler does not feel trusting toward herself.236 So, plausibly, the 
traveler does not trust herself.237 This example not only calls into question the sufficiency 
of trust beliefs for self-trust; it strongly suggests the necessity of trusting feelings toward 
one’s self. Again, non-cognitivists typically identify such feelings with optimism, 
confidence, or security.  
 Jones’s case also has implications for interpersonal trust: namely, that trust beliefs 
are insufficient for the attitude. The case is really a counterexample to cognitivism 
generally—both of the intrapersonal and interpersonal trust variety. If Jones is right, 
believing that others are trustworthy without certain feelings (or emotions) also implies a 
lack of interpersonal trust. We could imagine two travelers this time: traveler X and traveler 
Y. Traveler X and traveler Y assume certain responsibilities before the trip. One of traveler 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 This does not mean the traveler knows at any time that she brought the passport, especially if the 
possibility that she didn’t or that it somehow got lost since her last check is salient in the midst of her 
compulsive checking.  
236 Zagzebski (2012, p. 44) also discusses Jones’s case, but applies its lessons for some other purpose.   
237 Obviously, the traveler is not trusting herself in the action sense, given she constantly checks up on 
herself, so to speak. This does not seem to be Jones’s concern. 
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Y’s many responsibilities is to keep track of both X’s and Y’s passports in one carry-on 
bag. On departure day, traveler X constantly asks traveler Y if Y has the passports. A 
simple affirmative answer, though, is insufficient for traveler X. Traveler X demands 
traveler Y to check each time. This example is structurally similar to Jones’s single traveler 
who allegedly believes herself trustworthy. If it’s possible for the single traveler to believe 
herself trustworthy, though not trust herself, then it stands to reason that traveler X might 
believe that traveler Y is trustworthy (with respect to bag packing), but not trust traveler Y. 
If so, then trust beliefs are insufficient for interpersonal trust.238  
 Two plausible responses are available to the cognitivist. First, the cognitivist might 
concede that Jones’s counterexample applied to the case of interpersonal trust (i.e., the dual 
traveler case) shows that trust beliefs are insufficient for this attitude. Perhaps interpersonal 
trust is a complex of attitudes, belief being only one. In that case, strong cognitivism fails. 
This response leaves weak cognitivism in tact and it is consistent with my defense of 
cognitivism in Chapter 4.  
Second, the cognitivist could argue that both traveler cases are underdescribed and 
what intuition is supported depends on how their details are fleshed out. I’ll focus on the 
interpersonal case. On the one hand, if the interpersonal case represents one-off (or rare 
instances of) doubt and anxiety—maybe due to rare circumstances—then the cognitivist 
could say that traveler X interpersonally trusts traveler Y. Perhaps traveler X is disposed to 
feeling confident that traveler Y will fulfill Y’s travel responsibilities, but for some reason 
fails to manifest confidence on this occasion. Thick interpersonal attitudes of trust do not 
require believing that others are perfect, and so, occasional non-trusting feelings or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 As in the single traveler case, traveler X is not trusting traveler Y in the action sense. 
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thoughts are perfectly consistent with this attitude. The result would be that traveler X has 
trust in traveler Y, but apparently does not trust that traveler Y has fulfilled Y’s necessary 
travel responsibilities on this occasion. Maybe traveler X believes that, despite traveler Y’s 
trustworthiness (e.g., traveler Y is extremely thorough), even trustworthy people are subject 
to occasional failure and that this would be a terrible time for such an occasion.  
On the other hand, if the doubting and anxious traveler’s feelings (and behavior) 
represents a trend, then it seems highly implausible to say that traveler X interpersonally 
trusts—or trusts in any sense for that matter—traveler Y. Traveler X lacks the confidence 
(or security) necessary for belief that traveler Y is trustworthy. That is, X lacks that feeling 
non-cognitivists argue constitute interpersonal trust.  
To conclude, the objection just discussed challenges strong cognitivism—the view 
that interpersonal trust just is a matter of holding trust beliefs. The objection will not work 
against weak cognitivism, however. For weak cognitivism is merely the view that trust 
beliefs are necessary for interpersonal trust. I now move to an objection to weak 
cognitivism. 
 
        5.2 The Argument from Voluntariness    
In this section I discuss two considerations philosophers have noted to show that trust 
does not necessarily involve belief—i.e., that trust is non-cognitive. First, unlike belief-
formation, one can voluntarily decide to trust. 239  Some philosophers consider the 
voluntariness claim as reason enough to reject cognitivism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 See Richard Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1994). 
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Second, some have pointed to the fact that we obviously can, and regularly do, 
trust others without believing they are trustworthy, as reason to reject cognitivism. The two 
considerations, and the objections based on them, are isomorphic. Trust is voluntary to the 
extent that it does not involve belief; and trust involves belief only to the extent that it’s 
involuntary. A successful response to one objection should therefore work for the other.  
 One might respond to the two considerations above by denying that trust is ever 
voluntary or by arguing that trust always involves belief. This would be a mistake, which I 
hope will become apparent below. I show that the two considerations (whether taken 
individually or jointly), even if true, do not imply that no other form of trust ever involves 
belief that others are trustworthy (i.e., trust beliefs). I conclude that cognitivists may 
concede the voluntariness claim without problem. Cognitivism, both weak and strong 
forms, should be understood as accounts of trust attitudes, not exhaustive accounts of trust. 
I already argued for this point in Chapter 2, so I will not attempt to do so again here. 
Before presenting the argument against cognitivism based on considerations of 
voluntariness, it would be beneficial to consider doxastic involuntarism in a bit more detail 
than we did in Chapter 4.    
 
5.2.1 Belief and Involuntariness 
People cannot, as a contingent matter of psychological fact, believe propositions at will. As 
Alvin Plantinga puts it: “…whether or not I accept [a proposition] is not up to me.”240 
Following convention, call this position doxastic involuntarism. The idea is essentially that 
what we believe is beyond our basic (direct) voluntary control; at most, we only have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 38. 
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indirect voluntary influence.241 Actions under basic voluntary control are those things we 
“just do”. 242  In other words, performing basic voluntary actions does not require 
performing intermediary actions in the process. Simple body motions, such as raising one’s 
hand, count as actions over which we exercise this type of control; as a contingent matter 
of fact, belief-formation does not. Instead, as Alston (1988) argues, we exercise, if anything, 
only indirect involuntary influence over the process of belief-formation. As Richard 
Feldman says, “We have this type of influence when we undertake a course of action that 
may affect some condition over the long term.”243 For instance, one may exercise this kind 
of influence over one’s the health of one’s heart by exercising and eating a healthy diet. 
 Most epistemologists are doxastic involuntarists, despite major philosophical 
differences between them.244 On my understanding, proponents of doxastic involuntarism 
often argue for the view by pointing out that belief-formation is not directly responsive to 
practical considerations, for example, that it would be good for one to believe some 
proposition true. Practical considerations say nothing about the truth of propositions. That 
is, practical considerations do not indicate truth, but at best, offer reasons why it would be 
good or (practically) beneficial for one to believe some proposition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 See William Alston, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification”, Philosophical Perspectives, 2 
(1988): 257-299. Reprinted in William Alston, Epistemic Justification. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1989). The labels “basic voluntary control” and “indirect voluntary influence” are Alston’s. 
242 See Richard Feldman, “The Ethics of Belief,” Evidentialism. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), p. 169, 
originally published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000), pp. 667-695. 
243 Feldman, “The Ethics of Belief,” p. 170. 
244 Notable exceptions include Mattias Steup, “Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology,” Acta 
Analytica, 15 (2000), pp. 25-57, Sharon Ryan, “Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief,” Philosophical 
Studies, 114 (2003), pp. 47-79, and Carl Ginet, “Deciding to Believe,” in Knowledge, Truth and Duty, Mattias 
Steup (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 63-76. 
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 Epistemic reasons, on the other hand, are considerations that bear on the truth or 
falsity of a proposition. Evidence fulfills this epistemic reason-giving function, roughly, by 
acting as signs or indications of truth. That Innocent’s fingerprints were not found on the 
murder weapon, but someone else’s were, for example, is evidence that someone else 
committed the crime. This fact therefore offers an epistemic reason to believe that 
Innocent didn’t do it. That Innocent’s mother would feel awful if she were to believe that 
Innocent committed the crime is a practical reason for her to believe he is innocent; yet 
this psychological fact indicates nothing one way or the other but whether Innocent 
actually committed the crime.245  
 Consider some proposition you believe firmly, perhaps a belief grounded by 
excellent evidence. For example, I believe quite strongly that Alexander Hamilton was not 
an American President. I cannot believe at will that he was President even if offered a large 
sum of money.246 Being offered a substantial monetary reward counts as a practical reason 
for my believing (or bringing it about that I believe) that Hamilton was an American 
President. But this fact—that I’ve been offered money—does not tell in favor of the 
proposition’s truth. Therefore, being offered money does not give one epistemic reason to 
believe this proposition.  
 Practical reasons simply are not the sort of considerations that (can) directly issue 
in (i.e., cause) belief-formation. As Andrew Chignell says, “a belief is an involuntary 
disposition formed in response to perceived evidence [or epistemic reasons].”247 I should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 See Andrew Reisner, “Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief,” Philosophical Studies 138 (1) 
(2008), p. 17. 
246 See Matthew Chrisman, “Ought to Believe,” Journal Philosophy  105 (7) (2008), pp. 346-370. 
247 See Chignell’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, “The Ethics of Belief”. 
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note that the doxastic ineffectualness of practical reasons does not rule out wishful 
thinking’s psychological influence. Neither does it mean we always accurately identify the 
evidence for our beliefs and its rational import. Perceiving some consideration C as 
evidence for a proposition p does not entail veridicality of one’s perceiving. After all, C 
might not even evidentially support p, thus, not offer one epistemic reason to believe p.
 Practical considerations, insofar as they are epistemically relevant, motivate doing 
one’s best to bring about doxastic alteration. They indirectly affect belief systems by 
stimulating alterations in patterns of belief formation and informational input. Consider 
Pascal’s Wager, a series of arguments, which if heeded, would galvanize a course of action 
to bring it about that one believes that God exists. According to Blaise Pascal, one way or 
another, we must place a wager on the proposition <God exists>. Believing that God 
exists is the best bet because we stand to suffer immense loss if God exists and we fail to 
believe.248 The core of Pascal’s argument is meant to show that, even if the evidence for 
God’s existence is counterbalanced, there are prudential reasons to believe anyway. As with 
any other proposition, though, choosing to believe it is an impossible task. Pascal was fully 
aware of this fact, which is why charity demands interpreting his arguments as offering 
reasons for taking steps to bring it about that we believe.249 Taking such steps would likely 
demand drastic lifestyle changes, for example, hanging around theists, reading pro-theistic 
literature (while perhaps avoiding anti-theistic literature), asking God (if there be one) for 
help in believing, etc.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Sometimes Pascal’s Wager is put in terms of believing in God. However, I think we should distinguish 
believing that from believing in. To believe that God exists is to believe a proposition. To believe in God is to 
basically to trust God. In fact, it’s something like this distinction that’s ultimately behind the 
propositional/interpersonal trust distinction.  
249 Suppose God exists, but doesn’t care whether we believe. Some of us would still have perhaps excellent 
practical reasons to believe—e.g., fear of censure or expulsion from one’s community. 
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Success in this venture, however good the practical (or prudential) reasons, will 
require considerations that directly usher in a change of mind—considerations that 
convince one of the proposition’s truth. And practical reasons, by their nature, cannot do 
any such convincing. Actions are subject directly to the will; we can choose to act. Beliefs 
are not subject directly to the will; we cannot choose to believe. So, we have some reason 
to think doxastic involuntarism is true. 
 The primary case for doxastic involuntarism, then, rests on the idea that if beliefs 
were under basic voluntary control they would be directly subject to revision on the basis of 
practical considerations. But they obviously are not. We therefore lack basic voluntary 
control over our beliefs (and other doxastic states)—that is, believing propositions at will is 
practically impossible.  
 
5.2.2 Trust and Voluntariness: Counterexamples to Cognitivism? 
Let us assume for the moment that doxastic involuntarism is true. It follows, then, that to 
the extent that trust involves trust beliefs, trust must inherit the properties of belief. Holton 
argues, though, that this cannot be right: “…there are situations in which we can decide to 
trust.”250 That is, some instances of trust are under direct voluntary control. If this is true, 
doxastic involuntarism would seem to imply that, at least sometimes, trust does not 
necessarily involve belief. Therefore, cognitivism is false, so the argument goes.251 Call this 
“the argument from voluntariness.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” p. 63. 
251 Holton does not call the view he’s arguing against “cognitivism,” though it’s certainly his target.  
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To see the force of the argument, consider two obvious examples of voluntary 
trust, both of which fit Elster’s behavioral definition of ‘trust’ as instances of trustful 
action. If you’ll recall, Elster’s definition says: “to trust someone is to lower one’s guard, to 
refrain from taking precautions against an interaction partner, even when the other, because of 
opportunism, or incompetence, could act in a way that might seem to justify 
precautions.”252 Both examples also involve entrusting something of value to others, which 
I argued is necessary for trustful action. 
 First, consider the kind of trust some have called, therapeutic.253 As the name 
suggests, one therapeutically trusts for the purpose of therapy or reconciliation. More 
precisely, the purpose of extending trust in this sense is to induce trustworthiness with the 
aim of assimilating the trustee back into the community of trust. The idea is that when one 
trusts therapeutically, one gives others the opportunity to earn trust by creating situations 
conducive to confirming their worthiness of it. Consider an example similar to the 
previously discussed case, BOOKEEPER, and an analysis from Holton (1994): 
Suppose you run a small shop. And suppose that you discover the person you have 
recently employed has been convicted of petty theft. Should you trust him with the 
till?  It appears that you can really decide whether or not to do so. And again it 
appears that you can do so without believing that he is trustworthy. Perhaps you 
think trust is the best way to draw him back into the moral community; perhaps 
you think it is the way you ought to treat one of your employees. Of course your 
belief about the likelihood that he will steal will be one factor in your decision 
whether to trust. It might be that if you really believe he will steal, you will not be 
able to trust him. But you can trust him without believing that he will not.254 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Elster, Explaining Social Behavior, p. 344 (original emphasis). 
253 I borrow the term ‘therapeutic trust’ from H.J.N. Horsburgh (1960), “The Ethics of Trust.” Philosophical 
Quarterly 10: pp. 343-354. 
254 Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” pp. 63-64. 
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 I agree with Holton’s diagnosis of this example to an extent. Holton is correct both 
that you can decide whether or not to trust the felon and that trusting the felon does not 
require believing he is trustworthy. And since belief is an involuntary disposition, 
describing one’s trust as a choice makes sense only when belief does not comprise part of 
one’s trust. This is not to say that beliefs about trustworthiness must be absent. To the 
contrary; trust beliefs may be present without constituting, even in part, the type of trust at 
work in your decision. But therapeutic trust presupposes significant evidence of 
untrustworthiness, which explains both the need to extend therapeutic trust in the first 
place and the service it potentially provides. Therapeutic trustors trustfully rely, not because 
they believe others are trustworthy but, among other reasons, because they believe others 
aren’t. Consequently, therapeutic trust poses obvious (perceived) risk, particularly where 
stakes are high.  
 Second, consider the activity commonly referred to as a “trust fall”, an example of 
trust structurally similar to therapeutic trust. A trust fall is an activity where participants 
take turns falling off elevated platforms (approximately table height) into the arms of other 
participants. The primary purpose of trust fall is not so much, as with therapeutic trust, to 
induce trustworthiness as it is to offer participants an opportunity to confirm their 
trustworthiness for the purpose of building camaraderie. When engaged in such activities, it 
is questionable whether participants actually believe that their fellows, whom they might 
not have ever met before, are trustworthy. The point is that it seems highly likely that 
participants have, at best, suspended judgment about whether their fellow participants are 
up to the task. Yet, usually they fall anyway. 
 These examples strongly suggest that trust (of some form), unlike belief, is 
sometimes responsive to practical reasons. In the trust fall example, the fact that anyone 
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who did not participate (“party-poopers”) would be mocked by fellow students, or docked 
points from one’s grade, etc. gives one prima facie practical reason to participate—that is, to 
act as if one’s classmates will perform well, even if one does not believe they will or that 
the classmates are trustworthy. For Holton, this would involve adopting a voluntary 
attitude, namely, the participant stance, where we make ourselves ready to take reactive 
attitudes (i.e., resentment) if others fail us.  
In the shopkeeper example, the fact that the shopkeeper wants to give the 
convicted felon a second chance for the purpose of reintroducing the felon to the 
community of trust, gives the shopkeeper prima facie practical reason to act as if she believes 
the felon is trustworthy—for Holton, a reason to take a participant stance toward the 
felon. For when one person acts as if another is trustworthy or takes a participant stance, 
one basically takes it for granted (or accepts) that the other will do what one wants or 
needs. One needn’t believe that others are trustworthy to act as if they are so.255 
 Holton’s assumption that ‘trust’ picks out something voluntary is correct, but only 
because one sense of the term refers to voluntary acts of trust (i.e., trust reliance). Acts of 
trust are, after all, responsive to practical considerations. The above considerations merely 
highlight the fact of trust’s complex nature (and the ambiguity of ‘trust’), thus forcing us to 
recognize the fundamental difference briefly introduced in the introduction to this 
dissertation between acts and attitudes of trust. The examples employed in the previous 
section in defense of the involuntariness claim have at least one thing in common, namely, 
they are all paradigmatic acts of trust—acts where the trustor intuitively lacks certain 
features constitutive of trusting attitudes (e.g., belief or feelings). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 This does not mean, however, that trust as Holton understands it (as taking a participant stance) or as 
acting as if others are trustworthy (acts of trust) never comes with belief that others are trustworthy. 
	  149	  	  
 Not only can cognitivism withstand the argument from voluntariness by appeal to 
the act/attitude distinction, it can (at least partially) explain why attitudes of interpersonal 
trust are involuntary, as I argued in Chapter 4. If interpersonal trust entails (or just is) belief 
that others are trustworthy, then at least one component of the attitude is involuntary. We 
cannot simply believe that others are trustworthy at will or in response to practical 
reasons—e.g., that it would be good for one to adopt such an attitude toward others.  
 I should note that involuntariness considerations apply equally to even the most 
staunch of affective views. Granted, we probably have more control over our feelings and 
emotions than we do our doxastic states. But where our emotions aren’t what they should 
be, we must typically cultivate the right emotions, which often takes considerable time and 
effort. One doesn’t in any real sense choose to love one’s spouse. People do, however, 
choose to engage in steps that ultimately lead to love for their spouses or to “fall back in 
love” with them when the love is gone. In estranged relationships, it’s often difficult to 
bring back the love once shared. People cannot simply make themselves love or care about 
others, especially when others aren’t particularly loveable. As with belief, steps may be 
taken to cultivate (or bring about) emotions or, more precisely, the disposition to properly 
emote. For instance, many people battle issues with anger. One’s anger or disposition to 
lose one’s temper does not vanish overnight. It takes time and effort to respond calmly to 
situations that generally lead one to express anger.  
I now turn to J. L. Schellenberg’s (2005) objection to cognitivism. Schellenberg’s 
objection challenges the idea that trust is (in any sense) an attitude, much less one that 
entails belief.  
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    5.3 Trust as Action Disposition               
J. L. Schellenberg (2005) defends an account of trust as action disposition. According to 
Schellenberg, certain action disposition(s) wholly constitute trust; they are not simply one 
component among others. It will benefit our discussion if we take a more in-depth look at 
his view. After briefly explaining Schellenberg’s view, I offer reasons to reject it. I conclude 
that his argument against cognitivist views fails.  
 
5.3.1 Schellenberg’s View 
J. L. Schellenberg (2005) argues for an account that transcends the act/attitude distinction 
with which I opened the dissertation. Like Swinburne, Schellenberg’s discussion of trust 
focuses on what one means when “one professes trust in a personal God.”256 It might be 
tempting to think that “I am simply referring to a positive propositional attitude of mine, 
whether or belief or of faith, directed toward the very specific and—as we might say— 
personalized proposition that God’s goodness extends to me…”257 Schellenberg agrees 
with Swinburne (1) that trust is typically associated with some kind of positive cognitive 
attitude toward a proposition, (2) that trust entails vulnerability, and (3) that trust and 
action are intimately related. Let’s look at Schellenberg’s view to see how it differs from the 
other views discussed thus far. 
First, Schellenberg, unlike Swinburne, argues that trust is an action disposition, not 
the actual acting a certain way. In defense of his view over Swinburne’s act account, 
Schellenberg writes: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 J. L. Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 2005), p. 110. 
257 Ibid., p. 110 
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Strictly speaking, to trust someone is not to act in the relevant manner – the 
manner I have been mentioning – but to be disposed to do so. For I may speak the 
truth when I say of my partner that she trusts me even if she is at present engaged 
in activities that have nothing to do with me (or asleep), just as I may speak the 
truth when I attribute to her certain beliefs that are not now activated. What I mean 
in both cases is that she possesses a certain disposition, which is the sort of thing 
that may at any given time be either activated or unactivated.258 
  
What Schellenberg says makes sense. It seems true that in some sense trust persists even 
when we do nothing. Trust often lies dormant, ready for activation, pending circumstances 
conducive to activation. If so, we may have reason to reject Swinburne’s view and any 
other view that identifies trust with a type of act. Schellenberg seems to think that because 
his view identifies trust with action dispositions it can account for intuitions that motivate 
views that connect closely trust and action.  
Second, Schellenberg argues that trust is not a positive attitude toward propositions 
(e.g., beliefs). Such accounts, according to Schellenberg, unjustifiably divorce trust and 
action. To see the alleged problem consider what it would mean to trust one’s child with 
the family vehicle. Schellenberg contends that trusting one’s child with the vehicle requires 
more than taking a positive attitude toward him, for example, believing that he is 
trustworthy.259 Indeed, on his view, positive propositional attitudes do not even partially 
constitute trust: “To suppose that he will do what I need or want is only a beginning: it is 
just to suppose that he is trustworthy; it is not yet to trust.”260 Trusting one’s child with the 
family vehicle demands giving him the keys when the option presents itself and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Ibid., p. 114. Lawrence Becker identifies three different forms of trust, one of which is trust as reliance, 
namely, “a disposition to depend upon other people in some respect” (1996, p. 46).  
259 Technically speaking, trust is domain sensitive. Assuming the father trusts his son, this would means the 
father trusts the son to take care of the care. The relevant belief would be something like the belief that the 
son is a trustworthy driver.  
260 Ibid., p. 110 
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circumstances are conducive to manifesting the trusting disposition.261 If Schellenberg 
showed no disposition to hand his son the keys, his son would have “excellent reason” to 
doubt that Schellenberg trusts him.  
The first thing to notice about Schellenberg’s view is that, like Swinburne’s, it 
assumes a univocal view of trust at the expense of other intuitively plausible forms of trust, 
including acts of trust of which Swinburne offers an account. On my reading, Schellenberg 
offers a novel view of trust tout court to replace views that either say trust just is an action or 
an attitude that entails positive propositional attitudes such as belief. As claimed in the 
introduction to the dissertation, paradigm examples of trust (or statements about trust) 
support the view that trust comes in both act and attitude forms. What Schellenberg says 
about trust seemingly rules out these forms.  
So are there reasons for thinking that Schellenberg’s action disposition account is 
superior to attitude accounts, specifically cognitivism? In what follows, I will address this 
question. First, I describe one of Schellenberg’s primary arguments against attitude 
accounts of trust—call it the “vulnerability argument.” I conclude that cognitivism does 
not succumb to the vulnerability argument. Then I highlight the main problem for 
Schellenberg’s view.  
 
5.3.2 The Vulnerability Argument and Response to It 
Like most other theorists, Swinburne included, Schellenberg maintains that trust involves 
vulnerability: “If my interests were not at stake in trusting and if I could not be in at least 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Here is how Schellenberg puts it: “If, for example, I elect to place my trust in my son when he asks me for 
the keys to the care, I not only hold such an attitude [i.e., an attitude of acceptance]; I give him the keys to the 
car” (Ibid., p. 110).  
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some degree hurt by doing do so, there would be no point in using the language of trust at 
all.”262 This feature of trust, he thinks, supports his view over those that identify trust with 
an attitude. The vulnerability inherent in trust “tends to be expressed in action,” since in 
trusting we make ourselves vulnerable. The most plausible explanation for trust-generated 
vulnerability, according to Schellenberg, lies outside attitude-based accounts. If trust were 
merely a positive attitude toward a proposition (e.g., that others are trustworthy), and not 
the disposition to act on this attitude, the possibility of “bad consequences,” as he claims, 
would be eliminated.263 So, trust must entail an active disposition—the disposition to 
“count on” or “rely on” others. Otherwise, there’d be no vulnerability inherent in trust. 
Presumably the bad consequences Schellenberg has in mind include betrayal.  
 The most obvious way to exhibit vulnerability as it bears on trust is to perform an 
act of trust. Dispositions to act in such ways often presents potential harm to those who 
possess them, though as I argued in Chapter 2, this is not always the case. An obvious case 
is one where a patient trustfully relies on a doctor for care. Self-reliance would likely make 
one more vulnerable to harm, given the doctor is the expert.  
For now, though, let’s grant the dubious assumption that trust and vulnerability are 
inextricably linked. The vulnerability of trust insofar as it is, or entails, action dispositions, 
though, seems to hinge on the frequency of disposition triggering, which in turn depends 
on the frequency of circumstances conducive to disposition triggering. The real 
vulnerability comes in when we actually place ourselves or something we value in the care 
of another. Action dispositions increase the probability that we actually will depend on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Ibid., p. 110. Among those who link trust to vulnerability are Baier (1984), Swinburne (2005), and Elster 
(2007), among others. 
263 Ibid., p. 110. Schellenberg agrees with Swinburne (2005) that trust is linked with vulnerability and “bad 
consequences.” 
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others, hence make ourselves vulnerable to other people’s goodwill. Yet, action 
dispositions seem only indirectly connected with the vulnerability to which theorists point 
in the literature. Schellenberg’s point is duly noted. The dispositions intuitively inherent in 
trust expose us, or potentially expose us, to harm because they increase the likelihood that 
trustors will let their guard down and depend on others without monitoring performance. 
Letting down one’s guard creates circumstances where others might take advantage of one. 
Hence, the presence of trust-constitutive action dispositions increases the probability 
others taking advantage of one. It’s much more difficult to take advantage of others when 
they do not open the door to other’s ill will.  
The vulnerability argument presents a challenge to views that eliminate vulnerability 
from trust.264 The objection would not present a problem if the tripartite view of attitudes 
were true, since action (or behavioral) dispositions partially constitute attitudes on this 
view. According to the tripartite view of belief (and other attitudes), belief includes such 
dispositions, such as the disposition to let one’s guard down and depend on others. On the 
tripartite model of attitudes, interpersonal trust as cognitive would entail these same 
dispositions. Thus, cognitivism could withstand the argument from vulnerability for the 
same reasons that Schellenberg’s action disposition account does. Both respect the alleged 
connection between trust and vulnerability.265 
Things are a bit trickier for the proponent of the dual-component view of attitudes, 
which, if you recall, lacks a behavioral component. Again, assuming there really is a tight 
connection between vulnerability and trust, the dual-component theorist could not say that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Schellenberg’s presentation of the argument is somewhat more complicated than my explanation of it, 
though I believe I’ve accurately represented the core of his argument.  
265 I say “alleged” connection because, as I argued in Chapter 2, acts of trust do not necessarily entail 
vulnerability  or risk, at least not significant vulnerability or risk.   
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interpersonal trust increases vulnerability by virtue of behavioral dispositions. However, 
even if the attitude does not entail a behavioral component, it’s likely to have deep influence 
on trustors’ behavior. Intuitively, those who trust in this sense are more likely to “let their 
guards down,” to use Elster’s (2007) phrase, and trustfully rely on others, thus exposing 
themselves to the risk of betrayal. If so, then we still have a way to connect interpersonal 
trust with vulnerability. In the end, though, vulnerability (and felt vulnerability) might be 
more of a feature of trust reliance than a trustful attitude. Carving up the theoretical 
territory the way I do may halt the force of Schellenberg’s objection from the outset. 
Furthermore, as I argued in Chapter 2, even trust reliance does not necessarily involve 
vulnerability or feelings of vulnerability.  
I now discuss a problem for Schellenberg’s view. Schellenberg’s view, so I argue, is 
insufficient to account for anything we might plausibly consider trust. It fails to offer an 
additional form of trust, in addition to acts and attitudes of trust, for which to account.  
  
5.3.3 A Problem for Schellenberg’s View 
Consider again Schellenberg’s example of loaning the family car to his son. In one sense, 
Schellenberg trusts his son by handing over the keys, assuming, of course, other conditions 
are met, which we discussed in Chapter 2. This sense of ‘trust’ refers to a type of active 
reliance. On Schellenberg’s view, though, handing over the keys to his son manifests the 
action disposition that constitutes trust. On this view, Schellenberg trusts his son only if 
he’s disposed to letting his son use the car. However, it seems the son could accuse 
Schellenberg of a lack of trust despite his being so disposed.  
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Suppose Schellenberg does, in fact, frequently allow his son to use the car, and 
rarely denies the son’s request, despite feeling uncomfortable doing so. We might suppose 
that Schellenberg has moderate doubts about his son’s trustworthiness as a driver. Could 
the son properly accuse Schellenberg of distrust (or a lack of trust), if he were made aware 
of his father’s doubts? It seems he could. Imagine after discovering that Schellenberg has 
doubts, say, about the son’s trustworthiness, the son confronts Schellenberg and asks: 
“Why don’t you trust me?” to which Schellenberg responds, “I do trust you. I let you 
borrow the car every time you ask.” The son’s question seems reasonable. Schellenberg, the 
father, has seemed to miss the point of the question. Yet, if trust just is an action 
disposition, Schellenberg’s son’s question is confused. For having serious doubts about the 
trustworthiness of others is consistent with the disposition to rely on others in a way 
appropriate to the kind of action disposition Schellenberg identifies with trust, tout court. 
Moreover, Schellenberg (the father) could plausibly trust his son despite never loaning him 
the car, but only if the reasons why Schellenberg does not loan the car do not involve him 
believing that his son is untrustworthy. It could be that Schellenberg wants to teach his son 
patience or whatever. Action dispositions are neither necessary nor sufficient for acts or 
attitudes of trust. And it seems we have no reason to think that Schellenberg has identified 
some other form of trust.  
I now turn to the final set of challenges to cognitivism. My discussion in the next 
section will be exploratory and speculative due to the complexity of the issues to be 
discussed. 
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         5.4 Trust and Evidence     
In Chapter 4, I argued that interpersonal trust entails trust beliefs partially on the grounds 
that it is often responsive to, and plausibly justified by, epistemic reasons (or evidence). 
According to Karen Jones, “if a theorist analyzes trust as (perhaps among other things) a 
belief…then that theorist has committed herself to saying that trust is justified only if the 
one who trusts is justified in forming the belief constitutive of trust.”266  The belief 
constitutive of the thicker attitude of interpersonal trust, so I’ve claimed, is the belief that 
others are trustworthy.  
The problem with making interpersonal trust partly a matter of trust beliefs is that 
trust (in some sense) seems to be in tension with evidence in two ways. First, some 
philosophers argue that trust rules out reflecting on (or attending to) evidence of others’ 
trustworthiness when deciding what to do or what to believe (e.g., what to believe based on 
their testimony). Second, some philosophers have highlighted how unresponsive trust (or 
the trustor) often is to evidence indicating that the objects of trust (trustees) have acted in 
untrustworthy ways. Our trust often outruns or extends beyond the evidence, so to speak. 
The worry, according to Jones (1996) and others, is that if interpersonal trust is 
primarily, or even partially, a matter of belief, then it is often epistemically irrational (or 
unjustified) due to this apparent pair of tensions between the attitude and evidence.267 If 
trust, interpersonal trust or otherwise, is not a matter of belief, then the problems created 
by the apparent tensions are dissolved. The notion of “truth directed” epistemic rationality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” pp. 4-5. 
267 See also Judith Baker, “Trust and Rationality,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 68 (1987), pp. 1-13. 
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would not even apply to it, but rather some other form of “end-directed,” strategic 
rationality—e.g., practical or instrumental rationality.268  
A satisfactory response to these and related problems is crucial for the cognitivist. 
Some non-cognitivists start with the assumption that interpersonal trust, in some sense, is 
rational. But if interpersonal trust is primarily, or even partly, a matter of beliefs, then the 
rationality of trust must be epistemic; interpersonal trust (or trustors) must conform to the 
norms of epistemic rationality.269 If attitudes of interpersonal trust are inconsistent with 
reflecting on evidence of trustworthiness and/or resistant to evidence indicating 
untrustworthiness of those we trust, then as some philosophers suggest, cognitivists are left 
with two options: either say that interpersonal trust is not even partially a matter of belief 
or say that interpersonal trust is often (always?) epistemically irrational (or unjustified).  
Let’s consider the first apparent tension between trust (in some sense) and 
reflecting on evidence of trustworthiness. This tension depends on the sense of ‘trust’ 
under consideration. Reflecting on trustworthiness is not obviously inconsistent with coming 
to interpersonally trust others. Many relationships of trust are formed, and many trust 
beliefs are formed, partially in response to reflecting on evidence of others’ 
trustworthiness, as I claimed in Chapter 4. If that’s right, then it seems we ought not say 
that reflecting on evidence eliminates the possibility of interpersonal trust.  
Reflecting on evidence of trustworthiness seems to be more in tension with a very 
specific type of trust I have not discussed—one that’s difficult to adequately classify—
namely, epistemic trust. Epistemic trust of the interpersonal variety, understood quite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 See Baker (1987). 
269 The non-cognitivist’s strategy here is similar to a strategy (or starting point) epistemic externalists employ 
against epistemic internalism partly because they think internalism leads straight to skepticism. 
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generally, involves (roughly) trusting others for (hopefully) accurate information, typically 
in the context of testimonial exchange where, in standard cases, one person (the testifier) 
testifies to the truth of some proposition to another person (the hearer or recipient). When 
all goes well, the hearer presumably comes away with knowledge based to some extent on 
the speaker’s word. Epistemic trust involves (active) reliance on others, which is more or 
less trusting, depending on the level of monitoring involved. One way to monitor incoming 
reports, in a sense, is to reflect on the trustworthiness (or reliability) credentials of the 
testifier to determine whether to believe what the speaker says, then to draw a conclusion 
based on an inference from the outcome of one’s reflection. Doing this seems to reduce 
the level of trust one places in the speaker, even if one believes what the speaker says.270  
But epistemic trust seems to be something that is (often) based on the attitude of 
interpersonal trust rather than to be this attitude itself. We often trust speakers for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 See Hinchman (2005), Moran (2006), McMyler (2011), and Zagzebski (2012) for similar thoughts. Some 
philosophers maintain that by inferring a proposition, or inferring that a proposition p is likely true, from the 
fact that a speaker testified to p and the speaker is reliable or trustworthy amounts to treating the piece of 
testimony as evidence. And treating a piece of testimony as evidence is precisely not to trust a speaker. I’m not 
completely sure that treating someone’s testimony as evidence is tantamount to not trusting her. One might, 
after all, see a speaker’s testimony, and the testimony alone, as sufficient evidence to believe her. That one 
counts the speaker’s testimony as sufficient evidence in itself, and not another piece of evidence to be thrown 
in the lot of one’s other evidence for the reported claim, seems like a clear case of epistemic trust.  
On a related front, some philosophers in the literature on testimony have highlighted an apparent 
tension between trusting a speaker and possessing evidence that the speaker is reliable (or trustworthy). 
Edward Hinchman, for example, claims, “…when you have evidence of a speaker’s reliability you don’t need 
to trust her: you can treat her speech act as a mere assertion and believe what she says on the basis of 
evidence you have of its truth” (2005, p. 580). Hinchman goes on to say that by possessing evidence of 
speaker reliability “You can treat her as a truth-gauge” (Ibid, p. 580). Of course, you can treat a speaker as a 
truth-gauge when you have evidence of her reliability or trustworthiness. That does not mean you must do so. 
Notice that Hinchman’s initial statement rules out believing on (thick) trust. For evidence of 
trustworthiness entails evidence of reliability insofar as trustworthiness entails reliability, though 
trustworthiness is more than mere reliability. However, we often trust speakers, that is, we believe them 
without “checking up” or reconfirming what they say, because we believe in (i.e., thickly trust) them. And we 
believe in others because we have confirmed over the long haul that they are trustworthy. This evidence of 
reliability, though, is generally upstream such that it rarely factors into any inductive inference that would 
seemingly render a hearer’s (or recipient’s) treatment of testimony as evidence. That’s not to say evidence of a 
speaker’s reliability does not evidentially support a hearer’s belief based on the speaker’s testimony.  
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truth—in the sense of believing what they say without monitoring their reports and/or 
reflecting on, or checking into, their trustworthiness credentials—because we trust in them. 
And there’s nothing that obviously rules out interpersonal trust as the product of reflection 
on evidence of trustworthiness unless, perhaps, one constantly reassesses her attitude 
toward the objects of (alleged) trust. In that case, all things equal, it seems unlikely that 
one’s attitude toward others (the objects of her attitude) is trusting.  
Now consider the second apparent tension between trust and responsiveness to 
evidence of untrustworthiness. Paul Faulkner writes, “…trust need not satisfy either a 
positive or negative evidence condition: it need not be based on evidence and can 
demonstrate a wilfull insensitivity to evidence.” 271  Karen Jones notes that trust involves 
“…constitutive patterns of attention and tendencies of interpretation” concerning reasons 
(or evidence) for/against other people’s trustworthiness.272 Jones claims further that: 
Trust restricts the interpretations we will consider as possibly applying to the 
words and actions of another. When we can—and sometimes even if doing 
so requires ingenuity—we will give such words and actions a favorable 
interpretation as consistent with the goodwill of another. Trusting thus 
functions analogously to blinkered vision: it shields from view a whole range 
of interpretation about the motives of another and restricts the inferences we 
will make about the likely actions of another.273 
Trust influences the way we respond to counterevidence of trustworthiness and, indeed, 
very often whether we see the counterevidence at all, where “seeing” the counterevidence 
is to see the information constituting the alleged counterevidence as counterevidence. People 
who trust others (in the interpersonal sense) often spin evidence of untrustworthiness—
that is, counterevidence to trustworthiness—in a positive light.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Paul Faulkner, “On Telling and Trusting,” Mind  116 (464) (2007), p. 876 (emphasis added).  
272 Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” p. 4. 
273 Ibid., p. 12. 
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Bernd Lahno (2001) likens interpersonal trust to seeing the world through rose-
colored glasses. Lahno claims, “[Trust] determines what a trusting person will believe and 
how various outcomes are evaluated.”274 Trust influences belief-formation and evaluation 
of (alleged) evidence and circumstances by generating salience. How a trustor evaluates the 
epistemic import of evidence and, in some contexts, which evidence she notices depends 
on her orientation toward the person about whom the evidence allegedly charges with 
untrustworthiness. Lahno concludes that interpersonal trust is an emotional attitude, not a 
cognitive attitude, in part because it generates salience. 
The argument is premised on an influential account of emotion as salience 
generators.275 According to Ronald de Sousa, “Emotions provide a framework for our beliefs, 
bringing some into the spotlight and relegating others to the shade…Emotions are, in fact, 
patterns of attention.”276 On this view, emotions effectively “screen off” some information, 
rendering other information salient. Roughly, the idea is that trust, like emotion, involves 
certain patterns of attention, which is why Karen Jones refers to trust as “an affectively-
loaded way of seeing the trusted.”277 Trust affects the evidential connections trustors make 
and the evidence heeded in ways often contrary to the response of others not in the 
relationship of trust. Think of the parent who “refuses” to believe his child has committed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Bernd Lahno, “On the Emotional Character of Trust,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (4) 171-189, 2001, 
p. 171. 
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a crime of which she is accused or the husband who simply cannot believe that his spouse 
betrayed his trust and committed adultery.278  
The argument assumes that only emotion—or at least, emotions and not beliefs—
generate salience. Beliefs, particularly strong beliefs that rise to the level of conviction, 
affect what we “see” and how we respond to circumstances that challenge our beliefs. Like 
other beliefs, trust beliefs (that is, interpersonal trust) orient us to the world in particular 
ways. Consequently, the fact that trust can, as Faulkner claims, “demonstrate a wilfull 
insensitivity to evidence,” does not rule out the possibility that trust centrally involves 
belief. To say that it does suggests that beliefs do not generate salience, including salience 
of putative evidence, in much the same way that emotions do. We have good reason to 
think believers and beliefs, like trustors and trust, sometimes flaunt the norms of evidence 
and epistemic rationality. Beliefs, to use Faulkner’s phrase, “need not be based on evidence 
and can demonstrate a wilfull insensitivity to evidence.”279 In fact, social psychologists have 
noted people’s tendency toward “belief perseverance,” a resistance to change our views 
even in light of counterevidence. This includes a wide range of beliefs from the mundane 
to beliefs about religious and political matters about which people feel particularly strong.280 
If that’s right, then cognitivists can accept with equanimity the fact that trust beliefs impede 
our ability to “see” or to appreciate the force of certain kinds of evidence. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 In an important sense, the parent, we might assume, has more background evidence from which to draw 
concerning the trustworthiness of his child. This evidence may offer some reason, for the parent, to believe 
the evidence against his child is misleading. Furthermore, if trust really does generate salience, it may also 
partially determine what evidence one has. So, whether the information indicates as evidence for the parent may 
depend in part on the role of interpersonal trust in generating evidence (or epistemic reasons). The matter is 
complicated and is beyond the scope of the dissertation. I leave it aside.  
279 Faulkner, “On Telling and Trusting,” p. 876. 
280 See Craig A. Anderson, Mark L. Lepper, and Lee Ross, “Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of 
Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (1980), 
Vol. 39, No. 6, pp. 1037-1049. 
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However, the cognitivist must still explain how interpersonal trust could meet the 
standards of epistemic rationality (or justification) despite the fact the attitude often seems 
to outrun the evidence we have for others’ trustworthiness.281 It would be strange indeed if 
interpersonal trust centrally involves trust beliefs that are systematically unreasonable or 
unjustified. Though interpersonal trust might suffer this consequence on just about any 
plausible view of epistemic justification. The most obviously inhospitable view is probably 
an internalist version of evidentialism. Such a view holds (roughly) that beliefs are justified 
only to the extent that they fit one’s evidence.282 Seeing the potential problem on the 
evidentialist front, Jones (1996) writes: 
An account of trust that makes affect central has an unexpected payoff: it is 
able to view a wide range of our trustings—including many of those 
undertaken for instrumental reasons—as justified. Moreover, it is able to do 
this without taking a stance on evidentialism, or the doctrine that we should 
not believe anything without sufficient evidence. Since trust is not primarily a 
belief, it falls outside the scope of the evidentialist thesis.283  
 
Cognitivists have two plausible responses to Jones’s claims here. First, if as Jones 
argues, feelings of optimism (or confidence) are at the core of attitudes of trust, then 
trusting (in this sense) for instrumental reasons is ruled out in typical cases, since we 
plausibly cannot manifest such affective feelings at will. Hence, affective views do not have 
an advantage over cognitive views after all. Second, cognitivists could respond by denying 
evidentialism, though even many non-evidentialists recognize how central the notion of 
evidence is to epistemology, specifically to whether or not one believes with epistemic 
justification. Perhaps there are other ways of responding to the problem that involve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Even if evidence is unnecessary for epistemic justification it would still seem that trust beliefs would 
violate some plausible epistemic norms.  
282 Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), p. 83. 
283 Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” p. 5. 
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complex stories about what constitutes having evidence and the role of interpersonal trust 
in coming to have evidence. But this is a matter for another time. 
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              Chapter  6          
 
      CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Trust is both something we do and a set of attitudes we take toward others. Chapter 1 was 
largely devoted to motivating this intuition. In the remainder of the dissertation, I 
attempted to adequately capture this intuition in more detail by discussing the nature of 
acts and attitudes of trust.  
 In Chapter 2, I turned my attention to acts of trust (i.e., trust reliance). Acts of trust 
entail active reliance. But trust reliance is more than mere active reliance. I motivated this 
distinction by offering a case that intuitively involved active reliance without trust, namely, 
THE BUSS FOLLOWER. Furthermore, I claimed that acts of trust can be more or less 
trusting. In support of this claim, I compared two sets of cases. The first set involves 
minimal trust, namely, PARANOID PARENTS and GAMERS. The second set involves 
fully intuitively fully trusting action, namely, BOOKKEEPER and NAÏVE HEARER. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I considered four proposals for distinguishing trust from 
mere active reliance. I argued that none of the proposals succeeds. Then I argued that a 
non-monitoring, commitment condition can adequately distinguish trust from mere 
reliance, and it can explain what makes an act more or less trusting. This commitment 
condition can also explain why trust reliance often makes us vulnerable to the limits of 
others’ goodwill. 
 In Chapter 3, I motivated a distinction between two types of attitudes of trust: 
propositional and interpersonal attitudes of trust. Propositional trust (trust that), I argued, is 
something like predictive expectation. It’s a belief about what others will do in response to 
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our reliance on them. Interpersonal trust (trust in) is a much thicker notion. It is a matter of 
trusting a person.  
After making this distinction, I considered whether capturing the distinction was 
simply a matter of identifying propositional trust with predictive expectation, on the one 
hand, and identifying interpersonal trust with normative expectation, on the other. 
Normative expectations involve beliefs about what others ought to do, not beliefs about 
what others will do in response to one’s reliance. I rejected this proposal. Normative 
expectation, even in combination with predictive expectation, cannot capture the 
propositional/interpersonal distinction. We might predict that others will x, believe that 
they ought to x, but still not trust them in the interpersonal sense. I ended the chapter by 
explaining why interpersonal trust does not entail actual reliance. 
 In Chapter 4, I turned my attention to attitudes of interpersonal trust (trust in). 
There are two types of view about interpersonal trust: cognitivism and non-cognitivism (or 
affectivism). Cognitivists argue that trust entails belief. Some cognitivists take the relevant 
belief to be about what others will do (or are doing) in response to one’s reliance on them. 
But, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, there seems to be a difference between predicting that 
others will x (trusting that they will x) and trusting others to x (trusting in others)—even if 
others also ought to x. Other cognitivists contend that interpersonal trust entails trust 
beliefs (i.e., beliefs that others are trustworthy). Non-cognitivists contend that interpersonal 
trust does not entail belief at all. They argue instead that interpersonal trust is a non-
cognitive attitude such as an emotion or feeling of confidence, or (non-cognitive) sense of 
security.  
I argued that interpersonal trust entails trust beliefs. I argued for this claim by 
showing that it can explain why interpersonal trust is (1) inconsistent with doubt, 
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particularly doubt about others’ trustworthiness, and (2) an involuntary attitude that’s 
responsive to evidence (epistemic reasons) that others are trustworthy. Furthermore, 
cognitivism is supported by empirical research in social psychology on attitudes, which 
gives it a leg up, so to speak, on non-cognitivism. Cognitivism as entailing trust beliefs can 
also capture the non-cognitivist intuition that interpersonal trust entails feelings of 
confidence or security.  
I then considered two cognitivist views, particularly, Russell Hardin’s strong 
cognitivism and Linda Zagzebski’s weak cognitivism. I concluded that neither view could 
adequately account for the propositional/interpersonal distinction.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I defended cognitivism against objections. The first objection, 
offered by way of counterexample, challenges strong cognitivism, the idea that 
interpersonal trust just is a matter of holding trust beliefs. I contended that the objection 
leaves weak cognitivism in tact. Moreover, I explained that the strong cognitivism has the 
theoretical tools to reject the alleged import of the counterexample.  
The second objection to cognitivism is premised on the idea that (1) trust is 
sometimes voluntary and (2) we sometimes trust without believing that others are 
trustworthy. I argued that the success of the objection hinges on a failing to distinguish acts 
of trust from attitudes of trust.  
The third objection, the vulnerability argument, assumes that trust entails 
vulnerability. I argued that the objection fails. First, I already gave reasons in Chapter 2 to 
think that trust does not entail vulnerability, at least not significant vulnerability. Second, I 
claimed that attitudes of interpersonal trust often lead us to trustfully rely on others. If trust 
reliance does indeed entail some level of vulnerability, our holding attitudes of 
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interpersonal trust often increases the likelihood that we will make ourselves vulnerable. If 
that’s right, the vulnerability argument fails. 
The final set of objections have to do with a pair of apparent tensions between 
trust and evidence. The first apparent tension is between trust and reflecting on evidence 
of others’ trustworthiness. The second apparent tension is between interpersonal trust and 
the way trustors respond to evidence that trustees have been untrustworthy. I offered 
plausible responses to the objections based on these apparent tensions. My remarks were 
exploratory, however, given the complexity of the issues involved. More work must be 
done on this front to defend cognitivism completely. 
To conclude, cognitivism as I’ve defended it is a viable view of interpersonal trust. 
Cognitivism can account for certain intuitions about trust and can withstand objections. 
And it can do all this while accounting for certain intuitions of competing views.  
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